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PREFACE 
Why Engage in Nation-Building? An Overview 
The world we live in is interconnected and globalized. No nation or society can 
afford to advocate a domestic or foreign policy of isolationism from the rest of the world. 
Therefore, it is imperative that in the midst of the crises of failed states--the breeding 
grounds for terrorism, insecurity, wars, disease, and poverty--we must seek a collective 
and realistic agenda that promotes the (re)building of collapsed nations so that they can 
become healthy, civil, and eventually prosperous.  
In this effort, nation-building seeks to create a strong national identity that 
recognizes the diversity and historical narratives of its entire people. When a nation is 
divided on ethnic, religious, and racial lines, there is always an unhealthy lingering of 
tensions and lack cohesiveness for growth and development, as various groups become 
skeptical and resentful of each other. Additionally, nation-building requires local people 
to be available to take over most of the tasks of government. Therefore, the task of 
nation-building must be a wholistic one in embracing reforms that affect security, 
economic wellbeing, institutional development, and democracy. It must also include a 
commitment to transitional justice. This task demands us to be socio-ethical and theo-
political! 
In chapter one, I will address the problem of failed states as an emerging key 
global crisis and also a religious and moral challenge. A working definition of failed state 
 viii 
shall be developed, mainly articulated by Noam Chomsky.  He perceived failed states as 
the wanton abuse of power by leaders who also fail to protect their people. Later, we shall 
present a historical account of failed states as informed by Jared Diamond, Lester Brown, 
and others. Furthermore, we shall make the case for genuine nation-building as the 
needed response to this grave problem of failed systems of social integration. Because the 
problem of failed states has only become recognized and discussed in any sustained way 
in the last 30 years it is not surprising that the Christian Churches in general and Christian 
ethicists and theologians in particular have not given much sustained attention to, or 
reflection upon, these challenges. My contention is that the Churches and their 
theological communities must engage these problems because they are so grave and are 
the sources of massive amounts of raw human suffering. Where human suffering occurs 
the Churches’ attention should be fixated. 
In chapter two, I will examine the case against international failures to attend to 
the needs and suffering caused by failed state conditions and why such negligence has 
continued for so long. First, I begin by analyzing the historical impact of imperialism and 
colonialism from 1492-1960. I draw on John Henrik Clarke’s important account of the 
impact of the Trans-Atlantic Slave trade and how it shaped the world forever. Second, I 
attempt to locate the rise of the failed state problem historically by situating it in an 
examination of the general contours of the 20
th
 Century. Specifically, I examine in broad 
strokes the impact of World War I and II, the post-war efforts of Colonial liberation from 
the colonizing powers, and the Cold War that structured and reordered the International 
System by a superpower conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and 
their respective circle of allies, the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries 
 ix 
and the Warsaw Pact Countries of the Soviet dominated Eastern Europe. Moreover, I will 
also examine the significance of the end of the Cold War and how it left the United States 
as the world’s sole superpower but it also allowed a myriad of regional tensions to break 
out in armed conflicts. Where once the Cold War imposed a stable bi-polar regime of 
power relations on many regions in Latin America, the Balkans, Africa, and significant 
regions of Asia, the end of the Cold War uncapped this hegemonic stabilizing system and 
allowed a wide range of new ethnic and tribal energies to seek expression and 
institutionalization in new national formations. Tragically the end of the Cold War 
witnessed a host of emerging regional conflicts and horrific civil wars. Sadly the high 
hopes of a peaceful New World Order were dashed on the realities of emerging fracturing 
of nations into ethnicity and sometimes religiously driven conflicts that exhibited horrific 
carnage and generate immense raw human suffering.  
I examine also the powerful turning point of the 9/11 attacks on the United States 
by Al-Qaida, an Islamicist terrorist organization supported by Afghanis and Saudis. This 
attack highlighted how even the world’s remaining superpower is vulnerable to the 
tensions and hatreds born from distant failed state conditions. The Al-Qaida training 
camps were located in Afghanistan, a tragically poor country who has seen civil war 
sustained across the decades following the Soviet Invasion. The 9/11 attacks made clear 
how the international system has been integrated profoundly. A failed state is 
everybody’s business because in our historical condition failed states half way across the 
globe can harbor terrorist organizations with global reach. As 9/11 made clear, American 
national security requires an engagement to minimize failed state conditions for failed 
states can often serve as the breeding grounds for international terrorist threats. In chapter 
 x 
three, I examine Protestant perspectives on Christian ethics and use these to reflect on the 
contemporary problems of failed states. I make the case that there are core Christian 
theological and ethical resources that enable us to address state failures and promote 
nation-building. These key Christian ethical principles are love, justice, hope, and the 
promotion of the common good. In this chapter I draw significantly on the Methodist 
tradition and its emphasis on moral and socio-political actions. For example, the 
Wesleyan movement came to adopt the application of the quadrilateral—that is scripture, 
reason, tradition, and experience in dealing with fundamental moral issues. In the last 
section of this chapter I will focus on Reinhold Niebuhr, whose work significantly shapes 
this dissertation. His articulation of Christian realism addresses how we as Christians can 
deal with real world problems as a moral responsibility. 
In chapter four, I will analyze the Roman Catholic tradition on the articulation and 
application of the common good as a bridge ethics. Herein, a bridge ethics is a 
universally acceptable code of religious and moral teachings that unite everyone under a 
communion of understanding and appreciating the search for truth, justice and social 
action. We shall rely on the works of David Hollenbach, Michael Novak and a number of 
Papals’ encyclicals for insights into the development of Roman Catholic Social thinking 
on these issues. Finally, I will argue that there is an emerging consensus on the common 
good as advocated by both Protestants and Roman Catholics. As such, Christians are 
encouraged to accept the fact that our moral responsibility requires us being attentive and 
active in the pursuit of the common good of the individuals and society as a whole—
especially as it relates to the problem of failed states in need of rebuilding.  
 xi 
In chapter five, I will develop a wholistic nation-building toolkit that I assert is 
realistic and attainable. This toolkit that I refer to as SIDE (Security, Institutional 
Building, Democracy, and Economics) is the bedrock for the restoration and functioning 
of any nation and is a critical element in the practice of nation-building. I shall argue that 
ultimate goal is the search for social cohesion, embedded with SIDE. In addition, other 
factors like transitional justice, the delicate balance between reconstruction and 
development, and the international aids syndrome, and the role of narrative shall be 
emphasized within this toolkit. We shall also reemphasize the works of Christian thinkers 
such as Augustine, Aquinas, Wesley, Niebuhr, Tillich, Novak, Hollenbach, et al, who 
have been strong advocates for the Christian’s involvement in socio-political, economic, 
and cultural issues that affect our world. Though distinct in their own experiences, these 
Christian thinkers shared a common historical narrative based on the personal and 
universal themes of suffering, injustice, and depravation—in which they each seeks a 
world in dire need of love, hope, justice and the common good. 
It is in this very world of injustice, hopelessness, indifference, and alienation, that 
my own personal narrative (that I shall share in this conclusion) becomes interspersed 
with these great thinkers. We all seemed to be moved internally or externally, by 
powerful experiences that forced us out comfort zones, and ubiquitously requiring a full 
attention and engagement in this world especially redressing the unavoidable problems of 
failed states—the greatest challenge to the common good in our time.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Intractable civil and regional conflicts are creating the worst political, economic, 
and social disintegration around the globe, raising moral and ethical questions about the 
appropriate responses by the global community in general and the Christian community 
in particular. In view of these problems, we argue for the concept of genuine nation-
building as an effective framework and panacea for addressing these crises. Why have 
there been many failed attempts at nation-building and the obstructing cleavages?  
Christians cannot claim to be marginalized from the center of power and affluences with 
responsibilities in the political, social, cultural, and economic institutions of society.  
The basic method used in this dissertation is the application of historical 
narratives to understanding the phenomenon of failed states and assessing the strengths, 
weaknesses and ongoing relevance of Christianity and the International Community in 
the global public sphere of political, economic, and social policies and practices that have 
either created these failures or addressed them. In particular, we argue that Christianity 
provides distinctive perspectives on love, hope, justice and the common good as lenses 
for understanding self-interest through Christian realism as articulated by Reinhold 
Niebuhr. On this basis, it is in our interest and is a moral responsibility to champion the 
cause of nation-building, grounded in an ethical paradigm that also draws upon secular 
theories and practices. As a future research, we hope to observe the implications of this 
work on Christians who are cognizant and actively participating in nation-building as an 
ethical and theological task for the in breaking of God’s  Kingdom in the here and now. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
FAILED STATES: A GLOBAL CRISIS AND A RELIGIOUS 
AND MORAL CHALLENGE 
The Problem of Failed States 
 
 The proliferation of failed states today certainly is one of the most destructive 
forces threatening the global common good. It creates vast human suffering accounting 
for over 270 million civilian and military deaths during the past century.
1
 Without our 
active participation in reversing these global threats, we proceed down the path to more 
death and destruction and to, what some fear, is the eventual collapse of civilization and 
global stability.
2
 
Summary of Failed States and their Implications 
“Failed states” are what Noam Chomsky, in his book, Failed States: The Abuse of 
Power and the Assault on Democracy, describes as those “that do not protect their 
                                                 
1
 Rudy Rummel. Death by Government. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 1994. He is 
professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii, who has researched this phenomenon of 
the state and violence. He uses the term “democide” to describe “death by government.” This work 
transcends theoretical treatise and  is more a seminal work with an empirical account of the magnitude of 
government mass murders, mainly  in the political arena, committed in peacetime totaling 174 million 
victims of government violence, as compared with about 36 million as a result of government violence in 
time of war. Failed state is followed closely by the HIV/AIDs pandemic that have killed more than 34 
million more people than all of the combined civil wars fought in the last 40 years. This pandemic is 
directly or indirectly tied to failed states in their inabilities to deal with pressing social and economic issues 
facing their populations. 
 
             
2
 Lester Brown. Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization. Washington, DC: Earth Policy 
Institute, 2009. Brown seriously cautions the world leaders to proactively begin “mobilizing to save 
civilization" acknowledging the importance of such global action. Also see Brown’s book, World on the 
Edge: How to Prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2011.  
  
2 
citizens from violence and perhaps even destruction, that regard themselves as beyond 
the reach of domestic or international law, and that suffer from a ‘democratic deficit,’ 
having democratic forms but with limited substance.”3 Such state failure creates a false 
sense of stability but underneath is a massive reality of deep fear, hopelessness, and 
outbursts of lawlessness and violence once state power or authority is overwhelmed by 
competing armed groups engaged in armed struggle and power grabs. Since the dawn of 
civilization we have seen similar cases of such failure, leading to the decline of many 
once great empires and city-states.  
 The early history of the Fertile Crescent civilizations in the Middle East, ancient 
Egypt, empires in China, warring states in India, and the competing city-states of the 
Mayans in what is today Mexico and Guatemala all exhibited in their history powerful 
examples of massive state collapse into contesting sub-groups and factions. As seen 
through the lenses of history, those ancient regimes’ failures, some gradual and some 
rapid, led to destructive conflict, deep fear, disruption of commerce, and sustained 
warring tribes, regions, nations, and neighbors.
4
 
Brief Historical Examples of Failed States 
Indeed as Jared Diamond notes in his book, Collapse: How Societies choose to 
Fail or Succeed, the root of past destructions, such as the Mayan and other ancient 
civilization, lies often in the ecological problems initiated mainly by rising population 
growth that demands increased agricultural appropriation of the local ecosystems via 
                                                 
3
 Noam Chomsky. Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy. New York: 
Metropolitan book, 2006, 3. 
 
               
4
 See Jared Diamond for his helpful historical treatment of ancient failed states in his book 
Collapse: How Societies choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking Press, 2005, 23ff. 
  
3 
forest clearing and increased planting and in dryer settings an increase of the use of 
irrigation. Often such population pressures lead to unintended consequences like soil 
erosion, salt intrusion into soils because of irrigation, and ultimately overall agricultural 
collapse with increased societal tensions and political collapse.
5
 
Of significance is Diamond’s historical and comparative analysis of the island of 
Hispaniola—shared by the Dominican Republic and Haiti, two nations with similar 
historical narrative, resources and geography. 
However, their current conditions are markedly different. Haiti holds the distinct 
title as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, accounting for only one percent 
of forested land as compared to twenty eight percent in the Dominican Republic. Why the 
difference? These problems can be traced to the historical practices of Haitians in 
deforestation and mismanagement that were spurred by high population growth with 
limited resources—thereby creating immense pressure for the state’s impending collapse. 
Once the forests were cleared for agriculture and wood supplies for fuel, the soils were 
opened up to the full brunt of rain water action leading to massive soil erosion and a 
degradation of agricultural fertility. This ecological tragedy was sustained in great part 
                                                 
5
 Jared Diamond. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Viking Books. 
2005. In this fascinating work, the author seeks to understand the fates of past societies that collapsed due 
to ecological reasons, combining the most important political and policy debates of our world. Sadly, the 
developed world and its citizenry become oblivious to these imminent dangers due to conveniences around 
them. Thus Diamond compares past and present failure and successes in places like Greenland and Iceland, 
Rwanda, Australia, Montana, the ancient Mayans and modern China and the world.  
 
  
4 
through the historical conflict between colonial France and Western interferences in Haiti 
for a long period of time.
6
  
On the other hand the people and leaders of the Dominican Republic, in spite of 
their own socio-political tension, chose to establish laws governing agricultural and 
environmental policies and practices in anticipation of a sustainable future. The result has 
led to a more prosperous, healthy and stable Dominican Republic in contrast to its 
neighbor Haiti.
7
 In other contexts, security threats caused by invading armies and tribes 
created internal chaos and collapse that directly impacted the failure of particular empires 
or nation states as illustrated by Ambassador John Herbst
8
 of the US State Department 
who writes that:  
Over 2,000 years ago, the Chinese built the Great Wall to keep out 
intruders from the Eurasian steppes, and over 1,600 years ago, the Romans 
built a complex defensive system to demarcate and defend its borders in 
Germany and England. In the past, ungoverned spaces posed a problem 
only for immediate neighbors.
9
  
 
However, the current threat of failed states has far more global consequences that 
transcend a single national community. History has marched on and the international 
system of peoples and states and their economies are more integrated than ever.  As Paul 
Kennedy has argued, the last 50 years have seen a powerful global economic integration 
                                                 
              
6
 Yasmine Shamsie and Andrew S. Thompson. Haiti. Hope for a Fragile State. Waterloo, Ontario: 
Center for International Governance Innovation, 2006, 29-31. 
 
                7 Phillip Scher. Perspectives on the Caribbean: A Reader in Culture, History, and Representation. 
West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 247. 
 
8
 John Herbst. The Problem of Failed States: A New Instrument. Ambassador John E. Herbst is the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State. This article was written 
in The Prism, on August 13, 2010, filed under Security and Development, 
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1-1/3_Prism_21-26_Herbst.pdf (accessed 08.25.11). 
 
9
 Ibid., 1. 
  
5 
created by new advances in shipping, transportation and communication that allow for a 
vast increase in international trade and investment.
10
 Kennedy argues that increasingly 
the nations of the world have seen a diminishment of their ability to control their own 
destiny by themselves. Increasingly they are forced to face the reality of the demands of 
the global economy even as they are exposed to the globally wide shared threats posed by 
rising ecological concerns such as global climate change, habitat loss, deforestation, 
depleting aquifers, melting glaciers which have heretofore served as water reservoirs 
sustaining river flow during dry summer months, and species extinction.  
Nation-states today, Kennedy argues, seek to provide stability and security to 
their citizens, but they face this challenge of powerful forces beyond national 
governmental control. The global economic dynamics and the globally shared impacts of 
planetary wide climate change and other ecological dynamics mean that nation-states 
today are more integrated into a planetary community whether they wish it or not.
11
 This 
changed historical context means that the problem of failed states has a widening flow of 
regional and indeed global impacts.  
Today a failed state in one geographical location has a wide flow of negative 
impact on its entire region and indeed upon the global community. This problem and its 
complexities are regional, continental, and for that matter a global affair—often 
                                                 
 10 See Paul Kennedy. Preparing for the Twenty-First Century. New York: Vintage Book, 1994. 
Also See Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat, 3.0 A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century. New York: 
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2006. 
 
 
11
 Thomas L. Friedman. Hot, Flat, and Crowded, 2.0. Why We Need Green Revolution and How it 
Can Renew America. New York: Picador Book, 2009. Friedman argues for a concerted national strategy 
called “Geo-Greenism” needed to save the planet from disaster. The core argument is to save the planet 
from deforestation, pollution and overheating which is also is needed to make America a healthier, richer, 
more innovative, more productive, and more secure nation. 
  
6 
threatening global peace, security, trade, and governance. 
12
 Sadly, it took September 11, 
2001, as the wake-up call for the world’s most powerful nation—the United States of 
America, when men trained in the caves and mountains, in one of the remotest part of the 
world in Afghanistan, launched a terroristic attack on the greatest economic and military 
symbols of the Western World—the Twin Towers (World Trade Center) and the U.S. 
Department of Defense. More than three thousand innocent civilians were killed, a 
reminder to the West, the USA and all nations, that there was no longer a safe haven for 
anyone, or nation, in this globalized community of nations.  
Therefore, a new era in international relations has been redefined, negating the 
illusive and flirtatious Post Cold War,
13
 symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
                                                 
12
 See William French. “Natural Law and Ecological Responsibility: Drawing on the Thomistic 
Tradition.” University of St. Thomas Law Journal. St. Paul: Volume 5 No.1. Winter 2008, 13-15. Professor 
French argues that humanity’s action has far reaching consequences on the ecological state of the world 
and its effect on global security. He distinguishes the two distinct post-modernist views –the social 
constructionists and the postmodern deconstructionists. 
 
13
 In my argument  of the post Cold War in which I concluded, “Therefore, a new era in 
international relations has been redefined, negating the illusive and flirtatious Post Cold War era”, I assert 
that the West was either oblivious to reality or delusional to have preempted or concluded that the end of 
the Cold War meant declaring victory over communism, thereby relieving the United States and the West 
from its responsibility in truly helping those nations it supported or undermined for many decades as its so-
called Cold War allies/adversaries—through the process of democracy. As documented, the decade of the 
90s imploded into hot wars in Africa—namely in the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Angola and Sudan’s protracted wars, Somalia, and the D.R. Congo. What did the West or 
international community do? Watched and reluctantly responded but quickly pulled out. It took a decade 
for the West and international community on 9/11 to realize that the so-called distant wars perceived as 
tribal or low level civil wars were in fact the continuation of wars of aggressions that had the same effect or 
more global effect on war peace, economics, politics and environment. Nevertheless, to blame the West and 
the international community alone as the only culprit for the creation of failed state would be an injustice 
based on bias and uncritical analysis of the facts. Therefore, I further insist that dictatorial regimes in these 
failed states were also directly responsible for the implosions of their nations—Liberia’s Samuel Doe and 
Charles Taylor failure to adhere to the rule of law, The DRC’s Mobutu Sese Seko Nkuku Ngbendu wa Za 
Banga’s authoritarian and bloody regimes, Haiti’s Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier corrupt and ruthless 
regimes, and other dictators chose paths of nepotism, mismanagement, suppression, and destruction to ruin 
the lives and progress of their people and nations. Interestingly, a debate has ensued between the so-called 
“externalists” and “internalists” who either blame outside intervention or local actors as the root of the 
problems of failed states. For example, in August 2000 at a conference in St. Paul MN, where I was 
privileged to attend (African Nation-Building Conference), one of the keynote speakers, Dr. George 
  
7 
1989, when President George H. W. Bush declared a “New World Order”14 which 
parallels Professor Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history,” where the latter makes the case 
that the end of the Cold war signaled the spread of western democracy and the terminal 
point in humanity’s socio-political advancement or evolution in the affairs of global 
governance.
15
  
However, Fukuyama later answered his critics by tracing the term “end of 
history” to Hegel and Marx. In this argument, Fukuyama posits that Hegel understood 
human history as a coherent, gradual evolutionary process—where human reason would 
accept the concept of freedom in the world. But Marx on the other hand, was more 
focused on economic theory, based on the means of production—historically originating 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ayittey of Ghana and American University, proffered that the internalists argue that for uncritically long 
time, African elites and leaders, for their own benefits and scapegoating, which demonstrated their 
weaknesses, had blamed the continent’s problems on external factors alone without looking at the internal 
factors that have also contributed to the continent’s problems. It was this event that launched my curiosity 
and to seriously consider a future project on nation-building as a research endeavor. 
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 “The New World Order” as declared by George H.W. Bush was in reference to the end of the 
Cold war in 1989 and the first Gulf war, where, on September 11, 1990, President George Bush speaking to 
U.S. Congress, Joint Session, in a speech entitled, Towards A New World Order,” remarked: “The crisis in 
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nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice and strong respect the rights of the 
weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from 
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from the evolution of societies from “pre-human to hunter-gatherer to agricultural to 
industrial ones.” Clearly, the “end of history” was a theory of modernization that raised 
the question of where that modernization process would ultimately lead.
16
 
 Therefore, in reality the post–Cold War era that witnessed 9/11 illustrates the 
global dangers of failed states especially in Afghanistan, of a world more chaotic, 
unstable, and with uncontrollable chronic violence. Accordingly, the Foreign Policy,
17
 in 
its analysis of Failed States Index 2010, states that the top ten failed states have rotated 
among fifteen countries since 2005 when the index was first published, with a vast 
majority being African nations. The 2010 report lists “90,000 publicly available sources 
in its analysis of 177 countries, based on a criterion that rates them on 12 indicators of 
state collapse—from the problems of social, economic and political upheavals. These are 
key failed states indicators: 
Social: Mounting Demographic Pressures; Massive Movement of 
Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons creating Complex Humanitarian 
Emergencies; Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group 
Paranoia; Chronic and Sustained Human Flight. Economic: Uneven 
Economic Development along Group Lines; Sharp and/or Severe 
Economic Decline. Political: Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of 
the State; Progressive Deterioration of Public Services; Suspension or 
Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of 
Human Rights; Security Apparatus Operates as a “State within a State”; 
Rise of Factionalized Elites; Intervention of Other States or External 
Political Actors.
18
 
 
                                                 
                
16
 Ibid., 65. 
 
17
 Foreign Policy is published by the Slate Group, a division of Washington Post and Newsweek. 
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 Failed States List 2010, The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010failedstatesindexinteractivemapandrankings  
(accessed 02.23.10). 
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Clearly, the index rates every nation’s performance, giving us an indication of 
triggers that define stability or instability of that nation. In 2009 there were forty troubled 
spots. But in 2010, the number has increased to sixty, posing grave challenges and 
complexities to an already overburdened and troubled world, which Herbst asserts will 
last beyond a generation or more, due to “a consequence of paradoxical tendencies within 
the international system.”19 These tendencies lead to inconsistency, disinterestedness, 
limitation, and sometimes narrow self interest of powerful nation-states, becoming 
selective in responding to various intractable and prolonged global and regional crises.  
Clearly, there is empirical data that offer insight and help forecast concerns of our 
contemporary time.  We have before us the sad reminder of 9/11 that highlights how a 
failed state condition in one part of the world can sow such animosities and hatreds that it 
can reach out globally to promote massive destruction and suffering anywhere.  In this 
new world the nations and peoples of the world are all linked together. This premise 
asserts that there ought to be a strong self-interest by the developed world in the task of 
nation-building and global justice to prevent new cases of failed states that might become 
sources of international terrorism and of the disruption of the basic universal human 
rights. This global response is premised on the reality that fundamentally failed states are 
menaces that never go away until a concerted response is done to redress the problems, in 
contrast to past eras where powerful empires and stronger nations were built or expanded 
by preying on the territorial sovereignties of weaker nations and states.  
                                                 
19
 John Herbst. “The Problem of Failed States: A New Instrument.” Prism Magazine posted on 
August 13, 2010, 2.  
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Today the failed state frequently faces an overwhelming lack of interest in its 
current plight and in its future. These states tend to linger in their failed and failing 
conditions which create regional instabilities posing further challenges to neighboring 
states, regional stability, and international security. Empirically, we have seen in West 
Africa, Central Africa and the Middle East how state failure tends to occur in regions 
where other fragile states exist, creating refugee movements with serious trans-ethnic or 
inter-tribal conflicts, thereby burdening those neighboring states. It is possible that a 
cycle of regional state failure could result from the persistence of a failed state and their 
fluid nature. 
 Often time, the neighboring states as exemplified in Rwanda, Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo were drawn into border conflicts, directly and indirectly, 
from the use of their territories for illicit arms trafficking, by conflicting ethnic groups 
and militias. For example, the Hutu militias, the “Interahamwe” were notorious for 
carrying out ethnic cleansing in their quests for seeking safe havens across weak and 
porous boundaries—in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda where ethnic 
Hutus and Tutsis were involved in conflicts in five countries.
20
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 Herman Musahara, Prisca Mbura Kamungi, et al.  Conflict in the Great Lakes Region—How is 
it Linked with Land and Migration?  Natural Resource Perspectives. London: Number 96, March 2005.The 
Overseas Development, London. In this article, the authors argue that Africa’s Great Lakes Region—
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for abundant natural resources to hamper sustainable development, increasing poverty, tribalism and state 
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Reliable information to date suggests that it is very difficult to contain the 
problems of the failed states within the physical boundaries of that state. Another concern 
demanding international attention and response is how failed states matter to the larger 
international community. As noted earlier they are vulnerable to internal and external 
disruption as well as exploitation by other state and non-state actors with less-than-noble 
motives. And the suffering of one nation and people in today’s integrated world can sadly 
impact on other peoples across the globe. 
Therefore, the inability of any state to control illicit or criminal activities such as 
drug smuggling or weapons smuggling, money laundering, and terrorism may eventually 
transform that country into a kind of safe haven from which criminal groups can 
effectively consolidate and expand operations. To simply ignore the persistence of the 
failed state or to fail to develop a clear strategy poses risks that we should be wary of 
accepting without a global and concerted response.  
The current situation in Somalia is sadly a classic example of the problem when a 
failed or failing state is exploited by criminal groups. It is tormented with pirates 
operating on the vast Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden disrupting shipping and 
international commerce. This pervasive and powerful influence of Somali pirates is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
failure” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Le Billon, 2001). Additionally, primarily agricultural lands have 
continued to serve as source of fomenting or sustaining conflict through the use of profits or political 
capital from natural resource extraction or redistribution for purchase of arms, or mobilization of human 
and diplomatic resources for war. In Rwanda, unequal access to land was one of the structural causes of 
poverty which was exploited by the organizers of the genocide. Also see Samantha Powers. A Problem 
from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide. New York: Harper Perennial, 2003. 
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concern not only for the future of world maritime but potentially for the broader oil or 
energy supplies of the world.
21
 
Population growth and the expansion of production and consumption patterns can 
greatly stress ecosystems that support national communities and push them into failed 
state conditions. Lester Brown, former head of the World Watch Institute, documents 
well how ecological overuse, ecosystem damage, and population surge too often push 
food insecurity and famine that in turn are catalysts for the failure of state institutions. 
Even in a world that lacks the wherewithal, Brown remains cautiously optimistic that if 
we act collectively to reverse these calamities there is hope to reverse such trends.  
In his work, Plan B. 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization, Brown lists several key 
factors that directly or indirectly push toward the collapse of civilizations or nations.  
Among them are: ecological degradation, food shortages, insecurity, climate change, 
overpopulation, corruption and other negative factors.
22
  How can a nation claim its 
sovereignty or independence when it cannot provide the basic needs of it people such as 
food, water and shelter?  
In Brown’s analysis, food security is paramount to world peace and stability. 
When there are food shortages or diminished supplies there is a trend for a dangerous 
geopolitics of food scarcity in which fragile nations and other countries, acting in their 
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narrowly defined self-interest, perpetuate such negativity.
23
 Brown also notes that wheat-
exporting countries such as Russia and Argentina controlled or banned the exportation of 
their commodities in an attempt to counter domestic food price increases while Brazil, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and other tropical nations are diminishing their 
rainforests that are significant in sequestering carbon-monoxide.
24
 
Additionally, Brown draws attention to some of the disjointed economic practices 
that function as a “global ponzi economy.”25 This scheme is based on overexploitation of 
the natural resources of national ecosystems in the name of monetary profit vis-à-vis 
social and sustainable investments. Brown quotes Paul Hawken, author of Blessed 
Unrest, whose university commencement speech reads:   
At present we are stealing the future, selling it in the present, and calling it 
gross domestic product. We can just as easily have an economy that is 
based on healing the future instead of stealing it. We can either create 
assets for the future or take the assets of the future. One is called 
restoration and the other exploitation.
26
 
 
For example, the recent wave of democracy sweeping the Arab and Muslim world 
has its immediate causation to economic downturn—based on the soaring price of flour, 
wheat and cooking oil. It started in Tunisia when a young man was humiliated and denied 
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opportunity to sell his vegetables to earn the necessary cash in feeding his family. Sadly, 
he, in his extreme frustration, doused himself in gasoline and burned himself to death.
27
   
His remarkable personal sacrifice sparked a wave of anti-government revolutionary 
movements—the “Arab Spring” that have pushed for remarkable changes and reforms 
across much of Northern Africa and across the Middle East. These movements have 
toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and are continuing to try to push 
democratic reform in Syria.  
In Brown’s construct, a failed state, “In the past, was due to the “concentration of 
too much power in one state, as in Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet 
Union.”28 But today the fractured or failing states that emerged out of the old imperial 
states and empires are providing the greatest threats to global order and stability that are 
replete with tragedies based on the collapse of basic structures that affect the rules of law 
and order and the political function of the state. These states are characterized as having 
corrupt leaders, dysfunctional institutions, and high levels of chaos and violence. They 
pose both internal to its people and external threats to its neighboring countries.   
                                                 
27
 The wave for democracy in North Africa and the Arab world began on December 17, 2010 
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Now in the last few decades it has become clear that the collapse of societies in 
failed states in one part of the world can have a huge negative impact on other nations 
and societies who can be heavily impacted by violence and even terrorism that can flow 
out of failed state regions. We now know that what affects one country or region has a 
global ramification as depicted by the most recent Arab revolutions, the collapse of the 
global stock market, the global recession, the impact of high unemployment rates, the 
closing of multinational corporations, and degradation of the biosphere. The world we 
live in is truly a global village—requiring all of our full attention and collective 
responsibilities. When one member of this global family, nation or region is affected, 
we—as a planetary community—need to act collectively and responsibly dealing with 
these crises of conscience. 
Genuine Nation-Building: The Solution to Failed States 
The solution to remedy the chronic problems of failed or failing states by these 
world bodies, powers, including all of us, ought to be a genuine and sustainable nation-
building mission—which I conceive, is a complex, arduous, and often frustrating 
undertaking. Nevertheless, the need to engage in nation-building is the most urgent  
endeavor that we must undertake if we are to radically advert future calamities that 
follow in the wake of 9/11, the Rwanda genocide, the Balkans crises, the Darfur ethnic 
cleansing, the enormity of the Congo Basin’s conflict—so-called World War III, the 
Islamic and other religious extremist and terrorist movements in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, spreading their tentacles worldwide, the horrors of blood 
diamonds and exploitation of the biodiversities in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where war-
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lords drugged kids, raped women indiscriminately, and pillaged their nations—in quest 
for greed and violence unimaginable.  
For this work, a nation is conceived as “a body of people occupying a given area 
whose common interests are strong enough to make possible the maintenance of a single 
sovereign civil authority, i.e. a state which may and often does predate the nation as a 
historical reality.”29 The term “nation” therefore is in reference to nation states or 
countries that form the global community of nations being represented at the United 
Nations, the global world body that coordinates humanitarian and other socio-political 
activities around the world. 
So what is nation-building? It is “the process of reinforcing the common bonds 
among the people of a nation state to the end that there may be general stability and 
prosperity so that the nation may participate usefully in the community of nations.”30  
The Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a British think tank normatively sees:  
Nation-building in its simplest formulation, [as] state-building, especially 
as understood by the international community since the 1990s, [as] set of 
actions undertaken by national and/or international actors to establish, 
reform and strengthen state institutions where these have seriously been 
eroded or are missing…[with] key goals…include[ing the] provision of 
security, establishment of the rule of law, effective delivery of basic goods 
and services through functional formal state institutions, and generation of 
political legitimacy for the new set of state institutions being built. 
31
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In these formulae, nation-building must be seen as evolutionary process with 
many complexities and entanglements, needing perseverance, dedication and sustained 
vision by those partaking. The ultimate goal is to establish stability and (re)build 
institutions that can in the long-term produce a peaceful and functioning society. 
James Dobbin and other theorists and experts from the RAND Corporation, 
approach the concept of nation-building through the use of force or military intervention. 
In this analysis, “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an 
enduring transition to democracy”32 is the starting point for nation-building. This concept 
places the onus on the military as the intervening force that sets the agenda for 
democratizing the broken states and reforming the states’ institutions.  
 While we recognize that nation-building has a specific usage as a term, we can 
also use it in a very general term if we clarify how we are using it. First it is a concept 
used in political science and military affairs for a specific project when the United States 
troops are engaged in “nation-building.” But the more general usage is that it is most 
anything that we think is important to taking tribal and clan, and war-lords’ lawless 
regions into some sort of national stability and security. Thus nation-building is what 
every person or the critical mass in Liberia hopes for or every person in Iraq today. 
On the other hand, nation-building can be pursued from a painstakingly difficult 
level requiring a much more robust and arduous tasks. This is usually in situations where 
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the society has little experience of institution building beyond tribal councils. The reason 
is that the people of such community have very little experience of bureaucracy and 
modern economic theories and the needs of a complex society beyond subsistence 
standard of living. 
This is illustrated in the work of Carolyn Stephenson, Nation Building, where she 
essentially argues that “nation-building programs are those in which dysfunctional or 
unstable or failed states or economies are given assistance in the development of 
governmental infrastructure, civil society, dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as 
economic assistance, in order to increase stability.”33 Nation-building is the responsibility 
of someone or something intentionally leading the process to transform the brokenness of 
the failed state(s). However, Stephenson alerts us of the negative effect of nation-
building. In her critique she presents historical analysis of how the processes have been 
destructive to other nations and peoples. She writes: 
In the building of the US nation and others, aboriginal nations were erased 
or marginalized. The Six-Nations Confederacy of the Iroquois had existed 
before the US nation (and was thought by some to be a model for it). 
Today many “First Nations “are in the process of nation re-building, re-
building the social, cultural, economic and political foundations for what 
is left of self-governance. First nations seek to re-build cultural identities 
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as nations in order to challenge their disintegration by others in the 
creation of their own states.
34
 
 
However, rebuilding these nations, in particular aboriginal cultures and what is 
referred to as First Nations, Stephenson argues, that these people must be equipped with 
the institutional foundation necessary to increase their capacity to effectively assert self-
governing powers on behalf of their own economic, social and cultural objectives that  
also requires the people to determine: As Stephenson puts it: 
1) Genuine self rule (for making decisions about resource allocations, 
project funding and development strategy), 2) creating effective governing 
institutions (non-politicized dispute resolution mechanisms and getting rid 
of corruption), 3) cultural match (giving first nations institutions 
legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens), and 4) the need for a strategic 
orientation (long-term planning).35 
 
While it is true that historically the United States and its allies pursued this model 
of intervention with variation of successes in Japan and Germany, Iraq and Afghanistan 
proved to be quite challenging and very expensive. This means that the current trends in 
world’s conflicts with all the complexities require a new model of intervention that goes 
beyond military intervention.
36
 This new model for nation-building, as we shall later 
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discuss in detail, ought to be wholistic and well-balanced. It is a model that forces us to 
reexamine what we consider smart versus stupid nation-building. It is important to ask 
why intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than Darfur?  
This requires us to examine the limitations and role of the post-colonial and post 
Cold-War era, in the polarization and prioritization of failed states and nation-building. In 
particular, we analyzed the historical role of the Christian church in nation-building. For 
example, the intervention of America in Afghanistan was presented to the world as a 
humanitarian intervention. However, it was clearly known that the United States saw the 
Taliban government in Afghanistan as a direct threat and therefore needed to be ousted 
for accommodating Al-Qaida.  
In Iraq, the invasion was centered on regime change because the United States 
feared that Sadam with weapons of mass destruction posed grave threat to America and 
its allies. With little preparation and lack of a long time strategy, the United States soon 
realized that it was stuck in nation-building. Yet, with a decade since the United States 
invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has not formally accepted the reality that 
it has been involved in nation building despite nearly 2.3 trillion dollars spent on those 
two wars combined.
37
 Premised on such an ambiguous narrative of nation-building 
strategy, other scholars have critiqued nation-building endeavor and its intended goals for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Communist East that further enhanced geopolitical dominance in the form of nation building in Japan and 
Germany (West Germany). Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan where the formal ceremonies of wars did not 
occur: official wars, official surrender ceremonies, and official occupations, the US led operations has 
failed to even acknowledge its role as an occupier. So nation building can only succeed when we take into 
account contexts, situations, and reality that nation building is an expensive enterprise needing strategic and 
long term commitment. 
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establishing stability and democratic nations as a misadventure. A notable critic is Amitai 
Etzioni who makes the case that the task of nation building is as an illusion rarely 
producing the necessary results. He writes,  
The central thesis of this essay is that nation-building-however defined-by 
foreign powers can rarely be accomplished and tends to be very costly, not 
merely in economic resources and those of political capital, but also in 
human lives. Hence, for both empirical, social science considerations and 
on normative grounds, foreign powers would be best advised to scale back 
greatly their ambitions and promises. The more these powers focus 
whatever resources they are willing and able to commit on modest 
intervention, the more good they will do for the nation they seek to help 
and for themselves. There are many reasons why superpowers and other 
powers are tempted to promise nation-building. They believe in the value 
of forging nations and helping their development. They are keen to share 
with others that which they hold dear-domestic peace, the blessing of 
democratic politics and the rich fruits of developed economies.
38
 
 
In this polemic, Etzioni assumes that the ambitious nation builders are overly 
optimistic and believe in the ideals of human progress without accepting the reality of 
failure. In their illusive minds, Etzioni seems to argue that these nation builders hold that 
such developments can be accomplished relatively easily, especially if one is dedicated to 
bringing them about.
39
 But this assertion of Etzioni is an exaggeration. The reason United 
States and others avoid nation-building is due to the tedious task and expensive nature of 
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nation building. Additionally, there is a lack of strategic planning. Their involvement in 
these nations is mainly due to (over)reaction. For example, Iraq was a case of regime 
change and Afghanistan was a war against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, rather than a 
concerted and strategic effort to carry on the task of nation building.   
This strategic and long term approach is contextual and a difficult task but has far 
greater impact in creating a world much safer and peaceful. It seeks to redress essential 
components, namely—security, institutional building, democratic process, and sustained 
economic programs that are the necessary in the progression and stability of our world 
and sovereign nations. 
The Christian Church’s Response to Failed State Concerns 
 As a student of Christian ethics, my approach shall be limited within the scope of 
Christian ethical and theological tradition. However, I shall pay close attention to 
historical, social, political, economic, and developmental fields that authentically 
complement or inform my understanding of what nation-building ought to be pursued—
thereby challenging the limitations of the Christian approach to nation-building.   
Therefore, I shall identify within our own Christian heritage four focal points or 
themes that influence the Christian thinking on political theory: namely, love, hope, 
justice and the common good, in correlation with scripture, tradition, reason and 
experience. My choice of Reinhold Niebuhr in this discussion is that he brings a 
contemporary clarity on Christian realism that I consider as quintessential in any 
Christian engagement of real world problems and a search for genuine solutions.  
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My Christian ethical method is closely grounded in a communitarian value 
system
40
 that I assert is at the heart of Christian worldview. It embodies stewardship and 
responsibility for neighbors and the greater community. But I also recognize the 
individual’s need for freedom, innovation, and self expression (autonomy) as inalienable 
rights. This work is an attempt to present a Christian ethical response that applies to a 
wide range of global situations that affect the wellbeing of all peoples—the nations of the 
world and especially the fragile societies. Therefore most of the Christian scholars I’ve 
chosen have a lot in common—recognizing that ethical reflection on global matters is not 
a simple issue and that many times the conflicting claims over the forms of narrative that 
represents the greater good of the community can become conflicting ethical 
perspectives. Nevertheless, these thinkers drawn from both Roman Catholic and 
Protestant traditions—Hollenbach, the Papals’ Encyclicals, John Wesley, Paul Tillich, 
and Reinhold Niebuhr, provide numerous insights into how ethics can clarify and help to 
resolve difficult issues especially as pertain to nation-building from a Christian 
perspective that reflects the zeitgeist of our time. 
 So why has the challenge of failed states and need for nation-building often been 
a neglected area of Christian ethical discussion? Many frames are helpful for thinking 
about the better practices that help in conflict-resolution and nation-building, but an 
ethical paradigm that obligates Christian ethical and theological thinking on nation-
building shall remain an essential point of analysis. Firstly, any Christian ethical and 
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theological tasks that do not engage these pertinent and complex global issues and 
concerns for nation-building are either disengaged or inadequate like the ultra realist 
school that objectifies narrow self-interest as the primary lenses for conducting foreign 
policies or international relations. Secondly, a Christian ethical and theological 
contribution to nation-building has an explicit paradigm that also correlates with other 
multidisciplinary studies on nation-building. 
  Therefore, the understanding of the global common good is an important 
component of any serious analysis of the responsibilities of nation-building today. 
William Cavanaugh’s work, Killing for the Telephone Company: Why Nation-State is not 
the Keeper of the Common Good, places the onus on the church and not the nation-state, 
to be carrier of the common good. This church must “constitute itself as an alternative 
social space…need[ing] at every opportunity to promote alternative economies and 
authorities…’’41 Cavanaugh’s assertion thus presents some of the core debates and 
controversies in this work.  
 This global common is about the basic moral values that transcend national, 
ethnic, religious, or other cultural boundaries. This is the issue Sissela Bok takes up in her 
book, Common Values.
42
 She begins by listing a number of problems that transcend these 
boundaries: problems of the environment; war and hostility; epidemics; overpopulation; 
poverty; hunger; natural as well as technological disasters. The fact that we recognize 
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these as common problems suggests that we share some basic values (e.g., health, safety, 
and the desire for at least minimal happiness).  
In spite of these shared problems, we are caught in a stalemate of resolving a lot 
of these issues due to conflicting and competing views and interests that impede or delay 
genuine resolutions and global consensus for resolving the many protracted and deadly 
conflicts of our world. She lists ten ways we may seek a set of moral values. But for this 
work, I will briefly survey the last two that speak genuinely to the issue of the common 
good—that is, our moral values are held in common by virtually all human beings, such 
that they’ve had to be worked out by all human societies. Regarding these two, Bok 
makes four basic claims: 
Firstly, there is a basic set of values that every viable society has to accept 
in order to survive collectively. This includes positive duties of mutual 
support, loyalty, and reciprocity; negative duties to refrain from harming 
others; and norms for basic procedures and standards for resolving issues 
of justice. Secondly, these values are necessary (although not sufficient) 
for human coexistence at every level-in one’s personal and working life, in 
one’s family, community, and nation, and even in international relations. 
Thirdly, these values can respect diversity while at the same time 
providing a general framework within which abuses can be criticized. 
Finally, these values can provide a common basis for cross-cultural 
discussions about how to deal with problems that have global dimensions. 
This requires our understanding of the common good.
43
 
 
                                                 
43
 Ibid., 1-8. Bok argues that there are ten different ways in which we might express what we think 
we need and how they are expressed by various sets of moral values as: “1. Divinely ordained 2. Part of the 
natural order, 3. Eternally valid 4. Valid without exception, 5. Directly knowable by anyone who is 
rational, 6. Perceivable by a moral sense, 7. Independent of us, in the sense that they do not depend on us 
for their existence. 8. Objective rather than subjective, 9. Held in common by virtually all human beings, 
10. Such that they’ve had to be worked out by all human societies.” Although religious and philosophical 
traditions have concentrated on 1-8, Bok suggests we should start with 9 and 10. Due to the inability of 
religious and philosophical traditions to reach consensus on 1-8, it seems unlikely, she says, that we will 
reach consensus on 1-8. 
  
26 
Clearly, Bok makes a compelling historical and ethical case in differentiating the 
current global tragedies from that of the past by insisting that the pace and magnitudes of 
current crises are rapid, global, trans-border, and the worst threat to all of life. Therefore, 
we must avoid at all cost holding on to absolute ideological positions and work towards a 
constructive dialogue based on our shared humanity that transcends national, ethnic, 
religious, culture, and status. Even in a minimalist way, we must collectively seek means 
to address injustice, poverty, war, disease, and environmental concerns.
44
 
For Cavanaugh, the state should be a communitas communitatum, which is “the 
true meaning of our word Commons; not the mass of common people, but the community 
of the communities.”45 This community seeks the participation of all members to be 
joined together in the promotion of a common good that leads to the fulfillment of the 
general public good. “It’s [the common good] most basic meaning that the community 
and its institutions should serve the good of all its citizens and not just the restricted good 
of a particular ruler or class.”46 The nation-state then presents itself as a way of 
reconciling the many into one, e pluribus unum, serving the common good. This notion 
of the common good is best illustrated in the preamble of the United States which states:  
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
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of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.
47
  
 
This notion in the preamble is the recognition that the common good is directed to 
serving all rather than a specific interest group. Yet, it also understands the divergent 
views and other differences that exist in a nation, in which we must reconcile our 
individual rights with our responsibility for the whole community in acknowledging our 
common values.
48
  
  In his work, The Just War Ethic Protecting the Global Common Good, J. Bryan 
Hehir traces the origin of the concept of the common good within the scope of secular 
and religious traditions.
49
 He asserts that “the common good has referred primarily to the 
goal of each individual society to create a broad social fabric of spiritual, material, and 
temporal goods from which all would benefit.”50 He further adds that this concept of the 
common good took on a global nature beyond national borders during the second half of 
the 20th century and credits Pope John XXIII for invoking this concept of the global 
common good in 1961. Hehir asserts: 
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[The pope] recognized…the growing interdependence of the world in 
material terms required a moral vision that would connect the national 
common good to the international common good. Issues such as security, 
political economy, human rights, and global governance were related to 
national and international common interests. And all of these issues come 
to the forefront when exploring the role of the Just War Ethic in the 
pursuit of the global common good.
51
 
 
If as Hehir insists that the global common good is rooted in the vision of a global 
human responsibility for all, then a global issues on security, economics, governance and 
social capitals are core assets to the common good. This means that there is a 
responsibility on part of the international community and the United States and its allies 
to pursue the common good even at the level of the use of armed intervention to curb 
violent regimes and human rights abuses around the world especially in places that are 
hotbeds for civil unrests and terrorism. What is the measurement of such moral 
justification of war of intervention?  
Hehir claims that “the Just War Ethic makes morally legitimate and morally 
harmful methods of using force; its premises have been grounded in the concept of a 
single human community.”52 This view holds that even if there is a moral justification for 
war, there is a code of ethics based on preexisting moral bonds that must be respected by 
the intervening forces even during conflict. But war must be waged as last resort after 
exhausting all other available means of resolving the conflict. The history of just war has 
always been part of every culture. As a theory in Western civilization over the last 
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thousand years, the classic principles have evolved. We now have a consensus of 
religious and secular views of the use of such authority to engage in war.  
Basically, the obvious question at this point is, what are the principles of just war 
theory and how do they work to limit the negative effects of war? The modern theory of 
just war comprises three distinct but related areas that work together to determine which 
types of war are justifiable (Jus ad Bellum), which acts of war are permissible (Jus in 
Bello), and finally how to re-establish peaceful coexistence once war is over (Jus post 
Bellum). The moral rules of war are expressed as positive rights that states possess.
53
 So, 
for example, what we are witnessing more and more in our times, while the state has the 
right to defend itself and its citizens against attack from an aggressor-either as non state 
actors another state, the globalized world is now taking responsibility against regimes 
that perpetuate aggression on its own people—Libya, Liberia, Egypt, and now Syria are 
concrete examples of the emerging new world order.  
This theory of Just War is further articulated by Michael Walzer in his attempt to 
distinguish between justifiable and unjustifiable uses of organized armed forces.
54
 In a 
television interview titled On Just War in the Gulf War,
55
 he describes the classic just war 
                                                 
53
 Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, New York: 
Basics Book. 1977, 259-60. 
 
54
 Walzer. Arguing About War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004, 48-53. 
 
55
 Walzer makes the claims that the “troubles that we [USA] have had in Iraq after 2003 come 
from the loss of confidence of trust that we produced by our behavior in 1991.” For him trust plays an 
important role in building confidence. When such mutual trust is injured it always becomes suspicious 
when the same person or country attempts to rebuild that trust. I find the issue of “mistrust” quite 
remarkable. Madam Clinton in her role as Secretary of States and on her visit to Pakistan on October 27-29, 
2009 at the heightened tension of the Taliban offensive in both Afghanistan and Pakistan remarked that 
there is a “trust deficit,” http://bigthink.com/michaelwalzer/michael-walzer-on-just-war-in-the-gulf-war 
(accessed 07.09.10). 
  
30 
theory that calls on the intervention forces to act in defeating or repealing an aggression. 
Thus in the Gulf War of 1991, he contends:  
The USA and its coalition acted justifiably. However, the coalition failed 
its mission when it supported a rebellion or insurgency in Iraq and later 
failed to adequately support the uprising. The end result was Saddam’s 
brutal defeat of the rebellion by slaughtering a portion of the Iraqi 
population that was tied to the opposition.
56
 
 
Walzer also rejects pacifism, a non-violent alternative to any forms of aggression. 
This theory of non-violence argues that its moral principle is pragmatic and effective in 
confronting violent actions. There are wide spectrums on pacifism—from those who 
totally opposed any forms of violent actions to those who support some form of physical 
violence for emergency defense of self or others. Some may accept symbolic forms of 
violence targeting specific power structures such as the military or big corporations. 
However, part of the pacifist belief system is taking responsibility for one’s actions by 
submitting to arrest and using a trial to publicize opposition to war and other forms of 
violence. Martin Luther King, the late American civil rights leader and Mahatma Gandhi, 
the late Indian leader and lawyer were avid devotees of absolute pacifism. 
However, Walzer counters the pacifists by arguing on two fundamental grounds: 
The moral causes for war jus ad bellum and the moral means of war jus in bello. This 
ethical concept one can asserts “is not a tightly designed theory but a tradition of moral 
analysis that contains multiple theories of how it should be argued.”57 But they serve to 
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give us a working format in dealing with the ever changing nature of human conflicts and 
our role and responsibility of the interventionist(s).
58
  
The doctrine of the common good teaches that the individual person is a member 
of a larger body. Just as the goal or end of each individual member of a community is the 
common good of that larger community, so also the goal or end of each organ and muscle 
in our body is the common good of the overall person. We are all ordered by God to the 
same good. Moreover, we attain this good in life with others and not by ourselves. This 
should not be surprising for as Aristotle observed, even before Aquinas, humans are by 
nature social animals. Therefore, our happiness or the perfection of our natures will 
include this social dimension. For example, parents and children, as a microcosm of 
society, naturally have a sense that their individual good is the good of the family.  
 Should Christians then privatize their faith as a spiritual matter and disengage 
from national or global affairs? Should we advocate strict national sovereignty and avoid 
any global social and political responsibility? The global common good is also articulated 
by the Center for American Progress. In its 2007 publication, Pursuing the Global 
Common Good, the Center for American Progress argues that “U.S. foreign policy must 
go beyond preconceived notions of national self-interest and security by including our 
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ethical obligations to the global community.”59 America must see its responsibility 
beyond its own self-interest because its self-interest is interwoven with its moral 
responsibility to do the good around the world. 
Moreover, while other disciplines have succinctly argued for the concept of 
nation-building as the most effective framework for addressing these global crises, 
Christian ethics or theology has largely been uncoordinated in engaging the whole area of 
international peacemaking and nation-building. Instead, what it has offered are universal 
scattered themes on love, hope, peace, justice, etc., on the one hand, but accepting the 
status quo, where evil, suffering, injustice and poverty are part of God’s plan—while we 
await the miraculous intervention of the Eschaton—God. The form of eschatological 
concept  describes here in, holds that bliss is out there in the future and that God will 
bring an end to these global socio-political ills, but presumably in the after-life rather 
than in this real and visible world. However, we must recognize other diverse models of 
eschatology that are much more realistic and practical. One of such is well espoused by 
St. Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr. This view of the “already but not yet” form of 
eschatology holds that the Reign of God is already in breaking into history but that it is 
not yet complete.
60
 However, we must acknowledge that Christian theologians and 
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ethicists have greatly engaged the key themes and incidents of war and peace and for that 
matter, there is a large corpus of work on the subject of war and peace. Therefore, there 
are those Christians who would argue as pacifists against the proponents of the just war 
tradition that favor the use of force in certain cases of humanitarian intervention. We’ve 
seen images of protests since the Vietnam War, of Christians and ordinary citizens in 
America and other parts of the world, marching for or against different wars, such as the 
Persian Gulf wars, eliciting strong sentimental feelings on all sides. 
Nevertheless, many ordinary Christians and their pastoral leaders—the bishops, 
theologians, ethicists, and pastors are often times jittery or reluctant to deal with the 
issues of failed states or support for military humanitarian intervention. At worst they 
seem to find it difficult to make the case for a wholistic nation-building agenda in which 
a long and strategic plan of action—in which blood, financial resources, and 
technological expertise are at the crux of the matter. Probably, the messiness, 
complexities, and newness of the issues of failed state and nation-building seem so 
overwhelming.  
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Therefore, most Christians and their leaders retreat into their own comfort zones 
and act out their Christian love and virtues by participating in soup kitchen projects, 
taking a mission trip in Africa, Latin America, or other parts of the world—building 
schools, clinics, bore holes or wells, providing food, and other basic essentials to the poor 
and needy. These are all good efforts but they fail to engage with the massive structural 
violence caused by failed-state conditions.  
While we acknowledge such altruistic endeavors, there is a need to have a more 
robust and coordinated denominational efforts to educate about the need for nation-
building as a Christian goal of the in-breaking and building God’ kingdom on earth. In 
this schema, we recognize the different Christian ethical customary discussions or 
conversations—ranging from pacifism, just war theory, social justice and developmental 
concerns. For example, pacifism with a wide range of views, advocates the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts and non violence by the demolition of military institution by 
means of physical violence to obtain political, economic or social goals, the obliteration 
of force except in cases where it is absolutely necessary to advance the cause of peace, 
and opposition to violence under any circumstance, even defense of self and others.
61
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As good as the pacifist’s intentions are, there seems to be a lack of realism 
especially in a world where evil and violence are part of the human condition. This is the 
point that Samantha Power vividly illustrates in her great book covering Rwanda, The 
Balkans and America’s response to the UN and NATO’s responses to these crises. She 
thus asserts that “The United States has never in its history intervened to stop genocide 
and had in fact rarely even made a point of condemning it as it occurred.”62 Imagine a 
world where the Bin Laden’s, the Ghadaffi’s, Bashar Al-assad, the Mugabe’s, the Charles 
Taylor’s and so-called leaders of powerful Western and Eastern nations have directly and 
indirectly wrecked havoc on ordinary citizens, while the pacifists advocated a non-
confrontational approach to dealing with these crises. Such a stance in my view, simply 
illustrates how good men and women can be deeply idealistic, inattentive and silent in the 
midst of violence against the innocent.  
Just war theory is a realistic assessment that conflict is the revolving reason 
opposing factions and countries usually fight wars. Sadly, the inability to resolve these 
conflicts is mainly due to the bellicosity and selfish political posturing of entrenched and 
intransigent leaders. According to Reinhold Niebuhr, in his seminal work Moral Man and 
Immoral Society, conflict is inevitable, and in this conflict power must be challenged by 
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power.
63
 War then is the last resort because of the unpredictable, unexpected, unintended, 
and unavoidable horrors that it regularly brings.  
While a secular view of war is pertinent, religious debates are often pivotal to 
conflict, and therefore the religious view of war cannot be denied. With conflicting views 
of the necessity of war, the concept of just war cannot be ignored. Just war is an 
argument that war, under certain moral conditions, is not only acceptable, but also 
morally necessary. These moral conditions can be of different values, but may include 
minimal death and suffering, recognition of human dignity and rights, and a true cause to 
the start of the war, such as one country declaring war to stop genocide.   
The just war tradition of moral reasoning has been deeply shaped by many 
centuries of Christian reflection and discussion. A just war acts toward the goal of the 
common good. With this is a call to solidarity, because just war may come at a cost for a 
certain country, with no visible benefits other than to serve others. While war does cause 
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ultimate questions about the causes of social maladjustment, that religion unifies individuals, stabilizes 
societies, creates social imagination and sanctifies social life; but it also perpetuates ancient evils, increases 
social inertia, creates illusions and preserves superstitions. 
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death, a Christian ethical response to war is not to simply avoid war. War is sometimes an 
ugly truth that, according to the Just War view, is morally required.  
The Christian ethical response to war is that war should be avoided whenever 
possible, but that if war must be fought, it should be just. Avoiding war whenever 
possible is obviously ethical, as if conflict can be resolved peacefully it is best for the 
common good. However, defining the implication of just and unjustness on the Christian 
ethical view of war is not as straightforward. Justness does not only include an effective 
and beneficial end to the cause of the war. The basis of war or jus ad bellum must be 
reconciled with the idea of the justness of the fighting of the war itself. In such cases, like 
Libya or Syria today, the greater good is served by reining in mass murderers and 
dictators who dehumanized their people and thereby posing grave humanitarian crises 
that spawn across economics, political, social, and religious and moral boundaries. For 
Christians to sit aside and justify a non-intervention stance on a failed state is to accept a 
world of powerlessness and anarchy rather than embracing a Niebuhrean realism—where 
evil is real and must be confronted in order to approximate justice on earth.
64
  
On this basis of realism, where failed states have affected the global common 
good, creating some of the most unimaginable evils and deplorable conditions, the 
Christian ought to be the champion of justice, love, and hope. Christian realism requires 
the use of reason, experience, tradition, and Scripture to help us navigate the complexities 
                                                 
64
 Read Reinhold Niebuhr. Love and Justice. Selections from the shorter writings of Reinhold 
Niebuhr. Louisville: John Knox Press, 1957, 161-166. Also see Samantha Power. A Problem from Hell: 
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and ambiguous human conditions. To be inattentive to the problems of failed states and 
international issues is to be as guilty as the perpetrators of these evils acts. 
Our task then is not to wait for the eschaton, but to acknowledge and work in the 
here and now—in the breaking of the Kingdom of God, where we are active agents of 
change, affecting the general wellbeing of all people. On this notion, we must understand 
history to gaze at the ethical or lack thereof, of how civilization and society, have failed 
the vulnerable population through negligence, leading to wars, famines, genocides, and 
other forms of neglects. In the next chapter, we will analyze the role of international 
neglects and its global implications.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE TRAGEDY OF INTERNATIONAL NEGLIGENCE 
A Historical Analysis of International Negligence and Failed Interventions 
 History has been littered with the expansion of city-states and empires via war 
and the subjugation of surrounding peoples. The ancient empire of Persia, the conquests 
of Alexander, the wars that pushed the borders of the Roman Empire—all these forced 
many peoples to pay homage and taxes to the central imperial power. War, conquest and 
domination have ancient roots. But modern global history has been powerfully shaped by 
the emergence of European dominance and European colonial outreach that some say 
began in earnest in the period of the European seafaring exploration of the world’s oceans 
and the European discovery of the riches of the New World of the Americas.1   
 This historical fact is further illustrated by numerous scholars. One of such is 
Naill Ferguson whose magnificent narrative of the British Empire encapsulates the 
dominance of this European power.2 Paul Kennedy also expands on this notion by 
asserting that the British Empire as we know it was the largest expansion of global 
dominance and power to date.3  
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 Jared Diamond. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 1999, 414-415.  
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 Naill Ferguson. Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for 
Global Power. New York: Basic Books, 2003, 12-26 ff. 
 
 
3
 Paul Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. New York: Vintage Books, 1987, 535. 
Herein, Kennedy makes the case that European did overreach in imperial colonial expansion especially 
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What we have today in terms of technology, communications, and governance, 
including the many global conflicts, is the bye-product of British global hegemony.4 On 
this basis, I assert that since the beginning of the twelfth century, Europeans gradually 
became more aware of the outside world. The Crusades and the great Mongol Empire 
were etched on the minds of Europeans. The elites of European societies, were fascinated 
by imports, especially spices and other commodities coming from India and Southeast 
Asia to the Middle East by Arab vessels, and then carried to Europe by traders from 
Italian city-states. Sadly, these powers of the Far East, like the Mongols and many great 
African and South American Empires, in spite of their enormous wealth and natural 
resources, failed to improve on naval technology which undermined their ability for 
sustainable global trade, expansion, and dominance.5 On the contrary, the Europeans 
launched a more concerted and robust technological campaign for global expansion from 
the late thirteenth century, which would forever, reshape the world as we know it today.6 
Let us begin with 1492 as an important era in this narrative because of the emotions, 
distortion and myth that often get entangled with the facts of history. 
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Global Imperialism and Colonialism (1492-1960s) 
1492 and the Columbus Odyssey conjure lots of responses and serve as a 
flashpoint for controversy, drawing anger or admiration from different sides of the 
debate. While many consider this period as the beginning of cultural imperialism and 
colonialism, I argue that while colonialism is a key modern thing, it is basically as old as 
the Persian and Roman Empires. It was just done differently.
7
 Basically, it is about 
subjugation or oppression or dominance—as seen through the Persian, Mayan, Mali, 
British, Soviet or American Empires. 
However, to understand the modern historical tragedy of international negligence 
and of failed international interventions, one must be cognizant of the history and brutal 
ideology of imperialism and colonialism.
8
 Colonialism may be defined as the extension 
of a nation’s sovereignty over territory beyond its borders by the establishment of either 
settler colonies or administrative dependencies in which indigenous populations are 
directly ruled or displaced.
9
 Colonizing nations generally dominate the resources, labor, 
and markets of the colonial territory, and also, often, seek to impose socio-cultural, 
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religious and linguistic structures on the conquered population.
10
 The term colonialism 
may also be used to refer to a set of beliefs used to legitimize or promote this system 
Colonialism was often based on the ethnocentric belief that the morals and values of the 
colonizer were superior to those of the colonized. Some observers link such beliefs to 
racism and pseudo-scientific theories dating to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
In the Western world, this led to a form of proto-social Darwinism
11
 that placed 
Caucasian at the top of the different races of humanity and thus naturally in charge of 
dominating non-European indigenous populations.
12
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On the other hand, John Henrik Clarke asserts that the voyages of Christopher 
Columbus marked the starting point of modern world capitalism and the beginning of 
Europe’s colonial domination of the world.13 Columbus set in motion a historical domino 
effect that influenced the course of history and powerfully shapes it down to our present 
day. During this period, Europe witnessed the renewal of nationalism as well as the 
political transformation from feudalism into nation states through the centralization of 
power by the monarchs.  
Nonetheless, Columbus’s voyages were not the key catalyst but rather the result 
of the rise of the power of first Spain and Portugal and then the race joined in by England 
to colonize the new world (Americas) and to exploit the gold and silver resources. 
Previously in the pre-modern states of Europe, most people saw themselves as tribal 
societies and indigenous peoples and sometimes city-states and empires. However, most 
of those societies experienced conditions of failure in governmental apparatuses, 
ecological declines, chaos and starvation, as well articulated by Jared Diamond, Lester 
Brown and other scholars. 
 Clearly, this was a period that Europe took a big leap in dealing with its 
overpopulation and economic concerns. In Europe there was a gradual process of a 
coalescing of principalities and city-states in feudal structures and over 2-3 centuries 
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these coalesced into larger geographic entities, the slow emergence of European nation-
states. Spain for example only saw a unification of its peninsula in 1492 when the last of 
the Muslim city-states, Granada, was taken and the Muslims and Jews were given the 
choice to convert or leave. Italy was a bunch of city- states until the late 19
th
 century 
when Garabaldi finally unified it into what we today know as Italy. German unification 
also was late. Great Britain took wars to consolidate Wales, Scotland [See movie 
Braveheart and Ireland]. Even now the consolidation has stresses in that Scotland has its 
own parliament and some want to secede.  
Indeed this may well be one of the key power advantages that the colonizing 
European powers brought that allowed them to colonize the American Indigenous 
peoples. For example, Cortez with about 300 Spaniards defeated the Aztec Empire by in 
good part enlisting the hostility of many tribes who hated the Aztecs. So the Aztec and 
Inca Empires were pretty strong, but the Europeans were able to exploit some of the 
anger that locals had against these empires. Further, European diseases spread rapidly 
killing off large numbers of Indigenous Americans—thus weakening their ability to resist 
the Europeans. With new territories in the Americas, the Europeans sought means to 
harness the natural resources, enslaving the natives and later Africans as suggested by 
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Bishop Las Casas and approved by Charles V in 1517.
14
 Yet, the Church in its authority 
condemned slavery but struggled with the cultural complexities of the practice.
15
 
Africans and Other Subjugated Peoples 
 The African slave trade played an important role in the stabilization of Europe’s 
economy, its transition to capitalism, the development of the nation state, and the 
establishment of their imperial empires.
16
 The opening of the Atlantic led to the 
development of Europe’s commercial empire and industrial revolution. The continuing 
demand for African slaves’ labor arose from the development of plantation agriculture, 
the long-term rise in prices and consumption of sugar, and the demand for miners. Not 
only did Africans represent skilled laborers, but they were also experts in tropical 
agriculture. Consequently, they were well suited for plantation agriculture. The high 
immunity of Africans to malaria and yellow fever compared with Europeans and the 
indigenous peoples made them more suitable for tropical labor. While white and red labor 
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was used initially, Africans were the final solution to the acute labor problem in the New 
World.
17
 
The economic systems, which dominated the African slave trade, reflected the 
transitions in Europe’s economic systems. Initially, mercantilist views characterized the 
conduct of the slave trade. The primary purpose of mercantilism, an economic system, 
which developed during the transition of Europe from feudalism to nation-states, was to 
unify and increase the power and monetary wealth of a nation through strict government 
regulation of the national economy.
18
 Therefore, the organization of the trade in the 16
th
 
century tended to be entrusted to a company, which was given the sole right by a 
particular nation to trade slaves and to erect and maintain forts. However, these 
monopolistic companies had two major opponents, the planter in the colonies, who 
complained of insufficient quantity and poor quality of high priced slaves, and the 
merchants at home.
19
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One can argue that the failure of monopolies and the competitive spirit of 
European nations to deliver enough slaves led to free trade in the 18th century. While it is 
easy to analyze the various economic systems utilized in the African slave trade, it is far 
more difficult to determine a precise estimate of how profitable the trade was. The slave 
trade was one of the most important business enterprises of the 17
th
 century. The nation 
states of Europe stabilized themselves and developed their economy mainly at the 
expense of African people. There are several reasons why the European nations competed 
with each other to gain colonies in Africa. They all wanted to gain power and prestige. 
The more territory that they were able to control in Africa the more powerful and 
influential they thought they could become.
20
  
Africa was tremendously rich in natural resources, which could be brought to 
Europe and turned into manufactured goods. Europeans also needed markets for their 
manufactured goods. These goods could be sold in Africa and the rest of the world for 
large profits.
21
 This new sense of wealth, prestige, and power gave rise to the concept of 
modern nation-building, that is, the rise of the modern nation-state. However, we must 
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point out that the theoretical framework for the modern nation-state was still in its 
evolutionary stage and therefore lacks a coherent philosophical grounding. This view is 
further espoused by Benedict Anderson, who asserts that theoretical approaches had 
largely ignored nationalism, merely accepting it as the way things are. He writes,  
Nation, nationality, nationalism – all have proved notoriously difficult to 
define, let alone analyze. In contrast to the immense influence that 
nationalism has exerted on the modern world, plausible theory about it is 
conspicuously meager.
22
  
 
If the concept of nation-state is an emerging phenomenon, a breakaway from the 
primordial village, feudal systems, empires or monarchies of the past, we must then see 
the nation-state as vital in the affairs of global order. It’s where the global market place(s) 
and international relations are conducted between the nations. It is where people within 
sovereign borders must forge new identities beyond tribal, racial, or religious lines. It is 
as Benedict Anderson asserts an imagined community. “In fact, all communities larger 
than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are 
imagined…distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they 
are imagined.”23 In essence, this imagined community, the welding of tribes, into a larger 
political unit can historically be traced to revolution of the printing press when:  
The coalition between Protestantism and Print-capitalism exploiting cheap 
popular editions, quality created large scale reading public…who typically 
knew little or no Latin-and simultaneously mobilized them for politico-
religious purposes.
24
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So nation-building is the process in which diverse tribes are integrated into a 
coherent larger political and geographic unit to which they identify and begin to show 
allegiance and concern—as for example, Americans are made up of many tribal and 
ethnic traditions and communities. Therefore, the nation-state of the USA takes these 
diverse peoples and socially constructs them via customs, holidays, baseball and sports, 
into a people. The concept of “social construction of reality” is best described by Peter 
Berger who conceives this socio-political reality as intrinsic in our search to govern our 
activities as we externalize ourselves in order to create a sense of meaning.  
In essence, such social reality is evolutionary in scope shapes our ability to form 
distinct cultures, traditions, social mores, and other forms of expressions. Berger writes, 
Social order is a human product, or, more precisely, an ongoing human 
production. It is produced by man in the course of his ongoing 
externalization. Social order exists only as a product of human activity. 
Both in its genesis (social order is the result of past human activity) and its 
existence at any instant of time (social order exists only and insofar as 
human activity continues to produce it) it is a human product.
25
 
This constructed reality of nation-states often has a religious overtone—that is, a 
“civil religion,” in which we recognize certain historical figures, holidays, symbols, and 
forms of ritualization of the nation and its people in observance of customs and traditions 
imbedded in the society. This idea of the sacredness often bestowed onto nation-states is 
also articulated by Ninian Smart, who describes nationalism as a set of ideas, rituals, and 
practices that endow and unite a nation or region.
26
 For example, Smart illustrates how 
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colonial experience helped galvanized the colonized people into a sense of shared identity 
that transcended ethnicity and languages. He asserts, 
Partly because the colonial experience brought them [colonized] into a 
more intense self-awareness, certain large regions-previously disparate-are 
now considered as cultural networks…Black Africa was an extensive 
region before the advent of European powers and of Arab and Western 
slavers…The colonial boundaries, though short lived, lasted long enough 
to stay in place…create[d] new predominantly artificial 
nationalisms…punctuated here and there by civil wars between ethnic 
groups…Nevertheless, the bond of Pan-Africanism remained important.27 
 
In spite of the prospects of the imagined community and it social construction of 
reality, we experienced the exploitation of the nationalism through leaders like Hitler, 
Mao, Stalin, the Apartheid regimes in South Africa, and others. In their extremism, they 
implored racism, tribalism, and other forms of ontic evils like genocide. However, 
Anderson does not think the problem originated from nationalism but rather from racism: 
The fact of the matter is that nationalism thinks in terms of historical 
destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from 
the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: 
outside history.
28
 
 
Sadly, in the last century, the rise of nation-states and their impending 
complexities created new crises, imploding into two major wars and their domino effects. 
This created a global climate of changed condition, leading to the once enslaved and 
colonized people to gain independence and forged a new complex, conflicting, and 
evolving paths in their quest towards poor nation-building and eventually, failed-states.  
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The World Wars, Independence and the Cold War 
World War I
29
 and World War II
30
 had a huge impact on the way people viewed 
the world. Mainly, the end of World War II led to the draft of the Atlantic Charter,
31
 a pro 
Churchill and Roosevelt vision of a new post World War II peace and security order. This 
was followed by the birth of the 20
th
 Century independent movement—creating new 
nations unprecedented in world history. Sadly, the high hopes and the euphoria for self 
rule and optimism were dramatically shattered in major part due to the start of the Cold 
war.
32
 By the 1960s, after years of fighting for independence, most Western colonial 
territories had gained self-rule in Africa, South America, and South-East Asia. 
Independence and national sovereignty, however, did not always bring with it 
freedom from imperialist influences. Colonial legacies were visible in the desire of the 
new governments to keep the boundaries that were created during colonial times, in the 
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promotion of ethnic rivalry, in the continuation of inhumane and unjust actions against 
minority populations, and in the practice of distributing the country’s resources in an 
uneven manner. Also, after being under foreign rule for decades, newly independent 
governments often lacked governmental institutions, good governance skills, and the 
governing experience needed to effectively rule their newly sovereign nations.
33
  
In most cases, the transition from colonial province to independent state was a 
violent and arduous journey. Many post-colonial states in Africa, South-East Asia, The 
Middle East, Latin America and Eastern Europe, experienced similar problems.
34
 For 
example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its former Eastern European allies in 
the early 1990s, they faced conflicts involving borders, ethnic rivalry, human-rights 
violations, and the uneven distribution of resources which raged through these lands in 
Asia and Africa.
35
 In addition, many post-Soviet governments were plagued by a lack of 
governmental institutions, and good governance skills.  
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Most of these new nations, however, had not existed at all as nations before 
colonization, or they had not existed within the post-colonial borders. Most colonial and 
Soviet satellite borders were created either through conquest, negotiation between 
empires, or simply by administrative action. Nevertheless, many of the leaders and 
governments of postcolonial and post-Soviet states have fought to keep the territorial 
boundaries created by past imperialist governments.
36
 As a result, a number of boundary 
conflicts have arisen within post-colonial and post-Soviet territories. Parties to these 
conflicts justify and legitimate their side’s position, using different historical boundaries 
as evidence for their claims even at the point of war for economic and political reasons, 
as exemplified in the Iraq-Iran war.
37
 
The conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, for example, has its 
roots in ethnic rivalry encouraged during British colonial rule. During this time, Turkish 
and Greek populations were often played against one another as a means of maintaining 
control on the island. For example, as Greek Cypriots pushed for self-rule, the British 
encouraged Turkish Cypriots to actively oppose them. By the time the British pulled out 
of Cyprus in 1960, they had helped cleave deep divisions between the Greek and Turkish 
populations.
38
  
                                                                                                                                                 
groups actually lived. While borders separated culturally similar people, they also enclosed traditional 
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The new independent nation, equally ruled by Greeks and Turks, soon was 
embroiled in ethnic conflict. Greek Cypriots wanted the entire island to become part of 
Greece, while Turkish Cypriots wanted the northern part of the island to become an 
independent Turkish state. Consequently, hostilities between the two groups escalated to 
the point of violence.
39
 Decades later, ethnic rivalries that were encouraged during British 
rule, continue to impact the people of Cyprus as violence between Greeks and Turks 
continues to periodical erupt on the island state. The practice of favoring one ethnic, 
religious, racial, or other cultural group over others in most colonial systems, or of giving 
them a higher status, helped to promote inter-group rivalries, and often contributed to the 
unequal distribution of resources. Favored or privileged groups had access to, or control 
of, important resources that allowed them to enrich their members, at the expense of 
nonmembers. Today, many post-colonial and post-Soviet states continue the practice of 
favoring one group over others, whether it is a minority European settler population as in 
South Africa, a minority European alliance group (e.g., Lebanon, Syria, Rwanda, 
Burundi) or an internal ethnic group.
40
  
Today, many post-colonial and post-Soviet governments have adopted the 
legacies of unjust colonial practices and policies as a means to preserve their dominant 
status. Rights with regards to traditional lands, resources, and cultural language are 
denied to many populations, as groups that were marginalized under colonial occupation 
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continue to be marginalized under postcolonial governments, most notably indigenous 
populations such as the indigenous peoples of West Papua, Indonesia, and the natives of 
the Amazon. Human-rights violations, including horrific events of mass murder and 
genocide, can be found in postcolonial and post-Soviet states such as Cambodia, Rwanda, 
Kosovo, El Salvador, and The Democratic Republic of Congo.
41
  
For the most part, colonial and Soviet satellite societies were repressive and 
undemocratic in nature. Domestic governmental systems and structures were controlled 
and operated either from abroad or by a select domestic, privileged group. Consequently, 
when liberation came, these states lacked the internal structures, institutions, and best 
practices of thinking needed to create good governance systems. The result is that many 
postcolonial and post-Soviet states, although independent, are still ruled by repressive 
and restrictive regimes.
42
 
Ironically, during World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union fought 
together as allies against the Axis powers. However, the relationship between the two 
nations was a tense one. Americans had long been wary of Soviet communism and 
concerned about Soviets leader, Joseph Stalin’s tyrannical, blood-thirsty rule of his own 
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country. For their part, the Soviets resented the Americans’ decades and long refusal to 
treat the USSR as a legitimate part of the international community as well as their 
delayed entry into opening a Western Front at D-Day against Hitler’s forces in World 
War II, which resulted in the ongoing carnage on the Eastern Front of World War II and 
the deaths of tens of millions of Russians.
43
 After World War II ended, these grievances 
ripened into an overwhelming sense of mutual distrust and enmity. Postwar Soviet 
expansionism in Eastern Europe fueled many Americans’ fears of a Russian Communist 
plan to control the world. Meanwhile, the USSR came to resent what they perceived as 
American officials’ bellicose rhetoric, arms buildup and interventionist approach to 
international relations. In such a hostile atmosphere, no single party was entirely to blame 
for the Cold War; in fact, some historians believe it was inevitable.
44
  
However, one must credit President Richard Nixon for taking a new approach to 
international relations in the bipolar world. Instead of viewing the world as a hostile 
place, he advocated diplomacy in particular to hostile neighbors as the goal for a new 
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world order. To that end, he encouraged the United Nations to recognize the Communist 
Chinese government and, after a trip there in 1972, began to establish diplomatic 
relations with Beijing. At the same time, he adopted a policy of “détente”–“relaxation”–
toward the Soviet Union. In 1972, he and Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev signed the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), which prohibited the manufacture of nuclear 
missiles by both sides and took a step toward reducing the decades-old threat of nuclear 
war.
45
 
However, under the Reagan administration, the bipolar tension was reignited. 
Like many leaders of his generation, Reagan believed that the spread of communism 
anywhere threatened freedom everywhere. As a result, he worked to provide financial 
and military aid to anticommunist governments and insurgencies around the world. This 
policy particularly was applied in the developing world in places like Angola, Liberia, 
Grenada and El Salvador. Even as Reagan fought communism in Central America, 
however, the Soviet Union was disintegrating. In response to severe economic problems 
and growing political ferment in the USSR, Premier Mikhail Gorbachev took office in 
1985 and introduced two policies that redefined Russia’s relationship to the rest of the 
world: glasnost, or political openness, and perestroika, or economic reform. Soviet 
influence in Eastern Europe waned.
46
  In 1989, every other Communist state in the region 
                                                 
45
 Raymond L. Garthoff. Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to 
Reagan (revised ed.) Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985. 
 
46
 The historical narrative of the end of the Cold War began with the end of the communist 
ideology, the disintegration of the Soviet juggernaut, through the radical introduction of glasnost and 
perestroika by the Gorbachev’s administration in the defunct USSR, and the fall of communist backed 
regimes in Eastern Europe, signaling the evolution of a new global international geo-strategic, economic, 
social, and political order. 
  
58 
replaced its government with a noncommunist one. In November of that year, the Berlin 
Wall–the most visible symbol of the decades-long Cold War–was finally destroyed, just 
over two years after Reagan had challenged the Soviet premier in a speech at 
Brandenburg Gate in Berlin: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”47 But prior to the 
Reagan’s Berlin Wall speech, the Soviets were already in deep economic decline. The 
end of the Cold War can directly be traced to the end of the communist ideology and 
disintegration of the Soviet juggernaut, through the radical introduction of glasnost and 
perestroika by the Gorbachev’s administration in the defunct USSR.48 This was 
precipitated by the rapid fall of communist backed regimes in Eastern Europe, signaling 
the evolution of a new global international geo-strategic, economic, social, and political 
order.  
This end of the Cold War was immediately followed by a global and regional 
uneasiness and uncertainties as formerly backed Communist and Western regimes in 
places like Africa that depended heavily on these two ideological superpowers for 
military, economic and social aids were left in the dust—forced to directly confront any 
internal and external threats from rebellious citizens who felt excluded from the center of 
powers for a long time. The thawing was over and the new hot wars were rapidly and 
disastrously spreading their flames in almost every part of the globe. 
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Illustrative of Liberia, my world and that of thousands of Liberian citizens were 
forever changed on December 25, 1989 when American trained exiled Liberians in 
collaborations with other ethnic groups, who were ironically trained in Libya. On that 
date they launched an incursion that is now known as the 13 years long Liberian civil 
war— a war that destroyed the lives of more than 350,000 civilians and pillaging the 
natural resources. This historical narrative from a personal and national perspective is 
briefly chronicled in the second section of the introduction of this dissertation. 
The End of Cold War, the Unipolar World and Post 9/11 
The collapse of the Cold War bi-polar world in 1988 ushered in the post-Cold 
War era as a changed condition with enormous global conflicts and complexities. 
Arguably it can be considered as the “new world order” or disorder.49 Nevertheless, in 
this unipolar post-Cold war era, the U.S. and its allies erroneously predicted that the 
thawing of the East-West contestation and the relaxation of tensions between the 
superpowers marked a new Westphalian era of relative global peace
 
.
50
 The remaining 
concern was that the only superpower and its allies needed to police those nation-states 
who had weapon of mass destruction—WMD primarily in Iraq, North Korea, and 
appeasing Pakistan and India to avoiding a nuclear war. A power vacuum evolved and 
manifested itself with catastrophic results. From this vacuum have emerged the problems 
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of terrorism and state sponsored genocide. Even with the military and political presence 
of the Western nation-states in the Middle East and Central Asia, Islamic extremist 
organizations have relocated and opened a new front in the war on terror.
51
 
Paradoxically, a “new world disorder” or new world reality erupted in such places 
as the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and The Democratic 
Republic of Congo, as clear evidence of a world of new vicious hot wars, in which the 
international community responded reluctantly and selectively. Human rights abuses 
were visibly on the increase in nations such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Egypt, Myanmar, the 
Middle East, the Sudan, and many other places.
52
 These conflicts, mainly intrastate, also 
had regional, ethnic and religious implications, characterized by the unleashing of terror 
and violence on the civilian population. Additionally, these conflicts were intractable, 
porous, and championed by the emergence of sub-state actors in the forms of cartels, 
insurgents, irregular forces, local warlords, ethnic nationalists, etc, challenging the 
governing state authority and engaging in war as a business of greed and profiteering.  
Furthermore, due to the complexities of these crises, borders and loyalties were 
redefined, and compounded by an absence of clearly defined objectives of the warring 
parties. Therefore any genuine efforts for mediations often seem to be a daunting or 
almost an impossible task by mediators or third parties. Moreover, a lingering perception 
has been formed that the international community is too weak or disinterested in seeking 
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a panacea. Sadly, we saw the end results of this in the negligence in Afghanistan, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, the Balkans, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and now Darfur. 
These crises have been characterized by:  
Decades of wars, political quagmire, societal dislocations, and military 
tensions that not only psychologically destabilized, but equally put terror 
on the faces of the war victims. The sum total of these disorders are 
economic decay, militarism and militarization of society, erosion of state 
cohesion and power, etc. that accelerated the pauperization of the 
society.
53
  
 
Consequently, the failed state typically lacks the wherewithal to adequately 
provide the public goods, such as security, health care, economics, and education. 
Additionally, these states have weak central institutions, no independent courts, the 
absence of democracy; military coercion becomes the only tool in the hand of the 
executive authority. 
The new world order of the unipolar post-Cold War era has greatly reconfigured 
the international system with the emergence of multiple actors competing with states over 
the monopoly of the instruments of coercion, thereby negating the Westphalian 
conception of the sovereignty of the state in international relations. This tension created 
an erosion of the harmony and hegemony of the state, which serves as the legitimacy of 
its government. As a result of the post 1989 world order, many nations were exposed to 
the structural weaknesses once kept intact by the Cold-War bi-polar world. Therefore, the 
legacy of the common good as the cohesive and unifying force for stability of the civilian 
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populations within a sovereign state was forcefully challenged and to some extent 
negated.  
Today, the term failed state became popularized by the disintegrations taking 
place in the early nineties in the Balkans, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Afghanistan, to name a few. The so-called experts and theorists of international relations 
and political science were fascinated in analyzing this phenomenon but mainly from 
academic perspectives. Professor William Reno also referred to this phenomenon as 
“shadowed states.”54 For him, the collapsed state was the result of the shadow states, a 
form of personal rule, where decisions and actions are taken by an individual ruler and do 
not conform to a set of written laws and procedures, although these might be present.  
These Shadow State rulers manipulate the international communities and various 
agencies for access to both formal and clandestine markets, by relying on the global 
recognition of sovereignty, and are thereby able to undermine formal government 
institutions. Thus “Shadowed States” or “informal commercially orientated networks are 
created that operate alongside remaining government bureaucracies.”55 These crises and 
their sad and painful results have been the experiences of the people in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Zimbabwe, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and many 
failed nation-states that are either recovering from protracted civil wars or ongoing 
rebellion seen in Libya and Syria. 
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Furthermore, others scholars were mainly interested in understanding the 
causation of these problems but could do little or nothing in convincing the World’s only 
superpower and the international community that these were serious if not the most 
urgent matter that required a concerted, collective, and sustained global effort to contain 
the implosion and explosion of these collapsing/collapsed or failing/failed states—
considered as sovereign states. 
Primarily, state recognition is based on Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention 
on Rights and Duties of States where in “the state as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; 
(c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”56 However, 
the quagmire that the new world order or disorder must address is what to do with nation-
states that continually violate human rights and are sponsors of international terrorism or 
nation-states that are so weak that the central governmental administrations have little 
control over the smuggling and sales of illegal drugs, weapons, human trafficking, and 
environmental pollutions? Should they be recognized as full members of the community 
of nations or accorded quasi-state status or should they be considered as test cases for 
robust and sustained nation-(re)building?
57
 A full investigation by Scholars and Truth 
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Commissions may offer us some pertinent answers to these issues that may help us 
document and address these failures.
58
   
As such, I argue that a new perspective on the definition of the state must emerge 
to exclude states that violate the rights of its people and that of its neighbors. 
Consequently, the terrorist attack against the United States on September 11, 2001 that 
shocked and awakened the conscience of America and the rest of the world sent a 
powerful signal that even strong states cannot be protected from the devastating effect of 
weak or failed states in a technological and globalized world as we saw in the then 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Hence, the irony is America did not envision the 
prophetic vision of former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali who advocated 
for a new understanding of international relations in a speech entitled An Agenda for 
Peace. He remarked that: 
The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect 
for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common 
international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, 
however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task 
of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between 
the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever 
more interdependent world.
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It was such failure on the part of the international system to act or slowly respond 
to global threats that saw the implosion of the Balkans, Liberia and Sierra Leone in West 
Africa, and Rwanda and Burundi in Central Africa in the early nineties. Today, the 
problem of failed states overwhelmingly, has become an urgent security matter requiring 
a global response or strategic policy agenda. But the lingering question remain how 
effective could a nation-building tool kit be designed in dealing with conflict situations of 
weak or failed states. Before arriving at a genuine solution, I will examine a number of 
specific cases of nations who have trended toward failing/failed or collapsing/collapsed 
state status, while their entrenched and privileged rulers advocated for sovereignty 
against international interventions. I will describe these cases in their historical 
narratives—imperialism, colonialism, post-colonialism, the Cold-War, and post 9/11 era. 
Overview of a Few Illustrations on the Failed States Index 
Somalia 
Somalia, situated in the Horn of Africa, is ranked first in the 2010 Failed States 
Index. It was founded by various African tribes mainly from the Ethiopian Highlands.
60
 
However, from 1875 to 1941, Somalia was always occupied by regional and colonial 
powers such as Egypt, France, England, and Italy.
61
 The only form of leadership the 
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locals exercised was based on clans or traditional patriarchal hegemony. The image of 
Somalia etched in the minds of many in the U.S. and around the world is one of a 
powerful symbol of United Nations’ peacekeeping failure. This was the result of the 
inability of the international community to respond quickly to Somalia’s mass famine and 
civil wars in the early 1990s. During the Cold War both the U.S. and Soviet Union sought 
for influence and control over Somalia because of its strategic location along oil routes 
from the Persian Gulf.  
In the 1970s the USSR armed and aided Somalia. President Siad Barre, in turn, 
professed socialism to win Soviet military support and nationalized most of the 
economy.
62
 He also took on the adventure to annex Ethiopia’s ethnically Somali Ogaden 
region. After the Soviet Union switched support to Ethiopia’s new Marxist military 
government, Somalia lost the Ogaden war.
63
 By the early 1980s the U.S. had replaced the 
Soviet Union as Somalia’s military patron. U.S. military aid to Somalia during the 1980s 
totaled more than $200 million, with hundreds of millions more in economic aid. The 
United States sought to maintain its influence in this volatile area, and to counter the 
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Soviet presence in Ethiopia. Barre gave the U.S. a naval communications facility at 
Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, which had previously been under Soviet control.
64
  
The simmering conflicts between and among Somali clans and rival militias broke 
out in a full-blown civil war in 1988. Three years later the Russians abandoned Ethiopia 
as the Soviet Union collapsed. But the United States stuck with the Somali regime despite 
significant repression and corruption. Then, after years of creating Somalia’s dependence 
on imported food, the United States pulled out, which led to the ouster of President Siad 
Barre in 1991.
65
 The enormous quantities of military hardware from Somalia’s Cold War-
era sponsors virtually guaranteed the country’s long-term destabilization. As the United 
States left Somalia as it would do in many other African countries, ordinary people were 
confused and saw their hopes dissipated as they reflected on the meaning and prospects 
of independence.  
A power vacuum led to further anarchy and civil war that gave leading clan 
militia’s leaders greater and greater economic power because of their military might in a 
stateless and chaotic environment.
66
 Only after the international media finally carried 
shocking pictures of the widespread starvation hitting many Somali families and children 
did Washington and its allies begin to plan a relief and peacekeeping mission.
67
 In April 
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1992 the UN intervened with a mandate to make Somalia safe for the distribution of food 
and other aid. But it proved a disaster as various factions fought and humiliated the UN 
and US Special Forces—making Somalia ungovernable. In August 2000 Clan leaders and 
senior figures met in Djibouti and elected Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president of 
Somalia. They arrived with the newly formed government in Mogadishu and received a 
heroic welcome for the first time since 1991.  
But in April 2001, other Somali warlords, backed by Ethiopia, announced their 
intention to form a national government within six months, in direct opposition to the 
country’s transitional administration. In August 2004, for the 14th time since 1991, an 
attempt was made to restore the central government, after a new transitional parliament 
was inaugurated at a ceremony in Kenya, headed by Abdullahi Yusuf as President. But 
there were bitter divisions over where in Somalia the new parliament should sit. From 
2006 to 2008, the UN endorsed the presence of African Peacekeeping Forces, but ones 
which excluded the participation of Somali’s neighbors. Yet, the country, in spite of an 
interim government and the presence of African Peacekeepers, remains fragile. These 
flawed international responses have been criticized by the Enough Project, a strategy 
paper dedicated to ending genocide and crimes against humanity.
68
 Somalia is now facing 
the worst famine and drought since the Ethiopian famine that brought out the star studded 
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performance aimed at generating funds for humanitarian relief led by Lionel Richie, 
Harry Belafonte, and the late pop star, Michael Jackson in 1985.
69
  
Sudan 
Sudan, which ranks third on the Failed State Index in 2010 list, is the largest and 
one of the most geographically diverse countries in Africa. The region known in modern 
times as the Sudan comes from Arabic bilad as-sudan, “land of the blacks.” Its imperial 
and colonial history is intricately linked with or influenced by Egypt, its immediate 
neighbor to the north.
70
 Its historical narrative has also been influenced by Christianity, 
Islam, British colonialism, and Cold War politics. It has been divided between its Arab 
heritage, identified with northern Sudan, and its African heritages to the south. The two 
groups are divided along linguistic, religious, racial, and economic lines, and the cleavage 
has generated intractable violence and destructions that officially ended after two 
devastating civil wars.
71
 Following the  January 2011 referendum it was announced that 
almost 99 percent of voters in the Christian South had voted for independence from the 
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Muslim North, making Southern Sudan the newest nation—in need of a nation-building 
toolkit, come July 9, 2011.
72
  
Historically, Nubia, a vast portion of Sudan was influenced by Christianity dating 
back to the fourth century, when Egypt formally adopted the religion (along with the rest 
of the Byzantine Empire) and when the ruler of Ethiopia was converted to Christianity by 
Frumentius.
73
 But by 1881 an ascetic religious leader, Mohammed Ahmed, living with 
his disciples on an island in the White Nile, inspired by the revelation that he was the 
long-awaited Mahdi, publicly announced his new status advocating the creation of a strict 
Islamic state.
74
 The colonial administration in Khartoum immediately called for his 
arrest; however, he quickly escaped to the mountains with his followers and later 
defeated the Egyptian and British forces. He later died of typhus and his grave was 
desecrated.
75
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Similarly, the period of British control (1899-1955) has had a lasting impact on 
Sudan. In addition to pacifying and uniting the country, the British sought to modernize 
Sudan by using technology and industry to facilitate economic development and by 
establishing democratic institutions to end authoritarian rule. Even in 1991, many of 
Sudan’s political and economic institutions owed their existence to the British. Lastly, 
Sudan’s post independence history has been shaped largely by the southern civil war.76 
This conflict has greatly delayed the country’s social and economic development, 
encouraged political instability, and led to an endless cycle of weak and ineffective 
military and civilian governments. The conflict appears likely to continue to affect 
Sudan’s people and institutions for a long time to come.77 
Across the centuries, Islam eventually changed the nature of Sudanese society and 
facilitated the division of the country into north and south. Nevertheless, Islam also 
fostered political unity, economic growth, and educational development among its 
adherents; however, these benefits were restricted largely to urban and commercial 
centers. The spread of Islam began shortly after the Prophet Muhammad’s death in 632. 
                                                 
76
 Helen C. Metz. Sudan: A Country Study. Washington DC: GPO Press, 1991. Sudan has long 
been considered an impoverished backwater overshadowed by its Egyptian and Ethiopian neighbors. Even 
during the Cold War, Moscow and Washington showed little interest to meddle in the Sudanese civil war; 
they were far more interested in the terrible conflicts fought in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and 
Somalia. Nevertheless Sudan has subsequently played a central role in the evolution and development of 
militant Islam, providing Osama bin Laden with sanctuary after he fell out with the Saudi royal family. 
Washington has listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism since the early 1990s; though it has said it will 
remove Sudan if the referendum went well. After British forces took control of Sudan from the Mahdists in 
the late 1890s until independence in 1956 Britain ruled the country as two entities. The two halves came to 
blows just before independence sparking a civil war that dragged on until the early1970s. The imposition of 
Islamic Sharia law in the early 1980s and General Jaafar Nimeiri ignoring the Christian south’s autonomy 
sparked war again with the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).  
 
 
77
 Richard Crockett. Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State. Hartford: Yale University 
Press, 2010. 
 
  
72 
By that time, he and his followers had converted most of Arabia’s tribes and towns to 
Islam, which Muslims maintained united the individual believer, the state, and society 
under God’s will.78  
Islamic rulers, therefore, exercised temporal and religious authority, enforcing 
Islamic law (sharia), which was derived primarily from the Quran. However, the Arabs 
realized the commercial advantages of peaceful relations with Nubia and used the treaty 
to ensure that travel and trade proceeded unhindered across the frontier. The treaty also 
contained security arrangements whereby both parties agreed that each party (Christian 
Nubians and Muslim Arabs) would come to the defense of the other in the event of an 
attack by a third party.
79
  
The British colonial adventure in Sudan sought to modernize the country by 
applying European technology to its underdeveloped economy and by replacing its 
authoritarian institutions with ones that adhered to liberal English traditions. However, 
southern Sudan’s remote and undeveloped provinces received little official attention until 
after World War I, except for efforts to suppress tribal warfare and the slave trade. The 
British justified this policy by claiming that the south was not ready for exposure to the 
modern world.
80
 To allow the south to develop along indigenous lines, the British, 
therefore, closed the region to outsiders.  
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As a result, the south remained isolated and backward. A few Arab merchants 
controlled the region’s limited commercial activities while Arab bureaucrats administered 
whatever laws existed. Christian missionaries, who operated schools and medical clinics, 
provided limited social services in southern Sudan.
81
 Sudanese nationalism, as it 
developed after World War I, was an Arab and Muslim phenomenon with its support 
base in the Northern provinces. Nationalists opposed indirect rule and advocated a 
centralized national government in Khartoum responsible for both regions. Nationalists 
also perceived Britain’s southern policy as artificially dividing Sudan and preventing its 
unification under an Arabized and Islamic ruling class.
82
  
During World War II, some British colonial officers questioned the economic and 
political viability of the southern provinces as separate from northern Sudan. Britain also 
had become more sensitive to Arab criticism of the southern policy. In 1946 the Sudan 
Administrative Conference determined that Sudan should be administered as one country. 
Moreover, the conference delegates agreed to readmit northern administrators to southern 
posts, abolish the trade restrictions imposed under the “closed door” ordinances, and 
allow southerners to seek employment in the north. Khartoum also nullified the 
prohibition against Muslim proselytizing in the south and introduced Arabic in the south 
as the official administration language.  
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On December 19, 1955, the Sudanese parliament unanimously adopted a 
declaration of independence and on January 1, 1956 Sudan became an independent 
republic. The leadership called for the withdrawal of foreign troops and requested the 
condominium powers to sponsor a plebiscite in advance of the scheduled date. To 
advance their interests, many southern leaders concentrated their efforts in Khartoum, 
where they hoped to win constitutional concessions. Although determined to resist what 
they perceived to be Arab imperialism, they were opposed to violence. Most southern 
representatives supported provincial autonomy and warned that failure to win legal 
concessions would drive the south to rebellion.  
Sudan achieved independence without the rival political parties having agreed on 
the form and content of a permanent constitution. Instead, the Constituent Assembly 
adopted a document known as the Transitional Constitution, which replaced the governor 
general as head of state with a five-member Supreme Commission that was elected by a 
parliament composed of an indirectly elected Senate and a popularly elected House of 
Representatives.  
The parliamentary regime introduced plans to expand the country’s education, 
economic, and transportation sectors. To achieve these goals, Khartoum needed foreign 
economic and technical assistance, to which the United States made an early 
commitment. Conversations between the two governments had begun in mid-1957, and 
the parliament ratified a United States aid agreement in July 1958.
83
 Washington hoped 
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this agreement would reduce Sudan’s excessive reliance on a one-crop (cotton) economy 
and would facilitate the development of the country’s transportation and communications 
infrastructure.
84
 This tenuous relationship of the USA and Sudan has always been in flux. 
Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the U.S.A in June 1967, following the outbreak of 
the Arab-Israeli War. But relation was restored in 1971 when the Sudanese Communist 
Party attempted to overthrow President Nimeiri and suspected Soviet involvement. U.S. 
assisted Sudan in 1972 peace settlement with the south.
85
 On March 1, 1973, Palestinian 
terrorists of the “Black September” organization murdered U.S. Ambassador Cleo A. 
Noel and Deputy Chief of Mission Curtis G. Moore in Khartoum.
86
 Sudanese officials 
arrested the terrorists and tried them on murder charges. In June 1974, however, they 
were released to the custody of the Egyptian Government. 
The origins of the civil war in the south date back to the 1950s. On August 18, 
1955, the Equatoria Corps, a military unit composed of southerners, mutinied at Torit.
87
 
Rather than surrender to Sudanese government authorities, many mutineers disappeared 
into hiding with their weapons, marking the beginning of the first war in southern 
Sudan.
88
  By the late 1960s, the war had resulted in the deaths of about 500,000 people. 
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Several hundred thousand more southerners hid in the forests or escaped to refugee 
camps in neighboring countries.
89
  
By 1969 the rebels had developed foreign contacts to obtain weapons and 
supplies. Israel, for example, trained Anya Nya recruits and shipped weapons via 
Ethiopia and Uganda to the rebels. Anya Nya also purchased arms from Congolese rebels 
and international arms dealers with monies collected in the south and from among 
southern Sudanese exile communities in the Middle East, Western Europe, and North 
America. The rebels also captured arms, equipment, and supplies from government 
troops.
90
  
After the settlement in the south, President Nimeiri attempted to mend fences with 
northern Muslim religious groups. The government undertook administrative 
decentralization, popular with the Ansar that favored rural over urban areas where leftist 
activism was most evident. Khartoum also reaffirmed Islam’s special position in the 
country, recognized sharia law as the source of all legislation, and released some 
members of religious orders who had been incarcerated. However, reconciliation with 
conservative groups, which had organized outside Sudan under Sadiq al Mahdi’s 
leadership and were later known as the National Front, eluded Nimeiri.
91
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Notwithstanding, the region of Darfur, in western Sudan, erupted into conflict in 
2003. Despite international outrage and demands around the globe to end the brutality, 
the deadly conflict continues.
92
 Darfur remains one of the world’s worst human rights and 
humanitarian catastrophes where pro-government Arab militias (Janjaweed) are accused 
of a campaign of ethnic cleansing against non-Arab locals.
93
 The conflict has strained 
relations between Sudan and Chad, to the west. Both countries have accused each other 
of cross-border incursions. The leader of Sudan, Mr. Omar-al Bashir
94
 faces two 
international arrest warrants, issued by the International Criminal Court in The Hague, on 
charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. He has dismissed the 
allegations and has continued to travel to countries who have opposed the indictment. 
Sudan also played host to Osama Bin Laden in 1992, when he was exiled by Saudi 
Arabia, in a deal brokered by Ali Mohamed.
95
 It was in Sudan that bin Laden continued 
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his verbal assault on King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and in response, on March 5, 1994, 
Fahd sent an emissary to Sudan demanding bin Laden’s passport. His family was 
persuaded to cut off his monthly stipend, the equivalent of $7 million a year.
96
 
In 2001 the Bush administration named a presidential envoy for peace in the 
Sudan to explore what role the U.S. could play in ending Sudan’s civil war and 
enhancing the delivery of humanitarian aid. Andrew Natsios and subsequently 
Ambassador Richard Williamson served as presidential envoys to Sudan during the Bush 
administration. More recently, on March 18, 2009 President Obama announced the 
appointment of Major General (Ret.) J. Scott Gration as the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan 
who is tasked to understand the influence of political Islam.
97
 This is the integration of 
religion and politics within Islamic States.
98
 Finally, On October 19, 2009, Secretary of 
State Hillary Rodham Clinton announced the Obama’s new Sudan strategy of three core 
principles:  
(1) Achieving a definitive end to conflict, gross human rights abuses, and 
genocide in Darfur; (2) Implementation of the North-South 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that results in a peaceful post-
2011 Sudan, or an orderly path toward two separate and viable states at 
peace with each other; and (3) Ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe 
haven for international terrorists.99 
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This raises the prospect of the new nation of Southern Sudan that might be the 
poorest place in the world that largely lacks basic sanitation, clean water, clinic, hospital 
and more. The United States, through the United Nations, NGOs and religious 
organizations must continue to engage the Sudanese in facilitating a wholistic approach 
for peace and stability.  It is of such nation and people, that assert, is it perfect test case 
for a strategic nation-building agenda involving all stakeholders—the church, 
international community, the local populations, and other NGOs. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo 
 The Democratic Republic of Congo which ranks fifth on the Failed States Index 
2010 report is one of Africa’s largest countries with vast mineral and economic resources. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) has been a flash point of what is now 
known as Africa’s world war claiming more than 5.4 million lives. The vast majority 
have died from preventable non-violent causes such as malaria, diarrhea, hunger, 
malnutrition, pneumonia, creating one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.100 
Almost 45 thousand perish every month. The five-year conflict which began  in 1998, 
pitted government forces, supported by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, against rebels 
backed by Uganda and Rwanda. To date it remains the world deadliest conflict since 
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WWII.
101
 Despite a peace deal and the formation of a transitional government in 2003, 
people in the east of the country remain in terror of marauding militia and the army 
known for raping, pillaging, and exploiting the natural and human resources of the vast 
nation.
102
  
 Its colonial legacy began from 1840 to 1872, the Scottish missionary, David 
Livingstone, engaged in a series of explorations that brought the Congo to the attention of 
the Western world.
103
 During these travels, Livingstone was out of touch with Europe for 
two years. Henry Morton Stanley, a journalist, was commissioned by the New York 
Herald to conduct a search for him. The two met at Ujiji, on the eastern shore of Lake 
Tanganyika, in 1871. Three years later, Stanley was commissioned by the New York 
Herald and London’s Daily Telegraph to continue the explorations begun by 
Livingstone. With three British companions, Stanley began the descent of the Congo 
from its upper reaches, completing his journey in 1877. Returning to Europe, he tried to 
interest the British government in further exploration and development of the Congo but 
met with no success. His expeditions did, however, attract another European monarch.  
Stanley’s adventures brought the Congo to the attention of Belgium’s King 
Leopold II, a man of boundless energy and ambition. The European occupation of Africa 
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was well under way, but the Congo River basin remained for the most part unknown to 
Europeans. With no great powers contesting its control, the area appeared to present an 
ideal opportunity for Belgian expansion. Recruiting Stanley to help him from 1878, 
Léopold II founded the International Association of the Congo, financed by an 
international consortium of bankers. Under the auspices of this association, Stanley 
arrived at the mouth of the Congo in 1879 and began the journey upriver. After the 1884-
85 Conference of Berlin gave undisputed sovereignty of the region of modern Zaire to 
Léopold II, king of Belgium, the first order of business was to structure the area's 
economy to suit Belgian needs. The goal was to make an economically viable and self-
sustaining entity out of the Congo Free State, as Zaire was then known. Although 
exploitation of the country’s mineral and agricultural wealth was substantial during the 
colonial period, economic development bore little direct relationship to the needs of the 
indigenous population.
104
 The history of similar prejudices were also meted on the Congo 
in 1904  when Christian Missionary brought and showcased Ota Benga, an African 
pigmy at New York’s Bronx zoo, placing him in a monkey cage.105  
The production of cash crops for export was stressed at the expense of the 
production of food crops. Moreover, monetary benefits accrued almost entirely to non-
Congolese, the foreign shareholders of the industrial and agricultural companies that 
constituted the modern sector, and the colonial state, which had holdings in many of the 
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companies. The colonial government’s major aim was to encourage foreign investment in 
the Belgian Congo to develop agricultural commodities for export, to exploit the 
country’s mineral resources for the same purpose, and to establish a transportation 
infrastructure to facilitate the export of goods.
106
 The colonizer had very little interest 
with such basic social needs as health care or education, which were provided by 
religious missions and to some extent by the large concessionaire companies. Policies 
designed to promote state economic objectives emphasized measures to ensure adequate 
supplies of labor at low wages and human rights abuses.
107
  
Among such measures were the use of forced recruitment and restrictions on the 
establishment of foreign commercial trading activities, which would have encouraged the 
farm population to produce surpluses for sale rather than take low-paying work on 
plantations and in mines. Colonial authorities obtained through coercion the indigenous 
labor necessary to perform public works and private investment projects. A decree of 
1917, for example, required African peasants to devote sixty days a year to agricultural 
work, and mandated penal sanctions for disobedience.
108
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Sadly, the history of Democratic Republic of Congo has been one of civil war and 
corruption. After independence in 1960, the country immediately faced an army mutiny 
and an attempt at secession by its mineral-rich province of Katanga.
109
 A year later, its 
prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, was seized and killed by troops loyal to army General 
Joseph Mobutu. In 1965 Mobutu seized power, later renaming the country Zaire and 
himself Mobutu Sese Seko. He turned Zaire into a springboard for operations against 
Soviet-backed Angola and thereby ensured US backing. But he also made Zaire 
synonymous with corruption.
110
 After the Cold War, Zaire ceased to be of interest to the 
US. Thus, when in 1997 neighboring Rwanda invaded it to flush out extremist Hutu 
militias, it gave a boost to the anti-Mobutu rebels, who quickly captured the capital, 
Kinshasa, installed Laurent Kabila as president and renamed the country The Democratic 
Republic of Congo.
111
         
 Nonetheless, D.R. Congo’s troubles continued. A rift between Mr. Kabila and his 
former allies sparked a new rebellion, backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Angola, Namibia 
and Zimbabwe took Kabila's side, turning the country into a vast battleground.  Coup 
attempts and sporadic violence heralded renewed fighting in the eastern part of the 
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country in 2008. Rwandan Hutu militias clashed with government forces in April, 
displacing thousands of civilians.
112
  
 Another militia under rebel General Laurent Nkunda had signed a peace deal with 
the government in January, but clashes broke out again in August 2008. Gen Nkunda’s 
forces advanced on government bases and the provincial capital Goma in the autumn, 
causing civilians and troops to flee while UN peacekeepers tried to hold the line 
alongside the remaining government forces.
113
 In attempt to bring the situation under 
control, the government in January 2009 invited in troops from Rwanda to help mount a 
joint operation against the Rwandan rebel Hutu militias active in eastern D.R. Congo. 
Rwanda arrested the Hutu militias’ main rival, General Nkunda,114 a Congolese Tutsi 
hitherto seen as its main ally in the area. However, during 2009 eastern areas remained 
beset by violence. These shocking figures would usually be more than enough to get 
media attention the world over, especially if it were to threaten influential nations in 
some way. Yet, perhaps as a cruel irony, influential nations in the world benefit from the 
vast resources coming from the D.R. Congo for which people are dying.
115
 This deadly 
crisis in essence, had been driven by conflict minerals that multinational corporations 
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including electronic companies like Apple and Microsoft desperately need for their 
sustainability and profit margins.
116
  
Afghanistan 
Afghanistan which ranks sixth in 2010 Failed States Index, has a long history of 
instability. It’s a landlocked and very mountainous nation. Its strategic position wedged 
between the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent along the ancient 
“Silk Route” means that Afghanistan has long been fought over despite its rugged and 
forbidding terrain. It was at the center of the so-called “Great Game”117 in the 19th 
century when Imperial Russia and the British Empire in India vied for influence. And it 
became a key Cold War battleground after thousands of Soviet troops intervened in 1979 
to prop up a pro-communist regime, leading to a major confrontation that drew in the US 
and Afghanistan’s neighbors.118 But the outside world eventually lost interest after the 
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withdrawal of Soviet forces, while the country’s protracted civil war dragged on. But 
their extreme version imposed widespread oppression across Afghanistan and attracted 
widespread international criticism.  
The Taliban,
119
 drawn from the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, were opposed 
by an alliance of factions drawn mainly from Afghanistan’s other communities and based 
in the north. In control of about 90% of Afghanistan until late 2001, the Taliban were 
recognized as the legitimate government by only three countries. They were at 
loggerheads with the international community over the presence on their soil of Osama 
bin Laden, accused by the US of masterminding the bombing of their embassies in Africa 
in 1998 and the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001.
120
 After the Taliban’s refusal to 
hand over bin Laden, the US initiated aerial attacks in October, paving the way for 
opposition groups to drive them from power.
121
  
Infighting between local commanders over power and territory became a feature 
of the post-Taliban period. The authorities in Kabul have been able to exert little control 
beyond the capital and militant violence has continued. Predictions of the Taliban’s 
demise after the adoption of a new Afghan constitution in 2004 proved to be premature, 
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as the hard-line group came back with a vengeance and violence has risen steadily to 
levels not seen since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
122
 
The Afghan conflict replaced Iraq as the main policy headache for the US and 
their allies, and in March 2009 President Barack Obama unveiled a new American 
strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat what he called an increasingly perilous 
situation.
123
In December, this was followed by an order boosting US troop’s numbers by 
30,000, as well as a pledge to begin withdrawing forces by 2011. Afghanistan’s heroin 
industry was reported to make up more than half of the economy by 2007, having 
boomed since the fall of the Taliban. The country supplies over 90% of the world’s 
opium, the raw ingredient of heroin.
124
 International bodies and governments concluded 
that the drug trade was helping to fuel the Taliban insurgency, which is estimated to 
generate up to US$100m a year from the trade. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime 
called on Afghanistan to target the major traffickers and corrupt government officials, 
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who it says operate with impunity in the country.
125
 At the conclusion of the NATO 
conference held in Lisbon, Portugal on November 20, 2010, the US and its NATO allies 
planed to hand over security to the Afghans by 2014.
126
 Yet, the violence remains 
unabated with the killing of over twenty-five US Special Forces and President Karzai’s 
half brother in 2011. With a clear mandate by the Obama’s administration and NATO to 
end their mission in Afghanistan in 2013, the world awaits the outcome of a Post-NATO 
peace enforcement nation of Afghanistan, emerging either as a success story or a relapsed 
failed state. 
Iraq 
 Iraq which ranks seventh in the Failed States Index has a long ancient and modern 
history. The land known as Mesopotamia,
127
 wedged between the Tigris and Euphrates, 
which gave birth to some of the most early and advanced of ancient civilizations is 
present day Iraq. As the Sumerians, they created one of the most ancient civilizations in 
the world—credited with creating the first identifiable written language, sometime 
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around 4000BC.
128
 The ancient city of Babylon, capital of the region of Babylonia, lies in 
modern-day Iraq, its ruins found about 80 km south of Baghdad. The most sophisticated 
legal code of the ancient world came from Iraq. Introduced by King Hammurabi, whose 
dynasty ruled Babylonia from about 1793- 590BC, it is the first known legal code that 
takes into account whether a crime was committed intentionally or not. This makes it the 
precursor of the mens rea principle
129
 upon which our modern criminal legal system is 
based.  
During the reign of the Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar II (604-562 BC), 
Babylon became the biggest city in the world. The great biblical patriarch Abraham came 
from the city of Ur in ancient Iraq.  Nebuchadnezzar II is also said to have built the 
legendary Hanging Gardens of Babylon,
130
 one of the seven wonders of the ancient 
world. In ancient times, Baghdad was built on western bank of the Tigris and was also 
known as Madinatu s-Salam or “City of Peace”. The legendary warrior Saladin, who 
recaptured Jerusalem from the Crusaders in the 12
th
 century, was born in Tikrit, near 
Saddam Hussein’s native village.131 Saddam made comparisons between himself and 
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Saladin. In 1258, Genghis Khan’s grandson, Hulagu, led an invasion which utterly 
destroyed the Islamic capital of Baghdad. The Mongol army made a pyramid of the skulls 
of Baghdad’s scholars, religious leaders and poets. The late Saddam Hussein once called 
President George W. Bush as “the Hulagu of this age,” and warned the US that “the 
people of Baghdad have resolved to compel the Mongols of this age to commit suicide on 
its walls.”132   
Historically, Iraq, an Arabic word, has been associated with an ancient meaning 
of Uruk, for a Sumerian city in the 6th century. From 1534 -1918, the region was part of 
the Ottoman Empire. The British formed the modern state of Iraq when they consolidated 
the three disparate provinces of Basra (in the south), Baghdad and Mosul (in the north) in 
the aftermath of WWI, when the ruling Ottoman empire collapsed.
133
 The modern nation 
state of Iraq became independent in 1932. In the late 1800s, the British controlled the 
Middle East in order to have a land route to India.  
In 1904 the British Navy shifted from coal to oil and later in 1916 the British/ 
French in Sykes-Picot agreement arbitrarily drew national borders in the Middle East; 
southern Mesopotamia including Baghdad was to be administered by Great Britain. 
Arabs were angry about this secret agreement when it was published by the Russian 
government in 1917.
134
 Fearing a rebellion, the British used systematic aerial 
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bombardment for first time in history, invading Mesopotamia and occupying Baghdad, 
making Iraq a British Mandate. By 1921 the British Colonial Office demarcated a line 
across Southern Iraq creating Kuwait to prevent Iraq access to Persian Gulf. When in the 
late 1940s after WWII British power began to wane the Americans stepped in.
135
  
It was George Kennan one of the architects of US Cold-war Foreign policy who 
stated in 1948 that: 
The US has about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its 
population. In this situation we cannot fail to be the object of envy and 
resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of 
relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity 
without positive detriment to our national security. To do so we will have 
to dispense with all sentimentality and daydreaming, and our attention will 
have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives. 
We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford the luxury of altruism 
and world benefaction. We should cease to talk about such vague and 
unreal objectives as human rights, the raising of living standards and 
democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal 
in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic 
slogans, the better.136        
   
 Therefore, the struggle for Middle East oil became a geo-political battle of the 
Cold-War era. Moreover, in 1951 Mossadigh took power in Iran and declared that they 
will control their own oil. But in 1953 after two years of U.S. sponsored sanctions the 
                                                                                                                                                 
29, 1924. Parliamentary Papers 1924–25, vol. xxxi Cmd. No. 2557. In the initial secret agreements, the 
British sought to place the French in Mosul in order for them to act as a buffer between a British 
Mesopotamia and a Russian controlled Armenia. This was amended in secret negotiations between Lloyd 
George and Georges Clemenceau in February of 1919. See Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A 
Diplomatic History 1913–1923. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931. 
 
135
 See Charles Tripps. A History of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
136
 George F. Kennan. Realities of American Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1954.  See American Diplomacy, 1900–1950, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. George Frost 
Kennan (February 16, 1904-March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and 
historian, regarded as the father of “containment” and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War.  
  
92 
CIA supported a plot to overthrow Mossadigh and placed the Shah in power.
137
 The 
American General, Norman Schwartzkopf, was mandated to help the Shah develop its 
security apparatus. However, in 1958 a popular revolution led by Abd al-Kassem 
Quassim failed to overthrow the British-installed king of Iraq. But he was finally 
overthrown in 1959 and one of the assassins was Saddam Hussein who wounded 
Quassim.
138
 
 Later Saddam became a tyrannical ruler. However, his totalitarian, centralized 
rule was quite effective in keeping the tensions inherent amongst the three primary 
groups in Iraq (Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, and Kurds) intact. Saddam’s heavy-handed rule 
was the stabilizing force that held the ethnically and religiously divided nation of Iraq 
together, and when he fell from power the infrastructure of the state collapsed along with 
him. The long simmering tensions between the three groups finally surfaced. When the 
U.S. finally entered Baghdad, it found itself in a political and military quagmire which 
forced itself to be aggressive in helping avoiding civil war between the various groups.
139
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 The Neo-Cons
140
 of the Bush administration then, predicted that the newly 
liberated Iraq would become a beacon of democracy and hope for the rest of the Middle 
East, a region of autocratic regimes. The Bush administration was ideologically blinded 
by facts and reality. What most of the skeptics and critics of the world saw was “regime 
change” in Iraq and a massive failure to pre plan for the seemingly endless difficulties of 
nation-building in the absence of Saddam and his Baath Party.
141
   
Haiti 
Haiti which ranks eleventh on the Failed States Index, became the world’s first 
black-led republic and the first independent Caribbean state when it threw off French 
colonial control and slavery in a series of wars in the early 19th century. However, 
decades of poverty, environmental degradation, violence, high HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
instability and dictatorship have left it as the poorest nation in the Americas (Western 
hemisphere).
142
 A mostly mountainous country with a tropical climate, Haiti’s location, 
history and culture, epitomized by voodoo, once made it a potential tourist hot spot, but 
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instability and violence, especially since the 1980s, severely dented that prospect.
143
 Haiti 
achieved notoriety during the brutal dictatorships of the voodoo physician Francois “Papa 
Doc” Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude, or “Baby Doc”. Tens of thousands of people 
were killed under their 29-year rule.
144
 
 Hopes that the election in 1990 of Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
145
 a former priest, 
would herald a brighter future were dashed when he was overthrown by the military a 
short time later. Although economic sanctions and US-led military intervention forced a 
return to constitutional government in 1994, Haiti's fortunes did not pick up, with 
allegations of electoral irregularities, ongoing extra-judicial killings, torture and brutality. 
Additionally, a bloody rebellion and pressure from the US and France forced Mr. Aristide 
out of the country in 2004.
146
 Since then, an elected leadership has taken over from an 
interim government and a UN stabilization force has been deployed. But Haiti is still 
plagued by violent confrontations between rival gangs and political groups and the UN 
has described the human rights situation as catastrophic.  
Meanwhile, Haiti’s most serious underlying social problem, the huge wealth gap 
between the impoverished Creole-speaking black majority and the French-speaking 
minority, one percent of whom own nearly half the country’s wealth, remains 
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unaddressed. Many Haitians seek work and a better life in the US or other Caribbean 
nations, including the neighboring Dominican Republic, which is home to hundreds of 
thousands of Haitian migrants.
147
 Furthermore, the infrastructure has all but collapsed and 
drug trafficking has corrupted the judicial system and the police. Haiti has always been 
ill-equipped to deal with the aftermath of the tropical storms that frequently sweep across 
the island, with severe deforestation having left it vulnerable to flooding. It also lies in a 
region prone to earthquakes. 
 Natural disaster struck with full force in 2010, when the capital Port-au-Prince 
was hit by magnitude 7.0 earthquake became the country’s worst disaster in 200 years. 
Tens of thousands of people were killed and much of the capital and its wider area 
devastated, prompting a major international aid effort. In mid October to early November 
of 2010, an outbreak of cholera and Hurricane Thomas hit the country, leaving scores of 
people dead and displaced. The Haitian people certainly have been hit by multiple 
calamities—social, environmental, political, racial economic disasters. Equivocally, the 
nation of Haiti deserves a robust nation-building agenda with the help of the international 
community and Haitians people themselves. 
Rwanda 
Rwanda which ranks forty-first in the Failed States Index 2010, has experienced 
Africa’s worst genocide in modern times, and the country’s recovery was marred by its 
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intervention in the conflict in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo.
148
 The country 
has been beset by ethnic tension associated with the traditionally unequal relationship 
between the dominant Tutsi minority and the majority Hutus. Although after 1959 the 
ethnic relationship was reversed, when civil war prompted around 200,000 Tutsis to flee 
to Burundi, lingering resentment led to periodic massacres of Tutsis. The most notorious 
of these began in April 1994.
149
 The shooting down of the plane carrying President 
Juvenal Habyarimana, and his Burundian counterpart, near Kigali triggered what 
appeared to be a coordinated attempt by Hutus to eliminate the Tutsi population.
150
 In 
response, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) launched a military campaign to 
control the country. It achieved this by July, by which time at least 800,000 Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus had been brutally massacred.
151
 Some two million Hutus fled to Zaire, 
now the D.R. Congo. They included some of those responsible for the massacres, and 
some joined Zairean (renamed the DRC) forces to attack local Tutsis. Rwanda responded 
by invading refugee camps dominated by Hutu militiamen.
152
  
Rwanda withdrew its forces from DR Congo in late 2002 after signing a peace 
deal with Kinshasa. But tensions simmered, with Rwanda accusing the Congolese army 
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of aiding Hutu rebels in eastern D.R. Congo. Rwanda has used traditional Gacaca 
community courts to try those suspected of taking part in the 1994 genocide.
153
 But key 
individuals, particularly those accused of orchestrating the slaughter appeared before an 
International Criminal Tribunal in northern Tanzania. The country is striving to rebuild 
its economy, with tourism, coffee and tea production being among its main sources of 
foreign exchange. Yet, nearly two thirds of the populations live below the poverty line.
154
 
The Balkans (former Yugoslavia) 
Only Bosnia-Herzegovina ranked sixtieth, is currently listed on the Failed States 
Index for 2010 from the former Yugoslavia. The defunct Yugoslavia Federation was first 
formed as a kingdom in 1918 and then recreated as a Socialist state in 1945 after the Axis 
powers were defeated in World War II. The constitution established six constituent 
republics in the federation: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Slovenia. Serbia also had two autonomous provinces: Kosovo and 
Vojvodina.
155
 By 1992 the Yugoslav Federation was falling apart. Nationalism had once 
again replaced communism as the dominant force in the Balkans.
156
 Slovenia and then 
Croatia were the first to break away, but only at the cost of renewed conflict with Serbia. 
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The war in Croatia led to hundreds of thousands of refugees and reawakened memories of 
the brutality of the 1940s.
157
  
By 1992 a further conflict had broken out in Bosnia which had also declared 
independence. The Serbs who lived there were determined to remain within Yugoslavia 
and to help build a greater Serbia. They received strong backing from extremist groups in 
Belgrade. Muslims were driven from their homes in carefully planned operations that 
become known as “ethnic cleansing”.  By 1993 the Bosnian Muslim government was 
besieged in the capital Sarajevo, surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces that controlled 
around 70% of Bosnia. In Central Bosnia, the mainly Muslim army was fighting a 
separate war against Bosnian Croats who wished to be part of a greater Croatia.
158
  
The presence of UN peacekeepers to contain the situation proved ineffective. 
American pressure to end the war eventually led to the Dayton agreement of November 
1995 which created two self-governing entities within Bosnia-the Bosnian Serb Republic 
and the Muslim (Bosnjak)-Croat Federation.
159
 The settlement’s aims were to bring about 
the reintegration of Bosnia and to protect the human rights but the agreement has been 
criticized for not reversing the results of ethnic cleansing. The Muslim-Croat and Serb 
entities have their own governments, parliaments and armies.
160
 A NATO-led 
peacekeeping force was charged with implementing the military aspects of the peace 
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agreement, primarily overseeing the separation of forces. But the force was also granted 
extensive additional powers, including the authority to arrest indicted war criminals when 
encountered in the normal course of its duties.
161
 
Croatia, meanwhile, took back most of the territory earlier captured by Serbs 
when it waged lightning military campaigns in 1995 which also resulted in the mass 
exodus of around 200,000 Serbs from Croatia. In 1998, nine years after the abolition of 
Kosovo’s autonomy, the Kosovo Liberation Army, supported by the majority ethnic 
Albanians came out in open rebellion against Serbian rule. The international community, 
while supporting greater autonomy, opposed the Kosovar Albanians’ demand for 
independence.
162
 But international pressure grew on Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, 
to bring an end to the escalating violence in the province. Threats of military action by 
the West over the crisis culminated in the launching of NATO air strikes against 
Yugoslavia in March 1999, the first attack on a sovereign European country in the 
alliance’s history.163  
Slobodan Milosevic lost a presidential election in 2000 and refused to accept the 
result but was forced out of office by strikes and massive street protests, which 
                                                 
 
161
 Sabrina Ramet. The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and Legitimation, 1918-2003. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006. 
 
162
 Stephen Engelberg. “Germany Raising Hopes of Croatia, New York Times, December 12, 1991, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/12/world/germany-raising-hopes-of-croatia.html (retrieved 11.24.10). 
“Before the war, the Yugoslav Army drew its soldiers from conscription in all of the Yugoslav republics. 
Now it must rely on Serbian reservists and Serb irregulars who are poorly trained. A recent report by the 
monitoring mission concluded that the army was routinely shelling civilian areas.” 
 
163
 Marko A. Hoare. A History of Bosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day. London: 
Saqi, 2007. 
 
  
100 
culminated in the storming of parliament. He was handed over to a UN war crimes 
tribunal in The Hague, and put on trial for crimes against humanity and genocide.  
Slobodan Milosevic was found dead in his cell in The Hague on March 11, 2006. His 
long-running trial had been hit by repeated delays, partly because of his poor health and 
no verdict had been reached.
164
 A Dutch investigation concluded that he had died of a 
heart attack, dismissing claims by his supporters that he had been poisoned. In Kosovo 
reconciliation between the majority ethnic Albanians, most of them pro-independence, 
and the Serb minority remained elusive. Several rounds of UN-mediated talks have been 
held, without any significant breakthrough. The UN tried to find a solution for Kosovo’s 
disputed status in 2006 but has not of yet concluded.  All efforts to hold free and fair 
general elections in December, 2010 failed.
165
 The political and territorial status of an 
independent Kosovo still lingers in 2012. 
Lessons Learned: The Case of Successes and Failures Reexamined 
The United States emerged from its Civil War and subsequent Reconstruction 
period as a world economic power. National policies in the 1890s marked a distinctly 
changed condition in United States foreign policy reflecting in great measure the nation’s 
emotions and personality.
166
 Americans exhibited tremendous pride and confidence in the 
nation’s industrial capabilities and in their democratic form of government.  
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With this came a “sense of superiority of American political and social values and 
America began to see the world as an arena open and waiting for the embracement of 
these ideals.”167 The Spanish American War was a product of this rise to global power 
and, it can be argued, led to America’s first foreign nation-building effort. The reasons 
for entering this war and the later actions in the occupied territories are hauntingly similar 
to the conditions which 110 years later led to United States involvement in Germany, 
Japan, Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
168
 
 However, in post-war Germany before the U.S entered the war, it had done its 
planning for nation-building. There was a general belief in the United States that the 
exclusive market policies of Germany and Japan had been one of the primary reasons of 
the war. Japan and Germany “had pursued a dangerous pathway into the modern 
industrial age and combined authoritarian capitalism with military dictatorship and 
coercive regional autarky.”169 Addressing the political and economic principles of free 
determination and free trade, Roosevelt sought to set the conditions of the post-war world 
through the Atlantic Charter. The Atlantic Charter also served Roosevelt’s desire to 
restrain Great Britain’s imperialistic tendencies.170 
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Likewise in Japan the United States sought to achieve the same basic goals as 
those in Germany: “demilitarization, decartelization, destroying militant nationalism, and 
democratization.”171 A military Government was established under General MacArthur, 
the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP).
172
 The challenges confronting 
MacArthur were similar to those faced by the commanders in Germany. MacArthur’s 
task was simplified somewhat because the United States was the only occupying force 
and therefore not subject to the complexities caused by the four occupying forces in 
Germany. Although clashes did occur with the Soviet Union, particularly as the Cold-
War gained momentum, MacArthur was generally unencumbered in carrying out United 
States policy.
173
 
In  the  initial  years  after the end of World War II and throughout the Cold-War, 
nation-building by the  United States was  primarily concerned with  creating buffer  
states  that could  stem the tide of communism. This was widely termed as 
‘democratization’. In the cases of Germany and Japan, “it stood for demilitarization (and 
denazification in Germany), establishment of democratic institutions, and reeducation of 
the entire country’s population.”174  
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Part of the reason that these two nation-building efforts were successful was due 
to the fact that “the United States mobilized extraordinary resources to transform 
America’s war-time enemies, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, into liberal 
democracies.”175 But in reality, it was far less important that Germany and Japan be 
democratic than that they be capitalist and rich.”176 These two cases owe much of their 
success to the fact that most of the facets of the state (economy, governmental structures, 
national identity, civil society, security, etc.) were already in place, albeit deteriorated. 
These two nations point perhaps the most successful and extensive examples of nation-
building ever seen.   
Unfortunately, later US led efforts in places such as Vietnam, Lebanon, El 
Salvador, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have met with mixed 
results. The relative failures of these nation-building efforts is largely due to the 
international community’s tendency “to  settle for the dampening of violence, not to 
devote to nation-building the resources or time that would be needed for it to  
succeed.”177  
Henceforth, nation-building cannot be a half-hearted endeavor, unless the external 
actor is committed to a balanced approach and devoting an adequate amount of resources 
and time to making the nation-building effort work, it is doubtful that a complete 
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transformation can be achieved. The aforementioned nations also encountered difficulties 
because “most of the needed elements (as mentioned above in regards to Germany and 
Japan) were never in place or only in a very rudimentary amount.”178 
In the end it is all but impossible to create a nation out of a hollow state structure. 
During the Cold War the goal of nation-building was not so much as to completely 
rebuild a nation’s infrastructure, but rather to make a state stable enough to act as a 
counterweight against communism. During the Cold War the US and the Soviet Union 
each and, in some cases, both “propped up weak states for geopolitical reasons; but 
denied such support, these and other states disintegrated.”179 Part of the reason for such 
disintegration was the fact that the external actors “focused on the creation of state 
allegiance rather than on the creation of states themselves.”180  
During the Cold War period, “the objective was to create nations that would, by a 
complex combination of external pressure and the financial self-interest of elites, take 
(America’s) side in a global war and be useful to us in it.”181 But after the end of the Cold 
War, the aim of nation-building began to change. Once communism had been defeated 
and the Soviet Union was no longer perceived as a threat, the United States altered both 
the nature and purpose of its nation-building efforts.  
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As mentioned earlier, the goal of nation-building had now become the creation of 
reasonably legitimate, reasonably liberal democracies. In turn, this was meant to enhance 
international peace and security, with and economic system that is accountable and just. 
For much of the 1990’s, nation-building was carried out under the guise of ‘democracy 
promotion’. This was a somewhat altruistic effort on behalf of the United States and its 
allies that in the end served to “justify eight years of interventionist foreign policy.”182 
We saw various efforts to transform failed states into democratic allies were undertaken 
in places such as Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia to name a few. In the case of 
Somalia the nation-building effort ended in disaster when the U.S. suffered military 
casualties and promptly put an end to the nation-building ‘experiment’ there.183 After this 
incident, the somewhat idealistic nature of nation-building and the U.S.’s responsibility to 
democratize the world began to be called into question. Consequently, the United States 
and the United Nation’s failure in Rwanda was a setback to massive and collective 
responses of the international community to major humanitarian crises that imploded in 
places like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda.
184
 
 These long and painful crises, however, created a new paradigm shift in the 
international system, requiring the West and other influential nations like Japan and 
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South Korea to accept the establishment of genuine democratic states favorable to their 
interests. The United States finally saw the urgency of genuine democracy given the rapid 
ascent of terrorism during the last decade, amidst 9/11. In this  respect  nation-building  
has now  become  a  form  of  conflict  prevention. It is no great secret that failed states 
are often breeding grounds for terrorism. Indeed, “the breakdown of the state can cause 
economic, social, and political upheavals and, giving rise to major humanitarian disasters, 
destabilization of entire regions and even turn them into sources of transnational 
terrorism.”185  
Given this, it is in the interests of the external actors to ensure that any nation-
building efforts be seen through to completion. As Feldman describes it, “our objective 
must be to build stable, legitimate states whose own citizens will not seek to destroy 
us.”186 This leads us to an important discussion around the Christian involvement in the 
process of nation-building. Though a secular nation, most Americans identified with their 
religious conviction in decision making.
187
 This means that in dealing with the task of 
nation-building or failed states, the Christians ought to be key partners in this global 
effort. We now know that the war on terror and the hunt for Osama Bin Laden cost the 
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United States at least $3 trillion
188
 over the past fifteen years, counting the disruptions he 
triggered on the domestic economy, the wars and heightened security aroused by the 
terrorist attacks he masterminded including the covert missions to hunt him and other 
members of his organization. I certainly believe that such financial and human resources 
that were wasted in Afghanistan and Iraq could have been spent on a Global Marshall 
plan that could positively transform the world in terms of global and domestic security; 
strong economic, cultural, scientific, political and social cooperation and growth. This is 
indeed the challenge and way forward—to turning failed states into authentic nations.  
Clearly, we’ve seen throughout our historical analysis, that the failure of the 
international system to fully engage nations that are distressed by internal and external 
strive can lead to calamitous situations. Therefore, the colonial era in which mainly 
Western Europeans powers over reached their political and economic agendas by the 
occupation of other cultures, peoples and their resources created a world of the “weak” 
versus “strong”, a wedge between the “haves” and “have-nots.”  Further, the system 
created an unjust evolutionary chaos, leading to the partition of borders, cultures, and 
society in unprecedented fashions.
189
 In this reconfiguration and artificial engineering of 
the world order, the world could only be construed through the prism of East-West 
divide. Their so-called wars were known as World Wars. However, the end of the post-
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Cold War era world did little to create a new Westphalian era. Instead, the unipolar world 
has seen more human rights violations, genocides, wars, and pandemic—culminating into 
an era of failed states, that threatens the very foundation of civilization.
190
  
Sadly, one of the most curious aspects of Post-Cold War and Post 9/11world are 
the egregious terror, genocide and the many forms of injustices that have become so 
difficult to comprehend or assigning guilt to the perpetrators. As events that we know as 
war crimes, genocide, or dictatorships come to light, we learn that millions have been 
tortured and killed. We also have learned that many thousands have carried out the 
killing, that a smaller proportion of people have organized it, and that individuals in high 
office have ordered it or sometimes that one person only has ordered it.  
Eventually, we also have learned that endless multitudes of people were 
bystanders during those horrible crimes and atrocities both internationally and 
domestically. We have discovered that these people saw, heard, or knew about the 
violence, injustice that led to mass killing being carried out ‘in their name’, but that they 
largely did nothing. We find that a small minority—like Sister Shirley Kolmer in Liberia 
and Paul Rusesabagina of Hotel Rwanda, perhaps tried to help or rescue the victims, but 
that the vast majority exercised what has come to be known as ‘passivity’ or 
‘indifference’, but which is in fact an active choice to doing nothing—injustice. The 
situations described above apply in many cases of modern failed states and the crimes 
committed against the innocents, and the difficulty of assigning guilt in these cases can 
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be gleaned from the painful process under way in the UN international criminal tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC in The Hague and its equivalent 
for Rwanda, situated in Arusha.
191
 We are left to ask ourselves—where have we stood (as 
Christians) when millions were killed and made to suffer, while others lingered in abject 
depravity—why did we not see that our neighbors were beyond our own race, cultures, 
tradition, and geographical locations? Are we not as responsible like the very few who 
have been directly charged with responsibility? I assert that our reactions and inaction as 
the international community and human beings over the centuries have been one of failed 
interventions and neglects. Nevertheless, our only option in the midst of the perilous task 
and challenges in nation-building is genuine intervention and stability for those failed 
states to recover and reconcile their bitter pasts.
192
 In turns, it makes the world much 
more safe, stable, and sustainable for all of us. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CORE CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND THE PROTESTANT RESOURCES FOR 
ENGAGING WITH THE CRISIS OF FAILED STATES 
Core Christian Theological and Ethical Roots: The Biblical Heritage 
 
 In this chapter I will give an overview of the core Christian ethical principles of 
love, justice, hope, and the common good and relate them to the pressing problem of 
failed states and the suffering they cause. My methodological and historical analysis will 
be informed firstly by the Wesleyan Quadrilateral,
1
 in which we bring to bear four key 
sources—Scripture, reason, experience, and tradition—as guiding principles for our 
understanding of Christian socio-ethical and theo-political responsibility. My application 
of love, justice, hope and the common good is deeply informed by the views of Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s Christian realism, which I argued, is of deep significance in the current context 
of Christian engagement in a world torn by political, social, and economic calamities.  
Love 
 Within the Christian tradition, love is one of the three theological virtues.
2
 When 
Jesus was asked what the greatest teaching of the law is, he replied, “Love the Lord your 
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God with all your heart and with all your soul and with your entire mind. This is the first 
and greatest commandment. And the second is “Love your neighbor as yourself.”3 The 
term love has come down across the centuries with several meanings, including eros 
(romantic) love, or philia (friendship).  
Within the Christian context, there is agape, the love of God that compels us to 
love everyone, particularly enemies. This view of love is well articulated by Andres 
Nygren who concluded that “agape is the center of Christianity, the Christian 
fundamental motif par excellence.”4 Agape is not primarily an emotion, although it often 
involves the emotions, and is supported by them. It is primarily a commitment or 
obligation to care about someone or something. Agape is reasonably the divine, 
unconditional, self-sacrificing, active, and volitional love that is foundational to 
Christianity.
5
 
  In Paul’s letters, he writes, “Love is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or 
boastful or arrogant or rude. It does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or 
resentful; it does not rejoice in wrongdoing, but rejoices in the truth. It bears all things, 
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believes all things, hopes all things, and endures all things.”6 Most people misinterpret 
love to mean unrelenting emotional feeling for one’s country, religion, race, ethnicity and 
career. Such limitations of the meaning of love have led to great crimes and atrocities 
committed in the name of love. Hitler’s Nazism, White supremacists, Hutu and Tutsi 
genocide, Islamic Fundamentalism, Christian exclusionism, narcissistic love, United 
States exceptionalism, and many forms of extremisms are born out of such distorted 
notions of love. Most Evangelical Christians and Muslims are often time guilty of 
labeling nonmembers as infidels or animistic, an absolute narrow-minded claim on the 
narrative of love and truth. On his last night with his disciples before his crucifixion, 
Jesus said to them, ‘I am giving you a new command. You must love each other, just as I 
have loved you. If you love each other, everyone will know that you are my disciples.’”7 
 Jesus in his ministry had given his disciples a perfect example of love in his 
relationship with them. He then commanded them to do the same. He said, “And over all 
these virtues put on love, which binds them all together in perfect unity.”8 It is interesting 
that the command to “love one another “is found at the heart of every passage of ethical 
instructions which Paul gives.
9
 It is as if he regards other commands as merely an 
explanation of what it means to love. We are commanded to do many things for each 
other in the New Testament, but the command to “love one another” appears sixteen 
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times. Therefore, love becomes an ethical obligation that Christians are called to embrace 
unconditionally—which I assert must be the driving force for nation-building.  
It is this concept of love as agape that is fundamental to Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
philosophical and theological discourse. He holds to the pure ethic of Jesus which is 
love.
10
 The responsibility of the church then, is to relate God’s love in a meaningful way 
to the moral problems of our society. Unfortunately, Niebuhr insists that Christianity 
seems to lack an ethical relevancy. He insists that “the refusal of the Christian Church to 
espouse pacifism is not apostasy and that most modern forms of pacifism are heresy.”11  
So for Niebuhr, getting involved in nation-building, especially ending the regimes 
of tyrants, (in his days, Hitler, Fascism, and Nazism) would require the decisive and 
collective participation of Christians. On Germany, he wrote that “it is not possible to 
defeat a foe without causing innocent people to suffer with the guilty…It is not possible 
to engage in any act of collective opposition to collective evil without involving the 
innocent with the guilty. It is not possible to move in history without becoming tainted 
with guilt.”12 The Judeo-Christian creation myth in the Genesis account helps us 
appreciate tension and reality of our world and sinful nature of humanity. Yet, in spite of 
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our depravity, we remain hopeful, knowing that we are saved by the final form of love 
which is forgiveness.
13
 
Hope 
  In Christian thought, hope is one of the three theological virtues. It points 
exclusively toward the future, as a realistic desire and expectation. Hope is not a wishful 
thinking; rather, hope is a firm assurance regarding things that are unclear and 
unknown.
14
 Hope is a fundamental component of the life of the righteous.
15
 Without 
hope, life loses its meaning
16
 and in death there is no hope.
17
 The New Testament idea of 
hope is the recognition that in Christ is found the fulfillment of the Old Testament 
promises and hope.
18
 Christian hope is rooted in an eschatological vision of the world, 
where we have hope of the resurrection of the dead
19
 and the redemption of the body and 
of the whole creation.
20
 This description of hope is a powerful motif for all the Christian 
community. It is quite interesting that in Greek mythology of Pandora’s Box21, all evils 
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escaped the lid of the basket but for one—hope. Like other cultural traditions, hope plays 
a pivotal role in creating optimism even in the midst of uncertainties and turbulent times. 
In my personal experience, when I was severely abused and nearly killed at a check point 
during the Liberian civil war, it was such hope, even in the midst of uncertainties, that 
kept me positive. Additionally, hope gives us the desire that something is realizable even 
though there is a probability that one might not achieve it. Hence, for hope to be effective 
it must be approached from a balanced perspective—where optimism is fused with 
realism. In this way, there is no deep disappointment and relapse to fear. A good example 
was the 2010 American midterm political elections in the USA, where pro-Obama’s 
supporters who voted overwhelmingly in 2008 for him on the popular mantra of hope and 
change were disillusioned and refused to engage the midterm election process. I believe 
they were unrealistic in their hopes by failing to understand the need to persevere by 
indefatigably engaging the political process, which in essence defines the socio-economic 
policies of the nation and the world at large. In Niebuhrian argument, they failed to see 
the reality of a world in its complexity that is driven by self interest.  
                                                                                                                                                 
day, when Pandora was all by herself at home, she could not resist her curiosity and opened the box Zeus 
had given to her. However, there was nothing but all kinds of catastrophes in the box. From that time on, 
human began to suffer from all kinds of disasters such as disease and plague, misfortune and misery, 
selfishness and greed, madness and jealousy, pomposity and cruelty. In panic, she immediately closed the 
box and hope was left in the box. Hope was secretly placed in the bottom of the box because Athena did 
not want to see the destruction of humans. Therefore, even though people go through all the sufferings, 
they are able to keep hope in their heart and stay hopeful about their life and future. 
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Justice 
Justice is considered as one of the four cardinal virtues in Christian thought.
 22
 
From a biblical perspective it is primarily concerned with conduct in relation to others, 
especially with regard to the rights of others.
23
 It is applied to commerce, where just 
weights and measures are demanded.
24
 It is demanded in courts, where the rights of rich 
and poor, Israelite and sojourner, are equally to be regarded. Therefore judges and 
witnesses cannot be influenced by sentiments and popular beliefs: “Justice, justice shalt 
thou follow.”25 In a larger sense justice is not only giving to others their rights, but 
involves the active duty of establishing their rights.  
 The majority of references to justice in the Bible actually relate to a person’s legal 
rights. The sage or wise one exhorts us to “[s]peak up for those who cannot speak for 
themselves, for the rights of all who are destitute. Speak up and judge fairly; defend the 
rights of the poor and needy.”26 He or she is talking about the legal rights of the poor and 
destitute. When Absalom expressed his desire to be a judge so that “everyone who has a 
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complaint or case could come to [him] and [he] would see that [they get] justice.”27      
Absalom is talking about the courts upholding a person’s legal rights. When Amos 
declares that the people “oppress the righteous and take bribes and … deprive the poor of 
justice in the courts,”28 he is clearly referring to their legal rights being denied.  
 The Hebrew word most often rendered as ‘just’ or ‘justice’ in the Old Testament 
is misphat. It occurs four hundred twenty-four times in four hundred and six verses,
29
 and 
when rendered as ‘just’ or justice, it is used in numerous ways including as a reference to 
conformity with the law.
30
 It is used also to refer to moral uprightness rooted in God’s 
character,
31
 doing the right thing
32
, and justice in legal disputes.
33
 It can also refer to laws 
or statutes,
34
 legal rights,
35
 legal proceedings in general,
36
 correct weights and 
measures,
37
 specified or prescribed offerings,
38
 a judge’s decision/verdict,39 and a 
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sentence of punishment.
40
 In the New Testament, the Greek word krisis occurs forty 
seven times in forty six verses and mostly refers to divine judgment, especially in respect 
to the ‘day of judgment.41 The word ekdikesis is rendered as ‘justice’ in three verses, 42 
but like the word’s use elsewhere, it carries the connotation of vengeance and 
punishment. 
 From the above, it is clear that when English translations of the Bible employ the 
word ‘justice,’ the intended meaning is not any form of distributive justice but conformity 
with the law, legal rights and judgments, moral uprightness and in some cases retribution. 
Governments, then, in performing their role of maintaining justice, must ensure that no 
one is above the law,
43
 that everyone regardless of the social status, maintains their legal 
rights, and that laws and statutes created are fair and just.
44
 They also must insure that 
law breakers are adequately punished, and that sufficient remedies are available to 
victims. This biblical understanding of justice aptly illustrates how Christians must 
exercise careful discernment when considering the application of justice to problems, 
their root causes, and best solution for any social, political, spiritual and economic 
concerns.  
                                                                                                                                                 
39
 1 Kings 3:2. 
 
40
 1 Kings 20:40. 
 
41
 Matthews 11:22, 12:41. 
 
42
 Luke 18:7, 8, 2 Corinthians 7:11. 
 
43
 Job 34:17-19. 
 
44
 Isaiah 10:1-2. 
 
  
119 
Common Good 
 The crux of the common good within biblical or Christian thought resonates in the 
Judeo-Christian Sacred writings and other religious traditions. Paul writes that “now to 
each one the manifestation of the Spirit is given for the common good.”45 In the Catholic 
tradition, the universal common good is specified by the duty of solidarity, “a firm and 
persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good, a willingness to lose 
oneself for the sake of the other instead of exploiting them.”46 In the face of structural sin, 
solidarity requires sacrifices of our own self-interest for the good of others and solidarity 
places special obligations upon the materially wealthy and powerful nations and people 
of the world. In a special way, the common good requires solidarity with the poor who 
are often without the resources to face many problems, including the potential impacts of 
environmental degradation and failed communities and nations.  
Our obligations to the global human family transcend space and time. They tie us 
to the poor and vulnerable in our midst and across the globe, as well as to future 
generations. The commandment to love our neighbor invites us to consider the poor and 
marginalized of other nations as true brothers and sisters who share with us in this global 
ecosystem. Though God commands us to have dominion and subdue the earth, this is not 
a permission to dominate and exploit. Therefore, human dominion
47
 is a special 
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responsibility that ought to reflect God’s way of ruling as a shepherd king who takes the 
form of a servant wearing a crown of thorns.
48
  
The government or international community is intended to serve God’s purposes 
by limiting or countering narrow economic interests and promoting the common good. 
This requires regulating the paying of taxes to enable government to carry out these and 
other purposes that are appropriate expression of our stewardship in society, rather than 
something to be avoided. Many governments often fall short of these responsibilities 
which I assert have led to the current problems of failed states. 
A Historical Analysis of Protestant Christian Social Ethics          
The Methodist Movement and Social Christianity 
The Methodist movement founded by John and Charles Wesley on the campus of 
Oxford University is rooted in Anglicanism. These brothers along with some of their 
friends sought to bring a revival to Anglicanism. To them, salvation and holiness were 
essential for the reign of God.
49
 The movement began as a group primarily concerned 
about organizing small groups or cells in practicing a spiritually disciplined lifestyle, the 
reading of scripture (bible studies), rather than engaging in theological (speculative) or 
philosophical debates. To understand John Wesley, one must always bear in mind that he 
lived and died as an Anglican. Historically, the Church of England developed a method 
known as the via media, an attempt to bridge the gap between Roman Catholicism and 
the Reformation, yet remained open to the development of their own church. 
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Moreover, Wesley was quite aware of the influence of individualism that 
permeated the Enlightenment era—where religion became privatized. This was of deep 
concern for him. In his interpretation and application of scripture, Wesley and his friends 
practiced a communitarian lifestyle, where “social holiness” and “social witness” where 
rooted in the call to social justice with Jesus Christ as the model. Thus, the poor and 
deprived people of the slums of England deeply influenced Wesley and his movement.
50
 
Effectively, Wesley was able to attract the lowliest of societies such as slaves, poor, 
sinners and destitute during the Great Awakening, a period of great Christian revival and 
evangelicalism in Europe and the Americas.  
However, Methodism distinguishes itself from Calvinism and Lutheranism by 
positing that faith alone could not justify this new relation with God forever. We needed 
another form of grace—Sanctifying grace of the Holy Spirit upon the believer who must 
also be responsive to this dynamic process by his or her action (praxis). This continuous 
movement of renewal is what Francois Fenelon described as progressus ad infinitum 
(“my progress is without end”).  
Wesley as a “religious synthesizer” incorporated this rich element of sanctifying 
grace from Aquinas’s teaching on sanctification. It is described in the Summa Theologica 
(Prima Secundæ Partis) as the lifelong process in the journey of the believer whereby the 
fullness of the image of God in him or her is brought to bear fruits.
51
 It is this deep eternal 
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grace in the heart of the Christian that ought to sustain a social and spiritual angst against 
injustice. On this basis, the adoption of the Social Creed of Methodism attributed to its 
close attention and response to the lives of the millions of workers in factories, mines, 
mills, tenements and company towns in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. It was through the 
Methodist Federation for Social Service that in 1908 The United Methodist General 
Conference advocated that the church proactively address the pressing social crisis in 
many communities that had lingered on for so long during harsh economic times.  
The key strategy was to secure adoption of a statement on “The Church and 
Social Problems.” Proponents of the Social Creed came up with a list of eleven social 
reforms the group believed the church should champion, including the abolition of child 
labor and an end to the sweatshop system.”52 The Social Principles have become an 
intrinsic part of the United Methodist Church’s outreach in addressing human issues in 
the contemporary world.  They are rooted in a sound biblical and theological foundation 
as historically demonstrated in United Methodist traditions.  
The Social Principles are a call to moral responsibility intended to be instructive 
and persuasive in the best of the prophetic spirit. However, the UMC did not make them 
legally binding but morally demanding on Methodists’ consciences, requiring a prayerful 
and studied dialogue between faith and practice.  
In dealing with political matters, the statement declared: 
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While our allegiance to God takes precedence over our allegiance to any 
state, we acknowledge the vital function of government as a principal 
vehicle for the ordering of society.  Because we know ourselves to be 
responsible to God for social and political life, we declare the following 
relative to governments.
53
 
  
 It also addresses the political economy by categorically emphasizing the 
responsibility of governments to demonstrate sound and effective economic policies and 
practices that can lead to the flourishing of the human community. This call is based on 
the need for governments to be attentive and responsive and to be stewards of the 
resources that are needed for safe guiding our lives and that of the natural environment. It 
reads: 
We claim all economic systems to be under the judgment of God no less 
than other facets of the created order. Therefore, we recognize the 
responsibility of governments to develop and implement sound fiscal and 
monetary policies that provide for the economic life of individuals and 
corporate entities and that ensure full employment and adequate incomes 
with a minimum of inflation. We believe private and public economic 
enterprises are responsible for the social costs of doing business, such as 
employment and environmental pollution, and that they should be held 
accountable for these costs. We support measures that would reduce the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. We further support efforts 
to revise tax structures and to eliminate governmental support programs 
that now benefit the wealthy at the expense of other persons.
54
 
 
 It also made a profound statement on the social community by categorically 
advocating for equality and rights based on human dignity. The core of this social action 
premised on the notion that we are all endowed with these inalienable rights and therefore 
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valuable in the eyes of God. As such, the church must treat and protect the rights of all 
people regardless of creed, gender, race, culture, or beliefs. It reads: 
The rights and privileges a society bestows upon or withholds from those 
who comprise it indicate the relative esteem in which that society holds 
particular persons and groups of persons. We affirm all persons as equally 
valuable in the sight of God. We therefore work toward societies in which 
each person’s value is recognized, maintained, and strengthened. We 
support the basic rights of all persons to equal access to housing, 
education, communication, employment, medical care, legal redress for 
grievances, and physical protection. We deplore acts of hate or violence 
against groups or persons based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual 
orientation, religious affiliation, or economic status.
55
 
 
Categorically the root of Methodism’s socio-political actions is traced from its 
founders to the formulation of the Wesleyan Quadrilateral, a phrase coined by Albert 
Outler.
56
 When the Evangelical United Brethren and the Methodist Episcopal Church 
merged as the United Methodist Church in 1968, one of the most pressing issues was the 
formation of a doctrinal statement to replace both denominations’ respective statements 
of faith. When one speaks of Wesley’s Methodism, the word “method” seems implicit. 
Method is a “procedure or principle used in any organized discipline or in organizing.”57 
Methodology is the way in which we can arrive at a solution or obtain knowledge. 
Because the application of methodology is a scientific or philosophical enterprise, it is 
quite interesting that Wesley’s movement became identified as “Methodist.” This was 
due in part to his penchant for organizing the movement so effectively and diligently 
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dealing with practical matters of faith and social issues affecting the individual and 
community as a whole. 
For Wesley, scripture was divinely inspired during the Patristic period of the 
Early Church. For him, the writers of the scriptures were “immediate instruments” of 
God’s revelation. However, he clarified that inspiration was not a matter of 
“instantaneous expression” on the minds of the writers. He acknowledged the limitation 
of human beings in apprehending such revelation as experienced through our language, 
arts, forms and activities. However, these limits could never affect the primacy of 
scripture over all other sources of authority. Through the power of the Holy Spirit, 
scripture bears witness of God’s divine purpose of creation, bringing scriptural truth 
(gospel) to the heart of humanity as—testimonium Spiritus Sancti interruumt.58   
However, the Enlightenment promoted human autonomy and freedom allowing 
humans to see the ‘self’ as individualistic and answerable to none. So when religious or 
scriptural norms are imposed by the church on the lives of ordinary Christians it creates 
tension of loyalty. Should one follow the teaching of the church or be guided by the 
state? This unresolved tension is seen throughout the political, social, and economic 
arenas of various Western and Eastern societies. What this tension amounts to is the 
appropriation of the teaching in the lives of individual Christians through their traditions, 
experiences and reasons. Often times, disillusioned members are forced to leave the 
church when they feel excluded for failing to adhere to the authority of scripture.   
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 In dealing with this quandary, Wesley insisted that scriptural teaching is relevant 
for all ages because it affirms both church and state (secular) as institutions where God is 
at work.
59
 So, for the Wesleyan movement, the reclamation of the ancient faith is a 
confirmation of the scripture—as the living word in which God encounters all of creation. 
Thus, scripture, as the meta-narrative, is an invitation to humanity to participate in God’s 
redemptive plan for all of creation.  
For Wesley, tradition meant Christian antiquity. He personally defined it as “the 
religion of the primitive church, of the whole church in the purest ages”60 as revealed in 
scripture. He cautioned his preachers not to depart from such antiquity. However, he was 
quite aware of the traditional biases associated with problematic passages that needed 
correct interpretation through reason and experience. He writes, “If any doubt still 
remains, I consult those who are experienced in the things of God, and then the writings 
whereby, being dead, they yet speak. And what I thus learn, that I teach.”61 
Wesley also was aware of the tension associated with the reformation. As an 
Anglican, he steered clear from the extremes. In so doing, he appropriated teachings and 
practices from different religious traditions. At times he was accused by his detractors of 
“popery” for paying too much attention to hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic 
Church. On other occasions, he insisted the right tradition of the church is the application 
of the scripture as advocated by the Reformation. However, he avoided the “doctrinal 
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anarchy of Protestantism.”62 For Wesley, being open to other traditions was a form of 
reconciliation among Christians. Therefore, as long as those traditions supported his 
general principle of biblical orthodoxy, he incorporated them into his theological 
framework and practices. In essence, Wesley began an early ecumenical movement 
where he saw various traditions as branches of the same tree. 
The Lockean influence of Wesley’s epistemology is especially apparent in his 
embrace of the tabula rasa. Locke, in his writing An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding posited that human beings are not born with “innate ideas.” He argues 
instead that the mind is analogous to a blank slate (tabula rasa), on which the senses 
make impressions, i.e. empiricism. In fact, Frederick Dreyer notes, that Locke’s essay 
was one that Wesley embraced as a student at Oxford and on occasion recommended it as 
“suitable reading” for devout Methodists.63 However, Dreyer also notes that Wesley’s 
acceptance of Lockean epistemology was exacerbated by the fact that he was a 
committed Christian.
64
  
While Enlightenment sentiments about rationality and reason have long been 
interpreted as being antithetical to religious experience in general and the Christian faith 
in particular, Wesleyan thought thrived in this era. One of the reasons for this is because, 
as Brantley notes, the dialectic of empiricism and evangelicalism brought together the 
emotion and intellect. Wesley, unlike some of his clergy and religionist contemporaries, 
was able to find common ground between his versions of Christian theology with many 
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of the secular philosophical precepts of his day without losing the integrity of either. 
Brantley states, “Although empiricism is natural and evangelicalism is spiritual, the great 
principle of empiricism is that one must see for oneself and be in the presence of the 
thing one knows, applies as well to evangelical faith.”65 
Reason as a tool is an essential element in one’s articulation of the scripture. 
Wesley was aware of the rising suspicion of scripture during the Enlightenment on the 
broader Christian community. Historically, the church authority felt threatened by reason 
(scientific knowledge) for fear that it eroded confidence in the authoritative nature of 
scripture and tradition. Unlike the authority, Wesley saw reason as a “tool” needed for 
human flourishing. As noted earlier, he was greatly influenced by British empiricists. For 
the “empiricists, experiences (empiricist comes from the Greek word meaning 
“experience”) of the senses are the source of all knowledge.”66 But from a Wesleyan’s 
view, reason alone could not be a source of all knowledge. Miles posits that, “While 
reason alone is useless without data from experience, data alone is useless without the 
tool of reason. Without reason we cannot understand the data revealed in creation or 
scripture.”67  
How does reason shape our thinking in the matter of faith?  Wesley regarded 
reason to be consistent with faith. By this he meant that it was important for nurturing an 
authentic Christian.  Wesley asserted that any “Unreasonable person who claims to be a 
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Christian is no more a Christian than he or she is an angel. So far he or she departs from 
true genuine reason, so she departs from Christianity.”68 In reality, Wesley’s appeal to 
reason was an attempt to counteract those who felt threatened by its application. 
Interestingly, Miles observed that Wesley mentioned reason more often than the other 
forms of authority with exception of scripture—often pairing reason with scripture. He 
once remarked, “Use no other weapons than those of truth and love, of scripture, and 
reason”.69  
Influenced by Aristotelian and Empiricist philosophies, Wesley held the belief 
that human knowledge originated from human experience. In Pauline’s language, “God 
has written these thoughts on human hearts.” Wesley’s favorite quote was “Nihile est in 
intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu,” i.e., nothing in the understanding, which was not 
first perceived by the senses,
70
 but acknowledging that spiritual senses, the knowledge of 
God could still be acquired even without the physical senses. Through a via media, he 
appropriated a platonic view of the existence of God operating in a spiritual realm 
independent of the physical. In this way, Wesley encouraged his followers to cultivate 
spiritual insight into the knowledge of God as revealed by the Holy Spirit.   
In reconciling these two schools of thought (Empiricism) and (Platonism), he is 
credited for the development of what is known in the Methodist circle as a 
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“transcendental empiricism.”71 It is “This unconditioned condition by which the given is 
given…the given sees as “immediacy” that which is given to our senses...It is the 
immanence of the empirically given prior to any mediation of conceptual thought of the 
perceiving subject.”72 In essence, what the given sees as “immediacy” is the cohabitation 
of Wesley’s spiritual senses and the physical senses—a fusion of Platonism and 
Aristotelian thoughts.  
As a revivalist, Wesley took the role of human experience quite seriously. 
Because of this, critics often considered his movement as enthusiasts—those acting out of 
their raw emotion.  He dismissed their charges on the ground by claiming that experience 
must be validated by the other sources, especially reasoning. Experience becomes the 
total verifiable account of the lives of others that have been passed down as tradition. 
Yet, experience must be tested by the past experiences (traditions).  
The Catholic theologian Margaret Farley succinctly articulates Wesley’s 
perspective. She acknowledges that what we now have as scripture is in essence, “human 
experience being shaped and interpreted.” She notes that “there would be no theology or 
ethics were there no religion and morality, aspects of experience whose meanings 
need[ed] to be understood and articulated.”73 Farley’s assertion does make sense if our 
“claim to truth is at stake.” Wesley urges us to tests these experiences with other sources 
such as scripture. Experience becomes the source that enables us to appreciate all of 
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creation and the traditions of past. He wrote “We are incapable of loving God until we 
first experience God’s love for us.”74  
Lastly, experience allows us to value our human subjectivity in light of the 
experiences of others. As Farley observes, the disagreement usually associated with 
experience is not a matter about “differences in experience but about whether or not some 
person’s experiences should be allowed at all as a source for social or communal 
discernment.”75 In addressing this problem, Wesley encouraged his members to always 
verify all of human experiences in light of scriptural truths.  
Wesley offers us the prospect of love, justice, hope and the common good—for 
building and mobilizing all voices and communities. By adopting the stance of “open 
heart, open mind, and open doors,” Wesley saw Christianity as an invitation for all to 
participate in the narrative of God’s redemption for creation. This is a call for 
inclusiveness and consensus building where new voices are heard, thereby “offer[ing] the 
kind of public criteria needed for legitimizing new points of view in a rapidly changing 
culture.”76 Wesley’s message embodied by the spirit of solidarity is a call to praxis, 
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shaping our orientation of how we can love and respect our neighbors [and strangers] and 
protect the entire environment.”77  
The United Methodist Church holds that the living core of the Christian faith was 
revealed in Scripture, illumined by tradition, vivified in personal experience, and 
confirmed by reason. These theological and ethical sources within Methodism have 
enabled me to make sense and gain insight of a world so complex and diverse. Therefore, 
the quadrilateral is applicable to the Christian understanding of the problem of failed state 
and how we ought to be involved in nation-(re)building, the most pressing concerns in 
our world at this present time. 
The Modern Root of Christian Socio-Political Actions 
As John Atherton posits, the modern root of Christian political actions especially 
within the Protestant’s tradition in addressing pressing social and political issues can be 
traced to three movements, namely, “Christian Conservatism,” “Social Christianity,” and 
“Theological (Christian) Realism.”78 Christian Conservatism, which predates social 
Christianity, has had significant influence in both British and American politics, but also 
on the world. Most notably, Margret Thatcher of England and Ronald Reagan and 
President Bush senior and President Bush junior have dominated Western political 
economy for more than three decades. It is rooted in the 1798 seminal work of Parson 
Malthus, An Essay on Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of 
                                                 
77
 Philip J. Wogamann. The Doctrine of God and Dilemma of Power, Trinity, Community, and 
Power, edited by M. Douglas Meeks. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000, 36-38ff.  
 
78
 See John Atherton. Christian Social Ethics. A Reader, Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1994. 
  
133 
Society, in response to faith and the market economy.
79
 It strongly places premium on an 
unregulated market, but ironically acknowledging the “disruptive effect of economic 
change and its effect on the society and the vulnerably disposed. Hence its remarkable 
characteristics are “based on free market, democracy, limited state power, strong military, 
moral values, a selective amnesia of the market limitation, and opposition to socialism.”80   
On the other hand, “Social Christianity” has its root in America, since the end of 
the American civil war and the beginning of the industrial revolution and urbanization. It 
was a response to address the new problems that led Henry Ward Beecher to state that 
“Now that God has smitten slavery unto death, he has opened the way for the redemption 
and sanctification of our whole social system.”81 In the midst of this perplexing and 
challenging time, the Church in America realized that it must radically make some 
changes in the church’s life and prophetic witness in an evolving world order—
masterminded by the juggernaut of modernity in the name of industrialization and 
massive urbanization. Notable figures like F. D. Maurice, Charles Kingsley, Walter 
Rauschenbusch, Reinhold Niebuhr and most recently Philip Wogaman became 
champions of the social gospel movement.
82
 These changing realities within America 
triggered an alarm bell for the growing disparities in the midst of wealth creation. For 
example, 
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In the decade after 1880, the population of Chicago increased by more 
than 100 percent, with all the associated problems of poverty, 
unemployment, bad housing, vice, political corruption… [due to such] 
processes of industrialization in general, and industrial conflict in 
particular…accompanied by growing and vast inequalities of income and 
wealth…It represented a stark challenge to the prevailing belief that all  
life…was part of a divinely-regulated social order.83 
 
This problem brought about the reappropriation of a Christian ethical and 
theological perspective in engaging a world manifesting unchristian principles. These 
reformers combined “pastoral work, preaching, practical involvement, theology and 
spirituality as a wholistic and effective strategy for remedying the social ills of their 
society.”84 This meant rejecting the dominating Protestant theology that supported 
laissez-faire capitalism and particularly unrestricted market system. It opposed a 
Calvinistic view of individualism and orthodoxy, that focused on fundamentalism and a 
transcendent God far removed from the people.
85
 Thus, the reformulated view of 
Christianity was a conglomeration of two focal points for understanding the immanence 
of God and Christology for the realization of God’s Kingdom on earth:  
First, it meant coming to terms with liberal theology developed by Horace 
Bushnell… [with] emphasis on God’s immanence, on God at work 
through the world…It necessitated a profoundly solidaristic view of 
human. It involved too, the acceptance of Jesus as a person in light of 
faith, but also through the use of reason as biblical criticism…along with 
the view of the atonement as an example of love rather than a legal 
transaction…Secondly, the reformulation involved taking the world 
seriously as God’s arena. This required the major recognition of, and 
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contribution to, the rise of sociology as a major medium for interpreting 
contemporary context.
86
 
 
This view of Christianity articulated an open mind to secularism and scientific 
method for analyzing data and responding effectively to the pressing issues confronting 
society. The Golden Rule was seen as a universally accepted commandment that all 
society could accept, specifically the application of stewardship and agape in all of 
human interaction. It was Rauschenbusch who profoundly impacted this movement, by 
interweaving “a radical Christian socialist tradition, even though the gospel continued to 
be dominated by the social reformist tradition.”87 In his work, Christianizing the Social 
Order, Rauschenbusch advocated for a Christian social order built on democracy that 
rested on the family church, education system, and politics—all tied to the economic 
wellbeing of the community.
88
  
However, the devastation that the economic and international politics wrought on 
the global scale—for example, the Great depression in the 1920s and the outbreak of 
World War II in 1939 saw the emergence of “Christian realism,” posing a challenge to 
the social gospel movement. “Theological realism,” a term coined by Walter Horton 
emerged as a critique to the “ethos and theology” of a liberal church. It debunked the 
central belief of the social gospel—that it was possible to change people so that society 
could become better for the Kingdom of God. Centrally, proponents of theological or 
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Christian realism argued that humanity was too sinful and finite—and prejudiced by race, 
class, status, and nationalism.
89
  
Socially, full Christian love was unattainable on earth. This meant that the “self-
interest of groups was a matter of power, therefore, the appropriate moral response 
needed to be based on justice and not love…So the Jesus ethics , so powerful  in the 
social gospel , had now become  an impossible possibility.”90 Distinctively, Christian 
realism articulated its appropriation of realities based on pressing concerns of “war, 
ideology, class, egoism, and depression and not the social gospel’s faith in man that 
provided the context.”91 Consequently, a new understanding emerged in the interpretation 
of Christian symbols, vital for one’s belief and action. In summary, this new Christian 
realism argues that: 
[t]hey [Christian symbols] were seen to illuminate the dramas of the 
context as the creative tension between love and justice, the sinful and 
creative inclinations of man [and woman], and personal and the 
social…Theological realism was to be a dialectical relationship between 
realities and faith which challenged all theological and political idealism, 
and all unrealistic idealists and cynical realists. It allowed a theological 
interpretation of events which spoke to people bound up in them, and 
provided the common basis for action to an audience wider than the 
Church.
92
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Roosevelt’s New Deal was in tone with the vision of Christian realism’s emphasis 
on the common good. Poignantly, it rejected the extremes of both laissez faire and state 
socialism. It is noted that Roosevelt even identified himself as being as radical as the 
Federal Council of Churches, the brain child of Christian Realism.
93
 It is ironic that neo-
conservatives as well as liberals are today identifying their ideology with Christian 
realism. Niebuhr himself denounced conservatism—particularly a conservatism that 
defended unjust privileges.
94
 Moreover, this movement has always acknowledged and 
advocated for what it calls the middle axiom—a creative tension that existed in human 
affairs, especially in religion and politics. Therefore, the just God is the only one who 
could exert full justice and moral judgments on all of creation. Let us now examine our 
primary scholar, Reinhold Niebuhr in navigating the themes of love, justice, hope, and 
the common good. Our emphasis shall also focus on his articulation of Christian realism 
and his critique of power politics and how a dominant culture or powerful nation like the 
United States could avoid the pitfall of power and genuinely engage the issues of 
shadowed or failed states, in need of wholistic nation-(re)building.  
Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism 
Eric Patterson succinctly articulates the meaning of Christian realism and how it 
can illuminate our understanding of present political, social, and economic dilemmas. He 
questions the validity of “Christian realism [to] provid[ing] an intellectual framework for 
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approaching political theories as well as real-world policy alternatives.”95 He asks, “Can 
Christian realism suggest concrete proposals for the vexing issues of contemporary life, 
such as the war on terrorism, violent ideologies, genocide, and nurturing stable political 
institutions?”96 Affirmatively it does. Hence, “Christian realism is a vibrant intellectual 
approach for evaluating political phenomena that starts with considerations of power, 
order, security, and responsibility.”97 So as a Christian realist one must apply analytical 
tools in understanding the nature of power politics and its role in defining the political, 
social, and economic orders that affect the domestic and global affairs of our world. It 
also identifies the strengths and weaknesses of our human agency in the political context. 
Accordingly, Patterson quotes Roger L. Shinn, who described Christian realism as: 
The ethic …in its serious appropriation of biblical motifs and classical 
doctrines: the uniqueness of biblical revelation, the sinfulness of man and 
society, the judging and redeeming activity of God, the faith in 
justification by a divine grace that produces works worthy of repentance, 
the distinctive quality of Christian love. It was realistic in its criticism of 
naïve idealism or utopianism and its confrontation with the brute facts and 
power struggles of the contemporary world. This Christian realism, at least 
at its best, was not an artificial combination of two unrelated motifs. It was 
realistic in its appropriation of Christian faith, and it was Christian—often 
recovering orthodox traditions neglected in the modern church—in its 
realism…constantly sought the relation between the good news of the 
gospel and the daily news of the world.
98
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Therefore, Christian realism is committed to understanding and involvement in 
politics based on a realistic assessment of life. It is out of such development, that 
Reinhold Niebuhr analyzed the role of Christianity in an increasingly secular world. He 
proffers that Christianity in its humility ought to promote repentance, which is necessary 
for the Church to repent of its historic sins, but it also must assert a prophetic voice 
regarding the moral content of social and political issues and remind people and 
governments everywhere that their actions and motives are judged by God. Politics must 
be seen as ordering a moral compass which can be influenced by Christianity’s ability to 
inspire hope in the midst of political and economic downturn. “Just as the Christian 
gospel calls the proud to repent, it assures those who despair of a new hope.”99 Niebuhr 
also advocates that Christianity must provide answers to the meaning of life and history, 
and that the contradictions of human experience can find consolation. He writes that 
“through it [faith] we are able to understand life in all of its beauty and its terror, without 
being beguiled by its beauty or driven to despair by terror.”100  
Niebuhr profoundly shaped Christian realism and for that matter, Christian social 
thinking and political actions of our time. It is no surprise that both McCain and Obama 
during the 2008 United States presidential elections, claimed to be heavily influenced by 
Niebuhr. How could two political candidates and parties espousing totally different 
agendas come to this conclusion? In our examination of some significant Niebuhrean 
themes, we shall see how his analysis speaks to the current issues of nation-building. 
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Niebuhr, for example, asserted that there is no ‘Christian’ economic or political system 
that could be formulated as a panacea for world problems. However, he believed, there 
must be a Christian attitude toward all systems and schemes of justice. This requires us to 
have a critical attitude toward all claims, systems and schemes. The key question we 
ought to raise is whether such systems will contribute to justice in a concrete situation.
101
 
He writes: 
On the other hand a responsible attitude, which will not pretend to be God 
nor refuse to make a decision between political answer to a problem 
because each answer is discovered to contained a moral ambiguity of 
God’s sight…we are men not God; and we are responsible for making 
choices between greater and lesser evils, even when our Christian faith, 
illuminating the human scene, make it quite apparent that there is no pure 
good in history; and probably no pure evil either.
102
 
 
While acknowledging the dignity of the person, Niebuhr also admonishes us to 
recognize the sinful nature of the person—“that his [or her] lust and ambitions are a 
danger to the community; and that his rational processes are tainted by the taint of his [or 
her] own interests.”103 Therefore, he warns us of holding any absolutes because they are 
subjected to change and may only serve the interest of a few or particular section of 
society. He sums: 
In short, the health of our communities is best served if faith, humbly 
accept treasures of wisdom which may be mediated to the community by 
those who do not share their faith, and welcome those policies of 
communal justice which are designed to correct the aberrations of men.
104
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Niebuhr then can be considered a critically important resource of wisdom for our 
time. His writings and actions bear witness to the issues he dealt with in a dynamic and 
humbling ways, a man who avoided all forms of extremes. But his critics may consider 
him to be relativistic in his thoughts. Contrarily, such claims are unsubstantiated, because 
as we shall see, in his life long journey, Niebuhr took a stance on every issue he 
articulated in the public sphere. It is this attitude, ingrained in the Socratic Method and 
the prophetic witness that those engaging in Christian ethical and theological discourses, 
ought to emphatically appropriate.  
Christian realism is a clarion call to be actively engaged in global issues as 
decisive as nation-building. Niebuhr believed that the basic presuppositions of the 
Christian faith are political on the side of their application. “To deny this,” he argued, “is 
to be oblivious of one aspect of historic existence which the Renaissance understood so 
well: that life represents an indeterminate series of possibilities and therefore of 
obligations to fulfill them.”105 In reality, Niebuhr, like Wesley, sees his theological 
disposition as a reflection on political and social actions. 
As we are realizing daily, the world has become a web of interconnected relations 
and no one can remain completely isolated and at the same time narrowly self-interested 
in amassing countless economic wealth and power at the expense of the rest of the world. 
We now know that the little child in the remotest part of the world is equally human; and 
we must do all that it takes to help him or her reach her full human potential. In 
Niebuhr’s term, we must approximate some form of justice; for following in the views of 
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Aquinas and Augustine, it is extending love for neighbor; and for me, it is embracing 
God’s radical justice—which is wholistically tied to all forms of virtues that enable us to 
create utopia—the combination of Augustine’s City of God and City of [hu]man here in 
this globalized  world. 
Further, Reinhold Niebuhr the Christian realist, redefined how religiously minded 
Americans could realistically deal with the world. In his seminal work, Moral Man and 
Immoral Society, Niebuhr analyzed the human condition facing societies and nations. He 
argued that even though the individuals may strive to be moral collectively, human 
beings are compromised and prone to immorality, and even evil.
106
 Because of his 
complex reasoning about the world, God, and human nature, many critics and admirers 
had difficulties to ideologically decipher his position. Though identified as a pacifist for a 
while, he vociferously advocated for American engagement in World War II. He also was 
a pro-Cold War supporter, but vigorously rejected the Vietnam’s war as an extension of 
that conflict. He wrote that “civilization depends upon the vigorous pursuit of the highest 
values by people who are intelligent enough to know that their values are qualified by 
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their interests and corrupted by their prejudices.”107 In his view, human societies and 
human nature, as he acknowledged, is not just a matter of moral and immoral choices, but 
between external forces in history. “Politics,” as Niebuhr observed, “will to the end of 
history, be where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of 
human life will interpenetrate and work out their uneasy compromises.”108 
So how do you work out the tension of human history and its contradictions that 
persist? For Niebuhr, this tension is never ending until there is an eschatological 
intervention, but we must keep on trying to reduce the injustices and brutality to a 
manageable form. This is what he described as the paradox and irony of history. So the 
central question he poses is who are my neighbors and our response to their needs? For 
him, it was the Christian love that culminated into our responsibility for approximating 
some form of justice on earth.  
Niebuhr insisted that love obligates us to accept the best principles it can for the 
ordering of society. Often it is necessary to give priority to one principle over another. 
One such general principle is justice. Agape, the love of God is inseparable from justice, 
which is not distinctively Christian. Love then defines the mutuality of active care for 
another; justice therefore, is the impartial consideration of all parties concerned without 
giving preference to special interest over the general community. Justice thus, is the 
mediating principle between absolute love and the power principles of society—the 
relative embodiment of love in social structures. He then asserts that for large groups the 
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highest goal is justice rather than love.
109
 Hence, the relation between love and justice is 
dialogical, mutual and dialectical. In this description, justice is the realization of an active 
love affair where God’s selfless love ought to reflect how we are to love our neighbors, 
strangers, and ourselves. Love complements the concept of justice by partly fulfilling and 
partly negating justice. In Niebuhr’s construct this relationship permeates in three 
levels.
110
 First, love is implicitly the sine qua non of justice. In the Christian tradition, the 
love of God enables Christ to die for us , because we have all fallen short of the glory of 
God (Romans 3:23). In essence, the love of God creates equilibrium, an intrinsic element 
for justice: “Thus equality is love in terms of logic.”111  
This form of love is our ability to be empathetic to the experience and conditions 
of others. It is in the spirit of Umbuunti and the “I-Thou” relationship. This is what 
Niebuhr called “imaginative justice.”112 Second, love becomes the motivating principle 
for the establishment of justice. This means that love is actively finding means to elevate 
justice to a higher form of perfection based on agape. Our natural reason, as important as 
it is, cannot do this alone because it is subject to the corruptions of self-interest.
113
 
Therefore, in our limitations the self is in need of God’s love, which requires, grace, 
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humility, and contrition. Our contrite spirit is the recognition of our social and sinful 
nature which demands justice in order to create an impartial and harmonious 
community.
114
 Third, love mutually demands the instrument of justice to fulfill its moral 
obligation for the individual and the community. Love thus becomes an end and justice as 
a means. In this schema, “The love which creates community must be tentatively 
violated,” in order “to give the community the bones of authority for the flesh of its 
[sisterhood] brotherhood.”115  
This view on love and justice by Niebuhr is best described by Howard Patton, 
who asserts that:  
Justice is not a fully satisfactory goal in itself because it falls short of love, 
being dependent upon coercive power on the one hand, and requiring 
rational calculations in the balancing of rights against rights of others, in a 
complicated social interrelation, and in the wider community. In 
comparison, love is free, creative, and redemptive. Justice therefore, is the 
attempt to institutionalize the moral demands of love.
116
 
 
Patton, in his analysis of Niebuhr’s theological and ethical views, states that when 
love goes into action in society, it gives rise to specific schemes or principles of justice. 
The function of justice is a second best way to prevent one life from taking advantage of 
another.
117
 For Niebuhr, there is a realistic tendency for us to think more highly of 
                                                 
114
 Ibid., 44. 
 
115
 Reinhold Niebuhr. The Self and the Dramas of History. New York: Scribner’s, 1955, 201.      
 
116
 Niebuhr. The Nature and Destiny of Man, 2: 24.8. Also read Howard G. Patton. Reinhold 
Niebuhr. Baylor University, 1977. Full text online, Ch. 5, 2-4, http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter. 
asp?title=3279&C=2739 (accessed 07.10.10). 
 
 
117
 Ibid., Ch.5, 3. 
  
146 
ourselves than we ought to think. Love therefore, cannot be an alternative to the “pushing 
and shoving” which justice requires.118  
In our interactions, political structures and pressures remain necessary in 
conducting human affairs. These are the necessary socio-political actions needed to hold 
the ruling elites accountable to the masses. In essence, this is social justice which is 
needed as a corrective vision for conducting the economic, social, and political affairs of 
the society as a whole. Further, Niebuhr insists that “we need a great deal of this ‘second-
rate’ goodness to get along with one another.”119 He then contends that “the will to 
power” which ironically seeks justice, is at times guilty of the very insecurity it seeks to 
eliminate. That is, “the will to power in short, involves the ego in injustice.”120 Therefore, 
“the moral and social behavior of individuals and of social groups, national, racial, and 
economic; and that this distinction justifies and necessitates political policies which a 
purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing.”121 Correctly, Niebuhr 
concludes that the larger the group, the more difficult it is in attaining justice. So, the 
issue is not how well we are able to articulate the concept of love and justice but its 
application. Patton summarizes Niebuhr’s thought: 
Niebuhr said that the question of what is right in love and justice is usually 
clear. The real problem is what is possible in the light of man’s self-
centeredness and intransigence. Hence Niebuhr argued for the principle of 
prudence. The application of love to schemes of justice must prudently 
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take account of the human factor. Where group loyalties are involved, for 
example, coercion is often the only means of attaining justice. This holds 
true even for those men who most adequately embody agape. Love, 
persuasion, reason, and insight may mitigate and transcend the social 
struggle, but they cannot eliminate it.
122
 
 
We see this pattern transcending various religious and secular (political and 
social) traditions where privileged groups insist on claiming the moral high ground on the 
functioning of society—by  imposing their values or ideology on the greater community. 
As Niebuhr wrote, this “is the very heart of the problem of Christian politics: the 
readiness to use power and interest in the service of an end dictated by love and yet an 
absence of complacency about the evil inherent in them.”123 Illustrative of Niebuhr’s 
critique, Patton traces Niebuhr’s historical disposition to a number of factors—first, 
namely the heritage of Protestant pietistic individualism, which negates the application 
love to justice. Secondly, Niebuhr recoils from the vague affirmations of dominant 
orthodox and liberal streams of Christian ethics and of secular moralism (both in its 
Marxist and liberal versions), that misconstrues the application of love directly to justice 
without taking account of original sin. Thirdly, Niebuhr appreciates but critiques the 
Roman Catholic heritage’s natural law theory that he argues, relegates love to the realm 
of perfection while the church rationally defines the nature of Christian justice. The error 
here, for Niebuhr, lies in the Church’s uncritical regard for the purity of reason. Fourth, 
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Niebuhr affirms the socialist Christian positions on the application of justice to society, 
but submits this socialist tradition to the criticism of the law of love.
124
 
As a realist, Niebuhr constantly reminds us of the ever changing tide of history—
especially alerting us to be attentive to the world around us, a world in constant flux, 
where domestic and international relations are paramount. He admonishes us of “our 
dreams of managing history” as a source of a potentially dangerous path that many 
powerful nations have threaded. Though, he saw the United States as powerful and 
virtuous nation, Niebuhr warned of the attitude of “pretension” as a particularly 
undesirable state of mind for a powerful state. On this note, he equivocally chastised the 
United States for exhibiting such negative tendency in its effort to wield global power 
and influence. On this critical note, he saw the Bible as a powerful historical and moral 
source for drawing great lessons for nations, leaders, cultures, and society in general. He 
warns: 
The prophet never weary of warning both powerful nations…of the 
judgment which waits on human pretension. The great nation, Babylon, is 
warned that its confidence in the security of its power will be refuted by 
history… [because] the pretensions of virtue are as offensive to God as the 
pretensions of power.
125
 
 
According to Niebuhr, conflict and tension are permanent features of history. 
While social improvement is possible, the justice of this world is born in strife and is 
always provisional, fragmentary, and insecure. He recognized the potency of social sin 
affecting all of history. So humanity cannot by itself correct these problems; even by 
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surrendering to God, human is still imperfect; though reason can illuminate ethical 
standards and practices, but ironically, it can also create the capacity to rationalize 
selfishness.
126
  
This self-centered egotism transcends self-interest and is often driven by class, 
race, clans, groups, genders, and nations against nations. For Niebuhr, this fundamental 
problem is due to the lack of moral self-transcendence of individual members, which in 
essence, is a social sin rooted in pride.
127
 Niebuhr’s critique of the group’s egoism is well 
articulated by Christine Firer Hinze who writes:  
Their limited capacities for self-reflection and self-criticism restrict 
groups’ moral behavior primarily to the pursuit of survival and power. 
Worse, a group (family, class, nation, corporation) can co-opt members’ 
morally-praiseworthy loyalty and altruism into the service of collectively 
selfish or destructive ends. Groups themselves are incapable of self-
sacrifice; leaders, obligated to advance their members’ collective interests, 
never have warrant to altruistically override them…In group life, then, 
possibilities for moral heroism are virtually nil, but the potential for 
injustice much greater.
128
 
 
Niebuhr contends that nations and classes have limited understanding of the 
people they harm by their unjust policies and lack of appreciation for the often 
complicated laws and institutions through which such injustice is perpetuated. They are 
more inclined to embrace rationalizations of self-interest rather than the Socratic method 
or being prophetic witnesses on socio-political and economic matters. These facts, for 
Niebuhr, explain why dominant groups rarely yield their privileges except when put 
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under pressure by some countervailing social force. And we find this to be so true in the 
current crises that have engulfed our world—be it the so-called war on terror, the 
genocide in the Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Syria, and instability in 
Zimbabwe.
129
 
Reinhold Niebuhr also insists on the necessity of politics in the struggle for social 
justice because of the sinfulness of human nature, that is, the egotism of individuals and 
groups. He sees the limitations of reason to solve social injustice by moral and rational 
means, “since reason is always the servant of interest in a social situation.”
130
 This is the 
center of his critique of liberal Christian theology, which strongly believes in the rational 
capacity of humans to making themselves to be moral. Niebuhr also traces the root causes 
of social conflicts and injustices to the ignorance and selfishness of humanity. Therefore, 
the natural impulse is to rebuild or renew our communities or nations by proactively 
improving our human intelligence and benevolence.
131
 But, for Niebuhr, the increase of 
education and intelligence is no guarantee of a corresponding increase in benevolence.  
This view challenges the Christian notion of focusing only on selfishness instead 
of ignorance as the root of injustice. He writes, “[They] religious idealists have given 
themselves to the hope, that the purer religion would increase the benevolence and 
decrease the egoism of the human spirit” while the rationalists hold that an increase in the 
                                                 
129
 Niebuhr. Moral Man and Immoral Society, 76-78. 
 
130
 Ibid., xiv-xv. 
 
131
 Ibid., 23. 
 
  
151 
intelligence of men and women would minimize injustice, selfishness, and ignorance.”132 
That is why he declared that “the hopes and expectations of an ideal society through the 
development of the moral capacities of the individual men [and women], have proceeded 
from and been encouraged by the religious, as well as the rational [and the] idealists.”133  
This is the world of authentic realism where Niebuhr fuses a working relation 
between the secular and religious in the quest of supporting moral ideals in a realistic 
understanding of the world. Even though religion aims for the absolute, in making the 
case for the ethical, it must be credited for its insights in pointing at humanity’s sinfulness 
and preoccupation of the self.
134
 In this world of the religious minded person—in search 
of what Martin Luther King, Jr. dubbed the “beloved community,” one becomes 
committed to working for the virtues of love, justice and hope in a world where the 
disenfranchised are enabled and empowered by the good neighbors in a selfless and 
altruistic manner. It’s in this regard that Niebuhr writes that: 
If religion be particularly occupied with the absolute from the perspective 
of the individual, it is nevertheless capable of conceiving an absolute 
society in which the ideal of love and justice will be realized. There is a 
millennial hope in every vital religion. The religious imagination is as 
impatient with the compromises, relativities and imperfections of historic 
society as with the imperfection of the individual life.
135
 
 
 He sets up what amounts to a moral dualism between individuals and groups by 
drawing a radical distinction between individual and group morality, and by accepting 
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group egoism as our inescapable reality. According to him, individuals are morally 
capable of considering the interests of others and acting prudently when they sense 
conflicts of interest between themselves and others. That is, individuals can be unselfish. 
Societies, however, find it virtually impossible to handle rationally the competing 
interests of subgroups. Societies, he argues, effectively gather up only individuals’ selfish 
impulses, not their capacities for unselfish consideration toward others. According to 
Niebuhr, this collective egoism of individuals-in-groups is overwhelmingly powerful. “In 
every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse, less capacity for 
self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others, therefore more 
unrestrained egoism than the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in their personal 
relationships.”136 
Additionally, Niebuhr insists that “all social co-operations on a larger scale than 
the most intimate social group requires a measure of coercion”137 and “every group, as 
every individual, has expansive desires which are rooted in the instinct of survival and 
soon extend beyond it. The will-to-live becomes the will-to-power.”138 This means that 
“…society is in a perpetual state of war.”139  Therefore, he suggests a compromised form 
of society, “in which there will be uncoerced and perfect peace and justice, but a society 
in which there will be enough justice, and in which coercion will be sufficiently non-
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violent to prevent this common enterprise from issuing into complete disaster.”140 To 
cope with this struggling situation of society, reason and religion ought to find a common 
ground based on achieving the common good of society. So the role of reason is 
important in forming social justice. As he admits the dual character of “human beings are 
endowed by nature with both selfish and unselfish impulses…His reason endows him 
with a capacity for self-transcendence.”141 Moreover, Niebuhr asserts “Harmonious social 
relations depend upon the sense of justice as much as, or even more than, upon the 
sentiment of benevolence. This sense of justice is a product of the mind and not of the 
heart. It is the result of reason’s insistence upon consistency.”142  
This means that moral reason in relation with religion becomes intrinsically 
valuable in Niebuhr’s perspective especially in dealing with social problems as a method 
to reduce the influence of selfishness through contrition and the spirit of love. He stresses 
the role of the religious imagination, which helps to unite the absolute and the finite 
physical world. “The religious conscience is sensitive not only because its imperfections 
are judged in the light of the absolute but because its obligations are felt to be obligations 
toward a person. The holy will is a personal will.”143 “The religious sense of the absolute 
qualifies the will-to-live and the will-to-power by bringing them under subjection to an 
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absolute will.”144 He concludes that the spirit of love cannot prevent social conflict, so it 
is inescapable to use the instrument of coercion as we aim for the application of justice as 
a critical societal and international norm.  
Niebuhr developed his concept of love as a pure, highest form of morality further 
in his magnificent book, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics. He develops his position 
in contrast as he sees it to the weaknesses and delusions of “orthodox Christianity,” 
modern “liberal Christianity” and Marxism. The first identifies the transcendent will of 
God with doctrines and downplays myths by rationalization or scientific inquiry. The 
second abandons the ethic of Jesus and functionally absolutizes secular, relative standards 
of morality. The third is, he holds, a secularized religious view that takes the proletariat 
as the final judge instead of God. For Niebuhr, myth is meaningful in the sense that it 
involves the paradox between the Infinite and the finite, and it should be considered 
seriously, not literally. The ethic of Jesus shows the pure form of God’s love so that it 
cannot be realized in this present human existence, but only when God changes this 
world to the perfect harmony of the Kingdom of God.
145
 
Therefore, he understands love in its social application as an “impossible 
possibility.”146 That is even though love is important in all of human affairs (its 
“possibility”), it is so difficult to fully implement in this world of conflicting interests.  
Moreover, in as much as love is the highest attainment in life, “people living in nature 
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and in the body will never be capable of the sublimation of egoism and the attainment of 
the sacrificial passion, the complete disinterestedness which the ethic of Jesus demands 
(impossibility).”147 Instead of the direct application of the law of love to political and 
economical reality, he suggests the use of the principle of justice. “Yet the law of love is 
involved in all approximations of justice, not only as the source of the norms of justice, 
but as an ultimate perspective by which their limitations are discovered.”148 
Niebuhr on Current World Affairs and Failed States 
What would Niebuhr say today about failed states and the international failure to 
adequately address them? I argue that since nation-building ought to seek an ethical 
grounding from a Christian perspective, it ought to be balanced and realistic by avoiding 
a false allure of a simple solution in our quest of rebuilding failed or collapsed states. 
Niebuhr would critique any idea of seeking simplistic resolution to complex problems 
that often involve the process of nation-building. For him, this attitude has been the tragic 
path of many imperial and colonial powers (Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Japan, etc.), 
including the United states since the post World War II period. Niebuhr would insist that 
without adequate diagnosis of the complexities and conflagrations of global issues, this 
virtuous America, like past imperialists, has been pursuing often times its agenda with 
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tragic disregard of the nature of the international problems and its own role of flaring 
those conflicts. For example, Wikileaks openly disclosed (declassified) that America’s 
support for dictatorial regimes in many parts of the Arab World has been a source why so 
many in various parts of the world have come to view the United States as hypocritical, 
unjust, and undemocratic. So too are the Russians and Chinese, all in the name of power 
politics and narrow self interests. Case in point, the current crises in Tunisia, Yemen, and 
Egypt exposed the very heart of America’s failed policies of propping up puppets and 
friendly dictators such as Hosni Mubarak and the Royal House of the Saudis who have 
quashed the aspirations and hopes of their people for so many decades. We also see 
Russia and China reigniting the old Cold War feud over Syria. 
However, as the world’s leading Super Power but greatly being challenged by 
China, Niebuhr would encourage America to use its influence and power smartly, in 
order to advance the cause of justice and the common good. It requires careful reading in 
history of other great powers that have exerted power politics— negatively or positively, 
as seen through imperialism, colonialism, and post World Wars and the Cold War, in 
order to avoid similar tragic paths. In such case, America ought not to justify its moral or 
military action on an amoral and selfish reason—claiming for example, that the war on 
terror is primarily an effort, to preventing Islamic radicalism or extremism from the seat 
of political and economic powers. This propaganda was reminiscent of President George 
W. Bush’s regime, unlike Obama’s regime that sought a collective global effort in 
dealing with crises of failed states. In Niebuhr’s warning, America virtues of 
championing it’s version of democracy and economic system to the rest of the world 
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ought to avoid any kinship with the vices of the very extremism, for example, of Osama 
Bin Laden and others that continue to promote the purge of their society from infidels. 
Prophetically, Niebuhr warned us against such a catastrophic alliance of good and evil 
that can lead to more evil acts as exemplified in Iraq and Afghanistan, where America’s 
pursuit of justice have led to more death, destruction of American soldiers and of 
Afghanis and Iraqis citizens; even directly and indirectly creating a global economic 
meltdown since the Great Depression.
149
  
Nevertheless, I am certain that Islamic society and others such as African, Asian, 
and South American nations would gradually come to terms (whether through evolution 
or revolution—or what I call evolutionary revolution) with the need to pursuing a society 
that is just, hopeful, loving and democratic. As a process, it would be an arduous task 
involving the United States and the international community, since so many of these 
nations and their peoples have been suppressed and had very little experience with 
democratic processes. It is at this juncture that Niebuhr seems to infer that for the sake of 
justice, we must not shy away from the use of [smart] power in order to bring about 
God’s love and mercy to others who are faced by momentous challenges due to state 
collapse and failed states. He draws from the Christian motif of suffering, royalty and 
power. In this view, Niebuhr does not want us to accept the notion of helplessness and 
weakness as many Christians have resigned to accept in international affairs. He writes, 
                                                 
149
 Reinhold Niebuhr. The Irony of American History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1952, 147. With the trillions spent in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is sad to know that domestically, many 
national projects of nation-building in America have been ignored. Students’ educational debts have 
surpassed credit card debts. Yet, these are the very people the USA need to sustain its future prosperity and 
self-interests. 
  
158 
Could anything disprove and invalidate the Messianic claim more 
irrefutably than this ignominious death? He [Jesus the Christ] was weak 
and powerless. He had saved others but could not save himself…All this 
mockery and derision is the natural and inevitable response to the 
absurdity of weakness and suffering in a royal and divine figure...common 
sense  assumes that the most significant and necessary attribute of both 
royalty and divinity is power.
150
 
 
I must admit through my observation and experience, America has never shied 
away from the use of power—power politics or smart power in the last hundred years 
through the use of its political, military and economic endeavors. In this regard, the 
United States of America has been realistic in its understanding of power or the use of 
force in pursuing its goals. For Niebuhr, America exemplifies the paradox within the 
Christian articulation of political power. He writes, “the image of Christ crucified is, of 
all Christian images, the one that contains the full paradox of human doubt and human 
faith, the focal point of the temporal and the eternal…essentially challenged and most 
essentially triumphant.”151 How then does one resolve this absurdity of the divine 
weakness or powerlessness within the context of nation-building? From inference, 
Niebuhr seems to suggest that God’s self-imposed weakness of his love doesn’t diminish 
God’s powerfulness—which in essence is God’s goodness. Therefore, “a truly holy God 
must be both powerful and good” because “impotent and limited goodness is not divine” 
and “cannot be worshipped…but power without goodness cannot be worshipped either. It 
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may be feared, or possibly defied…”152 This Christian articulation of power must also be 
mindful of misconstruing power in a negative sense.  
Such negative view of power has the tendency to create disinterestedness on the 
role of Christians in securing or working for a harmonious political and economic order 
in this world. In concurrence, Niebuhr writes, 
The acceptance of goodness of power in Christian faith is intimately 
related to its whole “nonspiritual” interpretation of life…The created word 
as such is good; and all forms of creation represent various strategies of 
power. Life is power…[and] not the cause of the evil in it; and the power 
of the creator is not a contradiction, but an aspect of [God’s] 
holiness…But we cannot escape the responsibilities of power by 
preoccupation with these corruptions…Power is not evil of itself; but evil 
incarnates itself in power and cannot finally be defeated without the use of 
power.
153
 
 
Our understanding and application of power then from Christian realism must be 
a part of our mission in comprehending a world that ought to reflect the justice and loving 
nature of God. This means that wherever injustice and the manifestation of evil acts 
permeate, we as Christian ought to be active participants in curbing or restoring the 
dignity of others through the use of power—and by avoiding the spiritualization of our 
vision of power “which assume that the only hope of virtue among us is to disavow 
power… [in order to] achieve the spiritual power to defeat evil.”154  
This balanced view of power as articulated here by Niebuhr, is at the core of the 
current Christian debate and conflicting ideological divides between those who argue for 
disengagement on world issues on the one hand, to those who advocate a world of 
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physical engagement with all pressing issues confronting our world—as an eschatological 
and theo-ethical tasks. As a mission, the Christian cannot sit and be indifferent to the 
wrongful use of power by the state, corporations, non-state actors, and other international 
agents. Christians rather, ought to help shape the dialogue on the use of power in ways 
that promote justice and the common good. To this Niebuhr avers:  
In any immediate situation neither man nor God can defeat a powerful 
defiance of the order of the world without using power to set the limits of 
that defiance. There is no purely spiritual method of preserving minimal 
justice and order in a world, for the world is not purely spiritual. Power is 
the basis of justice in history as it is of order in the entire natural world.
155
  
 
Moreover, justice within the context of nation-building, where defiant rulers are 
defeated, in Niebuhr’s view is a form of divine justice, however obscured and confusing 
as seen through out human history. He adds, that justice and wrath have a negatively 
redemptive effect which illuminates us that there is a limit on how long those rulers can 
continue to perpetuate their evil regimes.
156
 However Niebuhr also contends that:  
…punishment may prompt men [and women] and nations to despair as 
well as to repentance…[as] there can be no repentance if love does not 
shine through the justice…whatever the inadequacies of forgiveness and 
love may be in the operations of human justice, men [and women] 
ultimately face divine forgiveness as well as divine wrath… justice is 
good and punishment is necessary. Yet, justice alone does not move men 
[and women] to repentance. The inner core of their rebellion is not 
touched until they behold the executor of judgment suffering with and for 
the victim of punishment.
157
 
 
 It is this view of justice on earth that has been either downplayed or overplayed in 
our world of defiance and hypocrisy. So often, when nations like the US and its European 
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allies seek to exact justice on other nations, they are met with deep suspicion and 
criticism as in the case of the Iraq war. Niebuhr also insisted that we must be mindful of 
coercive factor in society even though, he admits is both necessary and dangerous by 
seriously complicating the goal of achieving both peace and justice.
158
 Emphatically, he 
analyzed historical events that exemplify the failure to achieving a cohesive social order 
and justice in our world due to the misapplication of the factor of force. The failure lies in 
either “to eliminate the factor of force entirely or to an undue reliance upon it.”159  
Reinhold Niebuhr’s Realism—A Redux 
In making a good society or rebuilding failed states, Niebuhr is on point by 
asserting that “society will probably never be sufficiently intelligent to bring power under 
its control… [because] the stupidity of the average man [or woman] will permit the 
oligarch, whether economic or political, to hide his [or her] real purposes from the 
scrutiny of his [or her] fellows and withdraw his [or her] activities from effective 
control.”160 Therefore, the future peace and justice of society…depend upon, not one but 
many strategies, in all of which moral and coercive factors are compounded in varying 
degree…that it is safe to hazard the  prophecy that the dream of perpetual peace and 
brotherhood [and sisterhood] for human society…[that] will never be fully realized…[in 
our life time].”161 
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I concur with Niebuhr that “the ability to consider or even to prefer the interests 
of others to our own is not dependent upon the capacity for sympathy…[but] depends 
upon the sense of justice as much as or even more than the sentiment or benevolence… 
the sense of justice is a product of the mind and not the heart.”162 Therefore, reason tends 
to check selfish impulses and to grant the satisfaction of legitimate impulses in others.”163  
This view of the sinfulness and self-interest of human beings necessitates the need 
for reason and faith to be complementary of each other in shaping our understanding and 
dealing with complex issues that affect the social, economic, and political lives of our 
communities. These are real world problems that shaped the Methodist Movement and 
helped define its “Social Principles.” It also gave impetus to Social Christianity and 
Niebuhr’s Christian Realism. If our Christian virtues of love, hope, and justice can shape 
the common good, then the moral responsibility is upon us to act in reversing the failure 
and tragedy of nations. It means we must be attentive, active, and responsive in this world 
as an eschatological and moral mandate. 
Niebuhr like Wesley is not in search of an ideological perfect society as 
articulated in most of Plato’s writings. Rather, it is the world of reality where Augustine’s 
Civitas Dei intersects with Civitas Terrena.
164
 In this world order, Niebuhr like 
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Augustine, cautions us to be mindful of an utopian worldview, believing that we can 
make this world better by having a common humanity, language or reasoning because the 
world we live in is characterized by tensions, frictions, competitions of interest and overt 
conflicts to which every human community is exposed.”165 It is a world of humanity 
where we are capable of doing good or evil to one another. 
This is the real world of struggle and injustice and of death and destruction. It is 
“constantly subjected to an uneasy armistice between contending forces, with the danger 
that factional disputes may result in bloody insurrection at any time.”166 What the world 
needs is not just Cicero’s justice but a common love based on collective interest 
maintained by the use of smart power. In Augustine’s world, power politics is at play, as 
large society and dominant groups seek social and political power. This view of reality in 
Augustine’s and Niebuhr’s articulation transcends oligarchic, military, or democratic 
systems of governance—in a world of various interests where the dominant power group 
sets the agenda for the commonweal as exemplified in America’s hegemony in our 
current global politics.  
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 However, as Augustine infers, let our self-interest take consideration of others so 
that there is a collective self-interests that supersedes our narrow self-interest.
167
 In this 
sense, the love commandment—the love of God, amor dei and the love of neighbor, in 
spite of its limited classical interpretation, ought to be seen in our modern context as 
embracing both God and the neighbors as an essential ethical obligation. Therefore, we 
become actively involved in the flourishing of all people—especially those living in 
failed states that need to experience authentic nation-building—where rights and 
responsibilities are sine qua non.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES AS BRIDGE ETHICS 
The Roman Catholic Account of the Common Good and other Resources 
 
David Hollenbach, a Roman Catholic Jesuit priest, brings great insight to 
compliment the “Christian realism” as articulated by Reinhold Niebuhr. Hollenbach’s 
unique understanding is exemplified through his personal and professional experiences 
and interactions with Africans and peoples of other developing nations, where he 
empathizes with their struggles and aspirations. He argues that there must be a new 
commitment to the common good in addressing issues that confront the middle class and 
the poor in cities and the globalized world. As such, the common good ought to be one 
that “challenges cultural, racial, ethnic, national definitions of who count as part of the 
community.”1 
Certainly this inspiration is drawn out of his intellectual commitment and rich 
Catholic faith. His interpretation of the modern Catholic vision of the global common 
good is rooted in love, justice and hope and solidarity, oriented towards the good life of 
the individual and the larger community. In the tradition of Aristotle and the Stoics, the 
good life is oriented to goods shared by and with others—that is the common good of the 
larger community. 
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Hence, the good life and quality of the person’s life is inseparable from that of the 
society.
2
 In retrieval of the church’s social and political engagement beyond the Second 
Vatican Council, Hollenbach makes a historical case. He writes: 
The fact of such involvement is nothing new…the special place granted 
the church in the Roman Empire by Constantine, the investiture 
controversy of the Middle Ages…all show that the church has not been a 
stranger to the world of politics in the past.
3
  
 
As seen through history, the Church has been a catalyst in the transformation of 
our world in its response to many pressing social and political issues—hence, the Church 
helped produce some of the finest educational institutions, hospitals, and many social 
services the world has ever known. It is on this basis of the Church’s historical narrative, 
that Hollenbach envisions this new phase of engagement that is realistic, hopeful, and 
achievable. Firstly, Hollenbach acknowledges the importance of pluralism, which forces 
the church to recognize its social mission as rooted in its faith and identity.
4
 This bold 
reflection by the church also requires introspection of its vision and how such task can be 
pursued in the midst of plurality or diversity in our global community of characters and 
ideologies. Hollenbach writes:  
This context calls for careful discernment of the relations between the 
Christian vision of society and contemporary political ideologies and 
careful reflection on how the universal mission of the church is to be 
embodied in the… diverse nations and culture of the globe.5 
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This evolution of the church in its role in the world can be traced to the many 
social teachings and encyclicals issued by many of the modern popes. One easily 
recognizes how the earlier writings were heavily influenced in concept and language by 
the natural law ethics of scholastic philosophers such as Aquinas and Anselm. Thus, 
Hollenbach acknowledges that pre-Vatican II writings are insufficiently based in biblical, 
Christological, eschatological, or ecclesiological groundings of the church’s social role.6 
But based on the reality of the time the church found itself, especially during the 
Enlightenment, in which human autonomy based on reason had far more broader appeal, 
posed serious challenges to the authority of the church. It was based on such conflicts and 
uncertainty that that Vatican I (1869-70) strongly affirmed the full compatibility of faith 
and reason.  
On such basis, Leo XIII affirmed that Christian faith had an affinity with human 
reason because it “adds greatly to its nobility, keenness, and stability.”7 Nevertheless, this 
was an apologetic strategy of the church in which the church could consider anyone 
unreasonable and unfaithful if they rejected the teachings of the pope in the proper 
ordering of society.
8
 In reality the church was caught unawares. Therefore it became 
antagonistic to the end product of the time—liberal democracy and secularism, which 
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Hollenbach claimed were “regarded not only as betrayal of faith but as cultural heresies 
as well.”9  
However, this perspective of the church is a matter of the past. Instead, the church 
had come to accept its redefined role in an ever-changing world where it must be 
prophetic and actively engaged in all issues confronting our world. Hence, we are 
confronted with the conflict of cultural pluralism and social conflicts, which Vatican II 
succinctly diagnosed. 
Although the world of today has a very vivid sense of its unity and how 
one person depends on another in needful solidarity, it is most grievously 
torn into opposing camps by conflicting forces. For political, social, 
economic, racial, and ideological disputes still continue bitterly, and with 
them the peril of a war which would reduce everything to ashes. True, 
there is a growing exchange of ideas, but the very words by which key 
concepts are expressed take on quite different meanings in diverse 
ideological systems.
10
 
 
Like Niebuhr, Hollenbach recognizes that we cannot simply rely on scientific 
achievement and our intellectual prowess by reason of the natural law alone. The reality 
is that we are all shaped by our various cultural identities and geographical locales. 
Therefore, to harbor the idea of a unified and organic world, based on human moral 
reason would be a utopianism at its extreme. It would be based on such complexities and 
conflicting ideas of the world that Hollenbach argues, that the church ought to be visible 
and operative in all spheres. He states, 
If the church is intent on making a contribution to the debates about social, 
political, and economic life, it must state forthrightly and publicly its own 
most basic convictions about the nature and destiny of human being. It 
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must respond to the moist basic questions about the meaning of human life 
in its social teaching as well as in doctrinal theology.
11
 
 
In this reconfiguration of the church’s vision of, and mission to, the world, there 
is an deeper appreciation and acknowledgement of the role of Scripture and its 
theological and doctrinal significance in shaping our view and action toward the rest of 
the world. For example, the Vatican Council in its articulation of the social mission and 
identity of the church explicitly emphasized “the healing and elevation of the dignity of 
the human person, the building and consolidation of bonds of solidarity in society, and 
the endowment of daily human activity with a deeper meaning and worth.”12  
How then can we as Christians read such a biblically-driven mandate that 
transcends a single community and refuse to act in defense of the innocent or defenseless, 
for the natural environment? Why should our faith only be limited to the soup kitchens, 
Salvation Army, Catholic Relief or UMCOR (United Methodist Committee on Relief)? 
Are we not obligated to encourage our governments to be involved in socio-ethical and 
theo-political issues as intrinsic as nation-building efforts if human dignity and solidarity 
require us to take action for those that have been disenfranchised and seek the same life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness?   
For Hollenbach, human dignity is rooted in the creation of human persons in the 
image of God (though reaffirmed by the natural law), where freedom, intelligence, and 
conscience are in the reach of all persons. This belief resonates with the council’s 
theological affirmation that the mission of the church also extends to building up bonds 
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of community and mutual interdependence among all people, which is rooted in the love 
of God and neighbors. Our dignity rooted in our personhood then is realized only in 
genuine community that secures such right.
13
 On such basis, the council insisted that “the 
social mission manifests the fact that God’s saving grace draws persons into communion 
of solidarity with one another…until that day on which it will be brought to perfection.”14  
The church becomes a living sacrament promoting the Kingdom of God through 
its work of charity, its prophetic voice for the disenfranchised as it “promotes a process of 
wholesome socialization and the association in civic and economic realms.”15 In essence, 
the church is physical and real and confronts the enormity of a sinful world by engaging 
in “the affairs of the Polis.” However, with its historical past it is embroiled in 
controversies and other vexing issues such as slavery, imperialism, crusades, and other 
past transgressions. Hollenbach rightly cautions us to “distinguish our social mission 
from religious imperialism or theological triumphalism.”16  
As observed, the world is so diverse with multiple points of views that it would 
seem so arrogant to insist that the Catholic community or Protestant’s theological vision 
of world order holds an absolute and universal truth. Rather, what our ethical and 
theological task entails as articulated by the council is “seeking a Christian interpretation 
of social reality and proposing concrete directions for Christian social action…[that] can 
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be developed only through dialogue with the various interpretations and proposals 
present in a pluralistic society.”17 
On the role of justice, Hollenbach sees it as constitutive to the mission of the 
church. However, the question we are faced with is how can it be articulated or applied? 
Based on the generally accepted ancient phrase, suum cuique – “to each his due,” there 
are multiple of meanings or pluralism even within the Christian context. The notion of 
justice ranges from respect towards structured systems; to duty based on one’s ability, 
obligation and distribution based on merit or excellence [arête]; to the demands of equal 
liberty and opportunity for all.
18
 With this multiplicity of interpretations of justice what 
was the intention or implicit and explicit meaning of justice during the 1971 Synod of 
Bishops of the Roman Catholic Church in their reflection as declared?  
According to Hollenbach:   
 
Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the 
world fully appear to us as the constitutive dimension of the preaching of 
the Gospel, or, in other words, of the Church’s mission for the redemption 
of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive situation.
19
 
 
In our analysis of the Synod’s statement of justice in the life of the Christian 
church, how do we realistically and practically make sense of this bold declaration of 
these bishops without allowing it “from falling into the limbo reserved for slogans and 
platitudes?”20 In concurrence with Hollenbach, we ought to clarify the meaning of justice 
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within the context of this declaration. Firstly, this demand for justice through preaching 
the Gospel is in no shape or form advocating for “an updated version of medieval 
Christendom.”21 That is, we do not seek to idealize our understanding of justice in a 
narrow sense but to see it in a practical and applicable way. To idealize justice within 
such narrow theo-political framework would be tenuous and dangerous as well 
documented in the history of Christianity and world politics.  
Rather, the notion of justice sustained by the Catholic tradition is based on 
relational and mutual love and respect for all peoples across race, class, and gender. As 
articulated by Hollenbach, “[justice] is based on the conviction that one cannot specify 
the meaning of suum cuique without examining the social relationships, patterns of 
mutuality, and structures of interdependence that bind human beings together in 
communities.”22 In this regard, justice is social in nature as it promotes interdependence 
of all people through obligation and duty that encompasses freedom and dignity for all 
people in a pluralistic world. Hollenbach writes: 
Respect for freedom and dignity, therefore, involves more than no 
interfering with the activity of persons. Obligations of justice include 
positive duties to aid persons in need, to participate in the maintaining of 
the public good, and to share in the efforts o create the kinds of institutions 
that promote genuine mutuality and reciprocal respect.
23
 
 
Taken in our current context of the demand and aspirations of the Arab and 
African worlds and other places that are experiencing upheavals and becoming hotbeds 
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for failed states, it is our moral duty, according to this document, to be persistent in 
promoting such social good that comes from freedom and dignity. It requires us speaking 
about and participating in the necessary war and protests that have brought changes in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. To sit on the fence or to become 
disengaged from the world is to accept the carnage unleashed by brutal leaders and 
regimes. Such inaction makes us guilty as the good people who did nothing. 
Instead, we are being urged by the major encyclicals to understand the social 
nature of humanity from the philosophical and empirical appeals. Furthermore, these 
documents frequently stress the inter-connection of love that is rooted in the obligations 
of justice.
24
 This emphasis on love as observed by Hollenbach has twofold connections: 
firstly, there is a continuous concern for respect for individual human persons in their 
uniqueness and their concrete needs. Therefore, human rights and human dignity are 
intrinsic factors that elevate the Church’s role in promoting agape as it is ultimately 
grounded in concrete persons and situations requiring our action. In this trajectory, 
Hollenbach insists that “justice is rooted in the fact the very existence of a human person 
confronts others with [a] certain ought that demands respect and support.”25 What enables 
us to act then in the midst of the struggles and needs of others is love which is willing to 
foster  and support the “other’s subjectivity, selfhood and freedom.”26  
Secondly, Hollenbach argues, that the norm of agape, through the church’s 
tradition, promotes interpersonal and social mutuality within the framework of justice. 
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Yet, we are aware of the distinction between justice and love, with the former being 
attentive to concrete situations or particularities while the latter is unconditional. 
Hollenbach asserts: 
Justice calls for social relationships and a kind of social organization that 
open the way of the fulfillment of the person which only occur in unity 
and solidarity with others. Mutual interdependence is not merely a 
physical, psychological, or economic fact. It is a moral obligation. This 
interdependence can only be realized only in that form of solidarity and 
mutuality that Pius XI called social love.
27
 
 
Henceforth, we can affirm that from the Roman Catholic tradition, as articulated 
from the social teachings of the church, justice is rooted in the social nature of humanity 
where the notion of love [agape] enlivens the realization of justice in concrete terms. 
Justice concerns mutuality and reciprocity based on moral obligation. “What is due to a 
person or a group is to be determined by the kinds of relationships that shape and 
influence the life and action of that person or group.”28 In concrete terms, human dignity 
is of paramount or ultimate concern as it promotes the commonweal through mutual 
participation in the political, social, and economic affairs of our world.  
In its specificity based on rational appeal, the Roman Catholic Church 
intentionally “proposed certain specific rights, such as the rights to life, food, housing, 
assembly, etc., as concrete demands for justice and as equally binding on all persons 
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regardless of their religious convictions.”29 It is this concrete demand and articulation of 
justice through the church that obligates Catholics to promote the freedom of all people 
and nations from the grips of tyranny and hypocrisy. This call to solidarity is mutual or 
social love which, in essence, is grounded in our Christian understanding of justice within 
our social nature. 
This authentic participation of the church is further exemplified through the life 
and experience of Ignatius Loyola who himself was a product of his era, where he was 
“drawn by circumstance and grace from a life of self-glorification to clear-eyed realism 
oriented to God’s glory.”30 Just like all United Methodists are called to reflect and live 
(through the application of scripture, tradition, experience and reason), Ignatius brought 
to bear his experience, observation, methodology and insights as influential in shaping his 
Christian orientation of the world. Based on these foundational groundings, the Ignatian 
spirituality has offered a fuller and more realistic assessment of the Church in a real 
world, in which “God is present in and to every aspect of our human living an 
loving…[as] God is fully present in every molecule of the universe. The challenge is to 
find God where God is and not where we think God ought to be.”31  
In our challenge God is interested in the building of human communities and 
nations from the state of fragility to authentic stabled nations where humans can 
experience the fullness of peace, freedom, dignity, and aspirations. It is this Ignatian 
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service to God and the Gospel, where Catholics are called to respond to a world, where 
humanity dwells in poverty, ignorance, and oftentimes, violence. Ad majorem Dei 
glorian, literally translated as “to the glory of God,32 is the mantra that moves us to an 
active participation in a broken world. As exemplified in Ignatius Loyola’s own life, an 
inspiration for us as Christians, we learned that in this momentous call we are challenged 
to be “faithful, attentive, and generous in redressing the greatest or most demanding 
needs to which [we] are sent, the labor itself, whether spiritual; material, intellectual, or 
social, and the relationships that arise from such service, provide both an encounter with 
the risen Lord and any necessary penance and self-abnegation.”33  
This Christian oriented task demands a performance realized through our full 
participation in service for others in this world and it is captured in eight core principles 
articulated within the Ignatian tradition.
34
 These intrinsic Ignatian beliefs define how we 
can realistically deal with pressing issues that confronts our world. Therefore, we reorient 
and rebut a literal reading of Philippians 3:19-20 where St. Paul writes, “Their minds are 
occupied with earthly things. But our citizenship is in heaven.” Burke thus counters that:   
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Taken literally and out of context, this injunction might lead to extreme 
religious sectarianism where the sacred and profane never overlap. In 
contrast, Ignatian spirituality seeks God precisely in the world. It 
courageously engages worldly issues and affairs. It aims always for the 
magis but it does not for that reason shy away from controversy of 
conflict, from political, economic, or cultural concerns, from all that goes 
by name “the secular.” Rather, it seeks God precisely in the world, in wide 
range of symbols and languages accessible to various peoples, realms, and 
regions of life and thought….therefore citizenship in heaven finds a body 
in an through genuine citizenship in the world…[which] requires a 
prophetic stance  when worldly  values conflict with values of God’s 
kingdom, when human injustice imprisons the truth, when ideology, 
selfishness, and hatred threaten to turn God’s world into hell.35 
 
In essence, we are citizens of St. Augustine’s civitas Dei and civitas terrena 
where both cities commingled. It is where the love of God and of the neighbor is of 
paramount concern and the guiding principles for engaging the world in all affairs. 
Nevertheless, we must be aware of the tension inherent between the two cities. Yet, our 
call to service takes us to uncomfortable places and complex issues that confront our 
world. In this challenge, nation-building becomes in my view a pressing need that ought 
to be central and at the forefront of our task for rebuilding failed states, the breeding 
grounds for injustice, desperation, violence, and apathy. This task in essence, requires 
smart and timely intervention militarily and diplomatically where humanitarian needs are 
at the greatest—to establish stable government, institutional development, democratic 
society, and economically viable nations that promote the wellbeing of all people in 
respective of their race, religions, gender, orientation and status in life. 
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Furthermore, Pacem in Terris poignantly uplifts the theory of the natural law in 
concise terms. It states that our natural rights come from our nature as persons.
36
 In 
addition, humanity is endowed with intelligence and free will and also made in the image 
of God [Imago Dei]. Because of our dignity we have natural rights to life, bodily 
integrity, and means suitable to the proper development of life. We also are entitled to 
security in the case of illness, inability to work etc. It urges us to respect one’s own 
person, one’s reputation, freedom of speech and intellectual inquiry, and pursuit of art.37 
However, it argues that the natural rights are within the context of limits laid down by the 
moral order and the common good. These rights include the sharing the benefits of 
culture (e.g. education, honoring the good according to the dictates of our own 
conscience) and the right to practice our own religion,
38
 making one’s own decision about 
what kind of lifestyle – family or religious vocation.39 The family is seen as the essential 
cell of society; it has natural rights—advocating for provision for the family in social and 
economic matters and parents’ right to support and educate their children.40 It also 
advocates for the dignity of work without coercion and our duties in the preservation of 
life. Our lives ought to correspond to the right to a decent standard of living, where we 
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are to respect the rights of others recognize and observe mutual rights and duties, act 
responsibly, because a society established on force is inhumane.
41
 Our lives ought to 
correspond to the right to a decent standard of living, where we are call to respect the 
rights of others, by recognizing and observing our mutual rights and duties to act freely 
and responsibly, because a society established on force is inhumane.
42
 
The encyclical also makes the case that authority comes from God alone. In 
essence, “authority derives its obligatory force from the moral order. So, the dignity of a 
civil authority is due to it sharing to some extent in the authority of God.”43 Therefore 
“civil authority must appeal primarily to the conscience of individual citizens.”44 Since 
no one can oblige inner acts because of dignity, the state may oblige people in conscience 
only if their authority is “intrinsically related with the authority of God and shares in 
it…Therefore, to obey a just law is to obey God.”45  
Moreover, the common good is the responsibility of individuals and groups to 
make their own specific contributions to the common welfare.
46
 In this regard, the state 
ought to promote both the material and spiritual welfare of the citizens.
47
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Hence, governments must respect human rights and act in accordance with them. 
It should also “coordinate social relations so that the exercise of one’s rights doesn’t 
threaten the exercise of another’s rights nor hinder them in the fulfillment of their 
duties.”48 The role of the government is seeking to bring about a situation in which 
individuals can easily exercise their rights and fulfill their duties, where all share in the 
common good, although in different ways according to each tasks, merits, and 
circumstances.
49
 Thus, the common good is chiefly guaranteed when personal rights and 
duties are maintained
50
 with respect or attention to the social and economic progress of 
citizens.
51
 
Pacem in Terris also promotes states’ rights and duties in relations between 
countries. It argues that all countries share an equal natural dignity, just like all humans 
enjoy an equal natural dignity.
52
 The relations therefore between countries must be 
regulated by truth and justice
53
 in fostering the common good for all peoples. This act of 
mutuality emphatically states that developed countries should aid those in the process of 
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development.
54
 Therefore, it is absolutely unjust to oppress other countries in search of 
development of one’s own resources.55 
Pacem in Terris also argues that through the rule of truth, justice and sincere 
cooperation, and not by coercion or force of arms, ought to be the manner in which 
international relations is conducted. Arms race should cease and therefore no country 
may unjustly oppress others or duly meddle in their affairs and exercise political 
domination over nations it considered weak and vulnerable.
56
 It supports a global public 
authority such as the UN whose agenda is to promote the universal common good.
57
 It 
asserts that the fundamental objective should be the safeguarding and promotion of the 
rights of a human person. However, there must be limits such as avoiding or usurping 
national sovereignty or powers. But the principle of subsidiarity applies—that is doing 
the things that individual nation-states are incapable of doing alone.
58
  
Clearly, we can make the case that nation-building—the restoration of wholeness 
and dignity to so many millions of people and their environment requires a massive 
response and participation of Christians. It’s is a theological and ethical task that ought to 
be perceived as an act of genuine respect for justice, equality, and fairness. It’s a call to 
living out the Christian virtues which is rooted in the love for neighbors, strangers, and 
the others. It is wholistic and transcends boundaries, race, nationalities, cultures, and 
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ideologies. It’s a realistic and justifiable act of appropriating the common good in real 
time and experience.  
Michael Novak also brings a concise Roman Catholic articulation of the notion of 
the common good to this work. He draws on past historical and philosophical tradition 
that currently shape the contemporary Catholic social thought. He is concerned about 
how the church can adequately address and understand the democratic principles and the 
market economy inherent in capitalism, the nexus of global political economy—the heart 
of failed state or nation-(re)building.  
In particular, Novak makes the case that the Catholic Church during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century set itself against liberalism as an ideology but it 
has slowly come to admire liberal institutions such as democracy and free markets.
59
 Part 
of the problem, Novak insists, can be traced to the church’s failure to understand 
economic issues and their effect on a global scale. He writes,  
Religious leaders and theologians are awakening to the fact that their 
accustomed periodicals have ill-prepared them for this hour. Books on 
church and state, religion and politics, religion and the arts, religion and 
psychiatry and religion and sex outnumber books on theology and 
economics by a very large factor…To create a new subdiscipline of 
theology, “a theology of political economy,” will take a generation of hard 
work.
60
 
 
Nevertheless, the Catholic vision of social justice and liberal institutions, are now 
finding common grounds in spite of shared differences between the outcomes of the 
liberal institutions vis-à-vis, the philosophies of the liberal thinkers who first espoused 
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them.
61
 For Novak, institutions are ever evolving and finding meaningful ways of 
historically advancing which undergirds genuine but often unpredictable development 
from the genesis of these intuitions.  
One may argue that liberal institutions in conformity with adequate Catholic 
philosophy of the human person, its deep sense of community, and its long-experienced 
respect for “intermediate associations” or “mediating structures” offer our world a 
genuine appreciation for community, human dignity, and progress.
62
 These structures are 
what enable us to see more profoundly our need and longing for community and 
institutions that foster growth, accountability, human flourishing, and safe environment—
without which, we become individualistic, ahistorical, irrational, and confined to a world 
of nothingness. That is we become inadequate and selfish in our undertakings. 
In this historical development of the Roman Catholic Church, economic 
development and the protection of human rights have become deeply enshrined by the 
teachings of the Church.
63
 Historically, these principles are traced to liberal institutions 
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rather than to a socialist option, which official Catholic teaching from Roman sources 
strongly criticizes on economic affairs.
64
 Yet the only confirmed reading or misreading 
into socialism comes with John XXIII and Paul VI, especially Populorum progressio, 
where economic issues are addressed as a collective human endeavor.
65
 But Pope Paul 
clearly clarified any socialist interpretations of this encyclical in a subsequent document 
Octogesima adveniens.
66
 This letter emphasized the Church desires to see the full 
flourishing of all peoples. In addition, it recognizes scientific advancement as intrinsic to 
the development of our lives but lacks completion of humankind. It also asserted that to 
solve the multitude of problems facing humanity today the Church must be vigilant in 
working for the common good which requires greater justice in the sharing of goods 
nationally and internationally. Moreover, Novak argues that the goal of political power 
must be the common good, but in the political process there is often a legitimate variety 
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of possible options. We must be aware that the same Christian faith can lead to different 
commitments.  
However, Christians must articulate the common good by being involved in the 
building up of a just world at the local level in their communities. This notion of the 
common good is based on Jacques Maritain’s interpretation, which argues for democratic 
capitalism as a tripartite arrangement—a market-based economy, a democratic polity and 
a pluralistic and liberal moral-cultural system.
67
 Democratic capitalism is a system of 
natural liberty which forms the basis for a genuine form of communitarian free 
association, recognizes individual creativity and initiative, seeks to produce virtuous 
people, and reinforces habits consistent with Judeo-Christian tradition.
68
  
In his comparative analysis of capitalism and socialism, Novak asserts that the 
socialists were mistaken to think that they could create a good person which will then 
create a good society. For a proponent of socialism, this can be done through a good 
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government that is led by an elite group with gnosis. Realistically, this is an illusion that 
that has an appeal to Christianity where socialist redistribution parallels Christian 
charity.
69
 This redistribution in reality is “grotesque parodies of Christian 
community…that is not truly a Christian promise…It offers redistribution and abundance 
and on this promise it simply cannot deliver.”70 Sadly, this has been the reality in present 
day North Korea. Based on this socialistic premise, Novak writes,  
…there cannot be a good society unless there are good people…But the 
notion that a handful of true believers, can by manipulating the mass of 
people, create a good society inhabited by good people is pernicious 
nonsense.
71
 
 
Contrarily, capitalism has a rationalistic analysis of the world, where individual 
creativity must be encouraged in the generation of wealth.
72
 In its morphological 
structure, capitalism makes the case for human incentives based on self-interest that is 
tied to production and distribution. Since production and distribution are not autonomous, 
human incentives are what create wealth.
73
 Socialist economics assume that there is no 
problem of production, rather it is with distribution. But its philosophy is unattainable in 
a realistic society.  
Distinctively, capitalist society in its genuine nature (not the one promoted mainly 
by the United States during the Cold War when it supported tyrannical rulers who 
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repressed the very freedom inherent in capitalism and democracy) tends to be dynamic 
unlike socialist societies that are static. He writes that “Socialism, invented in the 
nineteenth century, and failing in the twentieth century has sought refuge at last in the 
myths of the eighteenth century.”74 
 Realistically, Novak argues, that capitalism succeeds because it is able to convert 
individuals’ private ambitions into the creation and distribution of wealth so that 
everyone has a solid material base.
75
 Additionally, capitalism demands freedom in order 
to function and thus liberates those who live under it; socialism ostensibly supports such 
liberation but, in fact, restricts freedom as observed in many former communist countries. 
In capitalist society, the government maintains the public morals and encourages its 
citizens to improve their conditions materially through economic growth that create a 
sense of comfort and happiness by reasonably accommodating individual self-interests. It 
is (self-interest) as Novak argues, that produces economic growth. In this comparative 
analysis, he concludes, 
Socialists believe economic growth is obtainable by having everyone 
place the common good before self-interest. In contrast, capitalism is not 
all utopian about human motivation. It recognizes that people will better 
their condition only if they have an interest in bettering their 
condition…capitalism considered self-interest as something that must not 
be repressed but restricted to area of economics by the moral codes 
established by Judeo-Christian tradition.
76
 
 
Similarly, Novak makes the case for poor in Third World countries to be brought 
into the capitalist system. He believes that foreign aid, when given, should primarily be 
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given directly to ordinary people—not in the form of welfare payments but in the form of 
education, training, and credit for the launching of small local businesses. Within 
capitalist nations, Novak calls for local initiatives to assist those in need. He warns that 
care must be taken to make sure that assistance programs do not lure the able-bodied into 
dependency. Assistance should encourage the building up of assets and not the 
prolongation of dependency. Therefore, we must as Christian, encourage wealth creation 
especially in communities and societies where inequalities are high.
77
  
Furthermore, in observance of Jacques Maritain’s work, The Person and the 
Common Good, Novak expands on the traditions of Catholic social thought of the 
common good with the liberal emphasis upon the free person and maintains that the 
liberal tradition of personal liberty has its own implicit doctrine of the common good. 
Whereas an individual is merely a member of a species, a person is an individual with a 
capacity for insight and choice, and, therefore, is both free and responsible.
78
 The purpose 
of every human person is to be with God in an eternal communion of insight and love. It 
follows that communion in perfect insight and love with God is both the common good of 
humankind and the personal good of each. For God, an absolute person, there is an 
absolute coincidence of common and personal good. It follows that on earth the common 
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good of persons is to live in as close an approximation of unity in insight and love as 
humans might attain.
79
  
To learn and achieve the common good, persons need institutions suitable to the 
task. American liberalism makes the protection of individual rights central to the idea of 
the common good and allows for the development of institutions that nourish cooperation 
without requiring prior agreement with respect to final ends or personal motivations. The 
common good consists in treating each person as an end and never solely as a means. As 
observed by Novak, in order to achieve both personal rights and the public good, he 
insisted that the framers of the American constitution chose not to impose a moral-
cultural system. Rather, they left the construction of such a system to institutions distinct 
from government. The American founders’ idea of a limited state, whose power is 
restricted by a written constitution, is based on the idea of the inviolability of personal 
rights. They upheld the consensus that the common good is not attained solely nor 
primarily by the government but by social institutions beyond the scope of the state.
80
  
Moreover, the purpose of government is to provide opportunities for individuals 
to exercise their own freedoms. In this regard, the common good consists of mutual 
cooperation and appreciation of all. In Novak’s inference, things can be done publicly 
without being done governmentally. In this case, the common good is far greater than the 
political good. Therefore, the main and most able instrument of attaining the common 
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good is not the state but society at large in its full range of social institutions, and not the 
autonomous individual but the communitarian individual.  
Furthermore, Novak draws a comparative analysis of both Madison and 
Tocqueville’s views to illustrate how factions and self-interest rightly understood are able 
to serve the public good.
81
 He writes that “each has been given by God the capacity to 
create more in a lifetime than he or she consumes. This causes economic progress. If 
people create more than they consume, the world will be better off because of each 
life.”82 
Accordingly, Novak asserts that the common good is actually many goods that are 
often in direct conflict. As realistically or accurately observed, free persons typically have 
diverse visions of the common good (as typifies in the United States political systems) 
where political candidates speak as if all Americans are in agreement with their views.
83
 
The reality is that each person in a free society is responsible under the veil of ignorance 
for his own conception of both his own good and the common good.  
On this basis, Novak asserts that the common good of any modern and pluralistic 
society is something usually unplanned, unenforced, and unintended but achieved 
through the participation of all citizens seeking their self interests but aware of the  
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common good for all. So what does the common good mean to Novak? He categorically 
identifies the common good to mean: (1) a liberating framework of institutions designed 
to liberate free persons; (2) a concrete social achievement; and (3) a benchmark that 
reminds us that no level of common good as concrete social achievement has as yet met 
the full measure of legitimate and moral expectation. In other words, we are seeking that 
perfection.
84
  
Novak further redefines social justice as a personal virtue, where the old vision of 
social justice as he argued, is guiding rule asserted by the state. Social justice, so defined, 
is not a virtue. Rather, it gives the state the authority and power to bring about a legal 
social order. This is the understanding of social justice that Friedrich von Hayek attacks 
as an arid, abstract, ideal enforced by an all-powerful state which encourages dependency 
and submissiveness. I assert that this is not the concept of social justice that Pius XI made 
canonical in 1931 in Quadragesimo Anno. What Pius intended was not the corporate 
welfare state but the revitalization of civil society or the Great society by the principle of 
association.
85
 
In this case, Novak, like John Wesley, amplifies this view by reinterpreting social 
justice as a distinctive virtue of free persons associating themselves together (forming 
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cells or communities). To be a free person is to know and love others in community. 
Novak believes that a community is true when its institutions and practices enable 
persons to multiply the frequency of their acts of knowing and loving. The purpose of a 
true community is to nourish the full development of each person among its members. It 
is also in the nature of each person to be in communion with others.
86
 In essence, this is 
the practice of social justice, which means activism, organizing, and trying to make the 
system better. Social justice is exercised as a social habit when men and women join with 
others to change the institutions of society. Novak explains that the habit of social justice 
has as its aim the improvement of some feature of the common good. 
Novak observes that envy must be defeated and the best systematic way to defeat 
it is through economic growth and open access. True social justice begins by removing 
systems of political allocation and group favoritism. Multiculturalism is currently being 
used to single out certain cultures for special status and discriminatory treatment. For, 
him love ought to be an intrinsic principle in the creation of a political economy. Love is 
caritas—a realistic possibility. He writes,  
One thing should perhaps be stressed about caritas. It is realistic. To love 
is to will the good of the other as other. To will, not what you wish for the 
other, nor what the other wishes, but the real good – which neither of you 
may yet recognize. Love is not sentimental, nor restful in illusions, but 
watchful…ready to follow evidence. It seeks the real as lungs crave air.87  
           
Categorically, Caritas is realism in Novak’s argument. It requires a realistic 
judgment of the world in dealing with the conditionality we faced on a daily basis. 
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Contrarily, any love “based upon appearances, illusions, and sentimentality is the 
opposite of caritas” because as Novak insists, “a civilization of caritas is a civilization 
acutely aware of, and provident for, human sinfulness.”88 In this realism of love, we are 
aware that we must never sacrifice the good for the perfect as we attempt to be hopeful in 
our approximation of justice and participating in the common good of society. In 
particular, caritas calls forth our participation in the affairs of the world, though 
imperfect as it might be. This “love that moves the sun and all the stars is ours to give to 
others.”89 It affects the social, cultural, economics, and political systems of our world. 
Therefore, it is imperative that we understand the sinful nature of human beings, laden 
with narrow self-interests. Our tasks then require a critical examination and possibly 
preventing the overuse of such powers in order to bring about a sense of responsible 
freedom for all people. Clearly, Novak emphatically asserts on: 
…separating the three great human powers: economic, political, and 
cultural. Since every person sometimes sins, we wish to prevent any one 
person (or group) from coming into possession of all three powers. The 
point of differentiation into three is to check the errant ambition, each of 
the others…The first is liberation from torture and tyranny through civil 
and political liberties. The second is liberty from poverty and want 
through economic liberties. The third – and most basic – is liberty of the 
human spirit, through religious liberty, liberty of the press, the liberties of 
inquiry in the arts and sciences, and the free exercise of the moral 
authority of conscience.
90
 
 
In this Catholic spirit, Novak, like Hollenbach, and consistent with the 
Encyclicals, is championing the cause for the primacy of our moral responsibility towards 
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the common good, which in essence, is the building of just and liberating communities 
and societies—where people can flourish and exercise their creative spirits and gifts. 
Consequently, when our political, economic, social, and cultural institutions fail us, we 
lose the inner core of the authentic self—which is the collective individuals forming the 
polis—nations of our world.  
We must therefore, have a corrective vision of our world, avoiding the absolutes 
and dogmatic posturing (based on arrogance and ignorance) amidst reasonable evidence. 
We must stand on the side of the good where reason, tradition, experience, and Scripture 
can interactively guide us towards the task of (re)building a just, hopeful, loving world 
where the common good is at the crux of all that we do. By partaking in such responsible 
actions, based on being attentive and responsive, we are indeed building a bridge ethics, 
informed by secularism and our Judeo-Christian heritage. 
Consensus on the Common Good: Catholicism, Protestantism, and Secularism 
 
  We can genuinely assert that the term “common good” within the socio-political 
tradition of our Christian moral and philosophical understanding, is deeply rooted in 
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas’s constructs. It is premised on the genuine good 
(bonum honestum) rather than secondary or tertiary goods. However, it also recognizes 
the importance of these general goods. In essence, the good of the community and other 
groups which supersede an individual good, is in reality the common good (bonum 
commune) in this classical view. In this concept, human beings are understood to be 
rational and political animals, grounded in moral reasoning that affect our deeds in an 
intelligible manner as we navigate in this interdependent world. This intelligibility makes 
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human action as distinct and distinguishable from instinctive behaviors.
91
 Therefore, 
human moral reasoning becomes a key component of the sum of the common good—in 
which our deeds are based on rational thought processes. This is well articulated by V.B. 
Lewis, who writes that,  
Reasons, on this view, are not merely justifications, but causes…. 
understood to be goods. The basic meaning of good here is simply 
‘desirable.’ The centrality of reasons understood as goods allows us to 
criticize action both internally (does it really achieve the goal set for it by 
the reason?) and externally (is the reason a good reason?). The external 
account and criticism of reason is possible because the proximate 
reasons/goods for any particular action can usually be referred to some 
more distant and general reasons/goods and all of them to some ultimate 
framework of intelligibility: the good…as such, the human good.92  
                 
It is our ability to be rational in our thoughts and actions that humanity is charged 
with the responsibility to see the world in its connectivity and therefore exercise the 
virtue of stewardship, which transcends such goods as pleasure, power, dominance, 
honor, and fortitude.
93
 It is out of such notion that Aristotle advocates for the complete 
human good, which he considered as happiness or flourishing (eudaimonia).
94
 As Lewis 
notes, Aristotle’s formulation of happiness is concerned with a type of life characterized 
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by rational activity in accordance with the virtues in a complete life.
95
 Such quest for 
happiness allows us to pursue all virtues for the sake of the community where the 
individual’s happiness is part of the whole within the polis. Lewis asserts: 
If the human good requires the virtues, the development of the virtues, 
one’s moral development, is the most important prerequisite for living the 
type of life that can be described as eudaimōn. Such development is 
impossible for one to pursue or achieve in isolation from other persons. 
This development requires the initial care provided by parents without, 
which no human being can even begin his or her moral development…of 
teachers, co-workers, and friends. It also requires an environment that 
includes the structures practices and the institutions to support them in 
pursuit of which one develops the virtues. Such things include not only 
schools, but athletic teams, chess clubs, and all the other human 
associations that provide the contexts for rational action through which 
persons aim at their good.
96
 
 
In addition, it’s out of such interaction, complexities, and multidimensional 
activities, that require two types of coordination: “first, the individual person must 
integrate the various goods and pursuits that make up his or her daily affairs into the 
overall good that is happiness or flourishing and that gives life its end; second, these 
various practices, institutions and actions must be coordinated by the larger human 
community.”97 It is this second social dimension that Lewis argues is Aristotle’s view of 
human being as a political animal; whereas, “the political community (the “city” or polis 
in Aristotle’s description) is the pinnacle that coordinates the actions of persons and 
associations within the city. “This coordination of actions, practices, and institutions is 
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what we usually mean by the common good.”98 So what we garnered is a complex 
network of coordination of the rational person pursuing his or her personal good in 
concert with the common good of others. Moreover, Lewis points at Aquinas ‘insights on 
the common good (bonum commune) by citing Gregory Froelich, who illustrates three 
ways the common good(s) is articulated in Aquinas’s thoughts: 
First there are goods that are common by predication, that is things that are 
potentially and in the abstract good for anyone, like food, money, exercise, 
or knowledge. These are common goods in the sense…But when 
discussed in this way they do not refer to any actual things, but are rather 
abstracted…A second sense of common refers to common goods, that is, 
goods that are real and not abstract, but actually owned by everyone, 
although not enjoyed by anyone in particular unless distributed to them 
from the common stock, at which point they  become private. The third 
sense of common good identified in Aquinas’s writings… [is] the political 
common good…[which] is the complete internal order of a political 
community, which, like the order of the army is both one and is also good 
for each citizen…The common good of any community, then, is an order 
of parts that explains and enables their coherence and activity without 
damaging their own internal integrity.
99
 
 
Of these forms or variations of the common good, it is the political common good 
that I argue is the centrality or the core of nation-building or rethinking the (re)building 
of failed states. It recognizes, affirms, and encompasses all goods—the individual, 
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private, secondary, collective, and particular goods—coordinating and organizing them in 
a multi-dimensional and productive manner in which the diversity and strength of various 
individuals and groups promote the wellbeing of the polis—which in our present realities 
refers to the local communities, nations and the world as a whole. It also seeks to bring 
law and order—based on rationality and the expression of all virtues in the interests of 
all. Notwithstanding, we must admit that the common good in this modern/postmodern 
sense is much more complicated and fragmented than in Aristotle’s polis.  
The characteristic of this genuine political common good as suggested by Yves 
Simon and well noted by Lewis is: 
Collective causality, i.e., that action can be traced to the community and 
not simply to individual members or parts…The second characteristic is 
that the actions of the community pursue a goal shared by the members…   
not by summing up the intentions of many individual persons or positing 
the existence of a super “organic” mind made up of individuals, but by the 
presence of…“we-intentions,” that is, the individuals who make up the 
community all think that “we believe: or “we intend” some goal.100 
 
A vivid illustration for this genuine common good is exemplified by the birth of 
South Sudan and the unanimous celebration and euphoria of the ordinary citizens of that 
newly formed nation, symbolized by the new national anthem, flag, songs, parades, and 
other national symbols. Additionally, the heroic victories by Team USA and Team Japan 
in the FIFA Women’s World Cup in Germany reaching the finals in 2011, clearly 
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demonstrates  how an entire nation can rally for victory or mourn in disaster or 
disappointment. However, this communion or “collective intention” can be exploited as 
seen in Hitler’s Germany and the after effect. We are reminded to be mindful as the 
“community [functions] with a genuine common good and not merely a partnership 
instrumental to the partners.”101 That is, the community cannot be suffocated by a ruling 
class that only seeks its own narrow self interests, dominance, and privileges against the 
overall objective of the entire nation or community. This distortion of the common good 
can be pointed at the recent debt ceiling debate in America’s political climate that 
seriously polarized and negatively politicized a nation’s division based on class welfare 
and ill-informed ideologies.   
 St. Augustine significantly contributes to this work and in particular on the matter 
of the common good. His works brings great insights into understanding the struggle of 
sins, the need for redemption, and trusting in God. Through such works like The 
Confession—a narrative autobiography and The City of God, we are able to grasp a 
clarity on how his rich theological and philosophical worldview impacts our world—of 
its brokenness and its need for redemption. Clearly, he reminds us of the real world of 
struggle and injustice and of death and destruction. For him this world is “constantly 
subjected to an uneasy armistice between contending forces, with the danger that 
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factional disputes may result in bloody insurrection at any time.”102 What the world needs 
is not Cicero’s notion of justice but a common love based on collective interest 
maintained by the use of [smart] power. In Augustine’s world, like ours, power politics is 
at play, as large society and dominant groups seek social and political power. This view 
of reality in the Augustinian and shaped vision and Niebuhr’s transcends oligarchic 
plutocracy, military, or democratic systems of governance—in a world of various 
interests where the dominant power group sets the agenda for the commonweal as 
exemplified in America’s hegemony in our current global politics. 
 However, as Augustine emphasizes, our reflection on self-interest must take 
consideration of others so that there is a collective self-interest that supersedes our 
narrow self-interest.
103
 In this sense, the love commandment—the love of God, amor dei 
and the love of neighbor, in spite of its limited  classical interpretation,  ought to be seen 
in our modern context as embracing both God and the neighbors as an essential ethical 
obligation.
104
 In this regard, to love one-self and the neighbors according Niebuhr in his 
                                                 
102
 Ibid., 127-128. In Augustine’s view he challenges Cicero’s conception of an ideal justice where 
the commonwealth is characterized by the compact of justice.  Niebuhr sees this Ciceronian ideal as a 
moralistic illusion that realistically fails to measure the “dangers of tyranny to the dangers of anarchy. 
Augustine in his realism asserts that we cannot make the flesh cease to lust against the spirit in this present 
life, but with God’s help we can keep from succumbing to the flesh – body and soul at war with each other 
(19.4, .677), The City of God. 
 
103
 Ibid., 134. It must be noted that Augustine places the onus on the visible Church as this perfect 
society and virgin – the manifestation of the civitas dei. But his view is criticized by others.  However, to 
his credit, he was espousing a world-view of his time where the church was a powerful political force. 
 
104
 We observe that The City of God is about two cities–with each characterized by a distinct love. 
The City of God is marked a true love of God and with that, the appropriate loves of self and neighbor. 
Once you love God, as Augustine said, “you can do what you will.” In the city of man, the Earthly city is 
characterized by the world of self-love that often overwhelms our true love of neighbor. So in the City of 
God our loves centered in God align appropriately, unlike in The City of Man. 
  
201 
reading of Augustine is not just a simplistic endeavor as one might think. It is complex 
and an ethical duty. Niebuhr writes: 
Augustine’s doctrine of love as the final norm must be distinguished from 
modern sentimental versions of Christianity which regard love as a simple 
possibility…that all conflicts in the community would be avoided if only 
people and nations would love one another. Augustine’s approach differs 
from modern forms of sentimental perfectionism in the fact that he takes 
account of power and persistence of egotism, both individual and 
collective, and seeks to establish the most tolerable form of peace and 
justice under conditions set by human sin.”105 
 
In Augustine’s assertion, we live in a world of paradox and conflict between 
classes in every nation or community. Therefore, to claim that we need justice in 
resolving all conflicts would be unrealistic. Rather, what matters most are the 
accommodations of peoples or various interest groups in addition to the collective interest 
of the commonweal—where the love of God and neighbor in a sense, becomes justice in 
which everyone is given his or her due in conformity to the national or collective interests 
of all.
106
 Despite Augustine’s own shortfall in articulating some aspects of his thought 
more efficiently, his realism is grounded in his anthropology that we are sinful beings 
with limitations and corrupted with pride. Yet, we do have the ability to transcend our 
limited space by understanding the need to be attentive to the collective interests of 
others.  
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St. Augustine also makes the case for perpetual peace which is needed to affect 
the concept of nation-building. Briefly, in The City of God, he posits that “all beings 
instinctively desire peace…just as there is no [hu]man that doesn’t wish for joy…so there 
is no man that does not wish for peace.”107 Therefore for Augustine, political life to a 
great extent is driven by people’s desire to have peace with one another. As he claimed, if 
“the city of man can’t be at peace with God they can be at peace with the law…which 
derived from the natural order is governed.”108 But Augustine makes it clear that there are 
difficulties in living in the earthly city.  
However, humans must be willing to negotiate and find compromises to our many 
“conflicting preferences.” He writes, 
They [Humans] can achieve agreement on a set of rules that will allow 
them to live together peacefully…The City of God also desires to have 
peaceful coexistence with the city of [Hu]man until the end…so it’s the 
duty of the Christian to participate in the life of the city and promote 
harmony.
109
 
 
Rightfully, Augustine analysis of the difficulties in obtaining peace does not 
necessarily support the view of a hostile world that must be subdued by the strong and 
mighty in order to bring a coercive peace. This problem rather, is due to the selfish nature 
of human sin that exists in both cities. He asserts: 
So the politics of life are seriously deficient...so there cannot be real peace 
on earth…it is total agreement in a state of true virtue and goodness, will  
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come only when God has banished  the underlying causes  of our disagreement: 
sins and ignorance….110 
      
Henceforth, in Augustine view, we must see the natural orderliness of our world. 
So we ought to work for the preservation of peace—though as earthly as it may be. The 
evidence for this earthly peace is the natural law, the law of nature that precedes all other 
laws and written in the hearts of every human being.  
The notion of the common good is further complemented by Thomas Aquinas 
who I regard as one of the greatest Christian thinkers of all time. His vision deeply 
informs Hollenbach’s, Maritain’s and most Catholic thinking today regarding the 
common good. Indeed Thomas’s vision can be seen impacting heavily on the Modern 
papal Social Encyclical Tradition beginning with Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum to a 
number of global challenges that require us to expand our understanding of the “common 
good” to include that of the entire global human family.111 He brings great insight into the 
notion of nation-building and Christian participation by his ability to seek a via media of 
both sacred and secular philosophic truths in conjunction with Christian realism—thereby 
integrating other sources within a systematic and constructive manner in the tradition of 
Aristotle and other scholars. In particular, Aquinas’ political and ethical conception of the 
common good (bonum commune) is grounded in our understanding of social and civic 
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life, that better enables us to envision the purposes of politics—that is happiness and the 
flourishing of the individual and society.  
In his articulation of the common good, as applied both socially and politically in 
the lives of humans, Aquinas writes: 
The human being is the best of the animals if virtue, to which he has a 
natural inclination, is perfected in him. But if he is without law and justice, 
the human being is the worst of all the animals....But human beings are 
brought back to justice by means of the political order. This is clear from 
the fact that among the Greeks the order of the political community and 
the judgment of justice are called by the same name: dike.
112
 
 
Aquinas is certainly an advocate for a harmonious political order that is grounded 
on the individual, family and community, where there are differentiations of roles but all 
serving the common good of that given society. He adds, 
It must be noted that this unity which is the political community or unity 
of the family is only a unity of order and not an unqualified unity. 
Consequently the parts which form it can have a sphere of action which is 
distinct from that of the whole; just as in an army a soldier can perform 
actions which are not proper to the whole army…113 
 
In this analysis of the political community as applied to our Christian ethical duty, 
we must find the connection between love of God and love of neighbor as an intrinsic 
moral imperative. Hence, Aquinas makes the case that whoever loves someone, also 
loves those whom that other person loves. Therefore since God loves all men and women, 
everyone ought to receive the same end—that is to enjoy the friendship of God. Also, if 
human beings are to have the time and opportunity to consider the things of God, we 
need tranquility and peace. When people live together in love for one another, this 
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removes most of the obstacles that prevent them from attending to the things of God. If 
our purpose and end is to love God, then we should love each other.
114
 
Moreover, Aquinas argues, that the law of God is given to humanity to provide 
help where the natural law is insufficient. It is natural for all of humans to love one 
another. One sign of this is that we are guided by a certain natural instinct. When we see 
another human being in need, even if it is a stranger, our human instinct leads us to help 
that person. For example, if we see someone lost, we naturally give them directions. We 
ought therefore, to help all people, especially, the weak, as if every person was a friend. 
Thus, Aquinas believed that act of love is written in human nature; the law of God clearly 
directs us to love one another and as such, the laws that govern the polis must be in 
conformity with the moral laws of God. He writes:  
Every law is ordered to this end, that it shall be obeyed by those who are 
subject to it… Since virtue is that which makes the person who possesses 
it good, it follows that the proper effect of the law is to make good those to 
whom it is given, whether in an absolute sense, or in a qualified sense. If 
the intention of the law-giver tends toward the true good, which is the 
common good regulated according to divine justice, it follows that by the 
law men become good in an unqualified sense.
115
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Enlightenment Voices for Perpetual Peace and the Common Good 
 
Furthermore, in the tradition of Augustine and Aquinas, John Locke
116
 concurs 
with the perpetual peace hypothesis grounded in the moral law. As a young man, he 
traveled to Germany and later observed that religious dissent was not the cause for 
political conflict based on religion. Rather, it was the outlawing of religious dissent that 
created conditions for political conflict that spiraled into religious violence. Thus, Locke 
concluded that any form of persecution posed a direct threat to peace and served as a 
distortion and an obstacle to salvation. In reference to the Christian religion mainly 
practiced in Europe amongst Protestants and Roman Catholics, he writes that “Toleration 
of all people is the chief characteristic… of the true church whiles those who punish 
people for their religious beliefs…have not really embraced the Christian religion in their 
hearts.”117 
Locke also argues that what matters for the preservation of society are shared 
rules of social interaction rather than religion. He also recognizes that society may not 
necessarily concur on the same moral principles or rules, because of the difficulties in 
obtaining a consensus on all moral issues. For Locke, as Greg Forster writes in his book, 
Contesting the Public Sphere, “what the community needs to survive is agreement on the 
specific moral rules governing justice and social relations—rules against killing, stealing, 
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contracts, etc.”118 Hence, Locke opposes theocracy or state sponsored church or religion 
within the public domain of politics. Further, Locke promotes a democratic system, based 
on representation and consent of the individual citizens, who he considered to be rational 
and independent. He also recognizes the anarchic system in which the world is built. In 
his comparison of Locke to the realists, Michael Cox writes,  
The difference lies in the importance Locke attributes to duties to protect 
life, liberty, and property that support just commonwealths to maintain 
peace with each other, provided that their natural partiality and the poorly 
institutionalized character of world politics do not overcome their duties to 
accommodate.
119
 
 
Like Augustine, Locke is aware of ‘a troubled peace, due to biases, partiality, and 
the absence of regular and objective system of adjudication and enforcement. But this 
must not be the cause of aggression in order to win the peace. Therefore in Locke’s 
schema, when there is mutual trust, governed by duties to the natural law, perpetual peace 
is attainable. Another peace proponent is Immanuel Kant
120
, whose groundbreaking 
works guide this school of democratic principle—the hypothetical peace treaty. Kant 
                                                 
118
 Greg Forster. Contesting the Public Sphere. IVP Academics, 2008, 157. 
 
119
 Michael Cox. American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000, 29. This work is a series of essays from various traditions reevaluating 
America’s role and image in international system of global politics and economics.  Of significance is the 
distinction between the two contending schools of thoughts: The political realist and the liberal or 
democratic communitarian in their worldview of international relations. These arguments are pertinent as 
America reassess its power in light of the current global issues confronting the entire world—from 
genocide, terrorism, economic meltdown to nation-building. Richard Brantley. Locke, Wesley & the 
Method of English Romanticism. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1984, 1. 
 
120
 Immanuel Kant develops his moral philosophy in three seminal works: Fundamental Principles 
of the Metaphysic of Morals (1785), Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and Metaphysics of Morals 
(1798). Under this heading Kant is probably best known for his theory about a single, general moral 
obligation that explains all other moral obligations we have: the categorical imperative. A categorical 
imperative, generally speaking, is an unconditional obligation, or an obligation that we have regardless of 
our will or desires. A hypothetical imperative, by contrast, is a conditional obligation, one that we have 
only if we have some desire or other: if one wants x, one ought to do y. 
  
208 
posits that our moral duties can be derived from what he calls the categorical imperative, 
which can be formulated in three ways. The first formulation—the formula of universal 
law, states, “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it become a universal law.”121 The second formulation the formula of 
humanity, states, “act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”122 The third 
formulation—the formula of autonomy, is a synthesis of the previous two. It states that 
we should so act that we may think of ourselves as legislating universal laws through our 
maxims. We may think of ourselves as such autonomous legislators only insofar as we 
follow our own laws.  
Kant also sees the importance of personal and public morality. Kant stresses an 
ethics based on reason and the choice to live by its rules made by free, independent, self-
reliant individuals in the modern state. But Kant is much more cautious about just what 
can and cannot be done, and he has no recourse to some utopian model. Kant fully 
acknowledges that what goes on in the name of politics is largely as Machiavelli 
described it: amoral self-interest.
123
 At the same time, Kant holds out the hope that 
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ethos—the moral guiding of political force must form a part of political action. Hence, 
Kant’s task, as one of the foremost Enlightenment moralists, is to show how in the 
modern state moral considerations are still of central importance as a means of guiding 
power.  
Kant is attempting to address the old question—why should a powerful politician 
pay any attention to moral issues? In terms of the brief retrospective I have sketched, 
what Kant might be seen as attempting to show is that Machiavelli and Hobbes were 
wrong to think that the modern political state can simply be the focus of only 
realpolitik—that is power arrangements and strategies for efficient applications of power. 
As a moralist, Kant insists that politics is not just a matter of prudence (i.e., material 
success in getting one’s way in the daily conflicts of the political world). There must, by 
contrast, be what he calls “a limiting condition of politics,”124 so that political affairs are 
in the command of the moral politician, “one who so interprets the principles of political 
prudence that they can be coherent with morality.”125 This position is central to Kant’s 
call for universal peace, because, as he points out repeatedly, if all statesmen [or 
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stateswomen] rely only on political prudence (on Machiavellian or Hobbesian principles), 
then there is no ground for any international cooperation, because power struggles 
between competing independent states will determine all politics. Only the clear 
recognition of a commitment to a universal rational moral duty can achieve the 
reconciliation he sees as essential to peace:  
Even a continent that feels itself to be superior to another, regardless of 
whether or not the latter stands in the way of the former, will not fail to 
exercise the means of increasing its power, plundering and conquering. 
Thus, all theoretical plans for civil, international, and cosmopolitan rights 
dissolve into empty, impractical ideals; by contrast, a practice that is based 
on empirical principles of human nature and that does not regard it 
demeaning to formulate its maxims in accord with the way of the world 
[i.e., in accordance with universal moral laws] can alone hope to find a 
secure foundation for its structure of political prudence.
126
 
 
         In summary, Kant infers that the common good is achievable when there is a moral 
responsibility based on universal principle of duty and mutual respect towards others. 
Such action can lead to perpetual peace that the world desperately needs to conduct the 
affairs of the state and international community.      
                H. Richard Niebuhr, Responsibility, and the Universal Community 
 
                In addition, H. Richard Niebuhr brings attention to this work in articulating the 
notion of the common good in his seminal work The Responsible Self, where he 
accurately and resolutely describes the moral life and Christian identity in a subtle 
interweaving and practical manner.
127
 He is therefore essential to the understanding of 
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how the individual self is morally beholden to the community at large. The premise of his 
argument, which he offers as a third possibility alongside teleological and deontological 
ethics, is responsibility: “the image of [hu]man the answerer, [hu]man engaged in 
dialogue, [hu]man acting in response to action upon him[self].”128   
 In this argument, H.R. Niebuhr further asserts that human are not simply goal-
seeking (teleological) nor simply rule-following (deontological) but responsive and  
being responsible: “What is implicit in the idea of responsibility is the image of [hu]man-
the-answerer, [hu]man engaged in dialogue, [hu]man acting in response to action upon 
him or [her]self.”129 Our moral responsibility is a solemn call demanding us to discern 
what is worth doing in light of what is actually going on.  But, if, for example, a 
nationalistic commitment predominates, the notion of responsibility will be confined to 
the exclusivist framework of that commitment, lacking universality. An example is the 
most recent 2011 U.S. “Debt Ceiling Debate” which has done a great deal of damage to 
the entire global political-economy as evidenced for the massive loss of US stocks and 
fear for another recession under the Obama’s regime.130 H. R. Niebuhr further asserts that 
our Christian disposition to responsibility ought to be a “radical monotheism”, in which 
                                                                                                                                                 
realities. We are urged to be attentive and responsive to what is going on.) The self acknowledges its 
potential identity and responds to the others. We then become consciously engaged and interactive with 
other—empathizing meaningfully with the suffering, happiness, struggles, hopes and aspirations of others. 
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we regard all human beings in the world, whether Christian or non-Christian, as our 
partners in this life experience because we are all called to participate in the “entire 
community of being.”131 Whatever participates in such a community has equal value 
derived equally from the only center of value without the presence of any privileged 
group: “It [i.e., radical monotheism] is the confidence that whatever is good, is good, 
because it exists as one thing among the many, which all have their origin and their 
being, in the One—the principle of being which is also the principle of value.”132 
Therefore, he insists, that Scripture can be considered as just and fair to the poor as well 
as to strangers, and neighbors through the expression of love. 
 This universal society constitutes the “spatial horizon” in which Christian 
reflections on responsibility are to take place. Christian reflections on responsibility are 
also to occur in the “temporal horizon” that is constituted by the universal history of an 
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all-encompassing divine activity involving creation and redemption.
133
 Niebuhr’s view, 
therefore, is not Christian ethics as such, which would defensively examine the Christian 
style of life within the framework of the Christian confession. It is rather an ethics of 
global responsibility in a world of drama, complexities, conflicts and yet, in search of the 
good. It is this chaotic world that our moral responsibility towards the self and the 
community is at play. Our task is to strike a balance that enables the good to be fulfilled. 
Paul Tillich on Christian Realism 
 
 Christian realism is also greatly influenced by Paul Tillich, who saw the firsthand 
carnage and physical destruction as evidence of the moral decadence of humanity in 
defense for absolute autonomy. His passionate concern for freedom made him an early 
critic of Hitler and the Nazi movement, and in retaliation he was barred from German 
universities in 1933. The chaotic situation in Post-War Germany served as a determining 
factor in his analysis that Western civilization was indeed nearing the end of an era. His 
practical response to this crisis was to join the religious-socialist movement, whose 
members believed that the impending cultural breakdown was a momentous opportunity 
for creative social reconstruction, a time that Tillich characterized by the New Testament 
term kairos, signifying a historical moment into which eternity erupts, transforming the 
world into a new state of being. Out of his narrative and that of others, the troubled 
Tillich sought to make sense of the chaos and anarchy of his era. He wrote:  
“The concept of the borderline might be a fitting symbol of the whole of 
my personal and intellectual development. It has been my fate, in almost 
every direction, to stand between alternative possibilities of existence, to 
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be completely at home in neither, to take no definitive stand against 
either.”134  
 
 From this personal experience, which shaped his identity, one can describe him as 
dealing with many “ultimate concerns”—from faith and reason, theology and philosophy, 
Christianity and socialism, religion and culture, and anxiety. For Tillich, humanity is 
faced with two issues, namely—humanity’s separation from God and the perpetual 
judgment under God. The crisis in humankind is an eternal one that results from being a 
spiritual animal who exists tensely on that borderline of life.
135
  
 The second issue which he describes as the “Protestant principle,” concerns itself 
with “religious obligation” and the “religious reservation.” The religious obligation, in 
Tillich’s analysis, is to work God’s will on earth, to establish justice and love in 
economic and social relations as means to bring an eschatological redemption to the 
world.
136
 On the other hand, the religious reservation is to protest against any absolute 
claim to truth made in the name of a relative, historical reality—whether that reality be a 
totalitarian state, a religious institution, a dogmatic creed, or a social movement—and the 
possibility to be loyal to the Protestant principle without belonging to a Protestant, or any 
other church.  
 Tillich, like Reinhold Niebuhr, was mindful of the inevitability of society’s 
potential for idolatry—the worship of certain institutions and beliefs as having absolute 
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and unquestionable validity, as being at long last the final word. For Tillich, what ought 
to be this “Protestant principle” is a realistic understanding that the only absolute truth is 
that humanity can never attain absolute truth—because the “the final word” is always 
with God and it comes as a judgment upon us. In reality, Tillich is aware of the many 
challenges, evils, suffering and pains that we must endure, including the idolatries 
manifesting themselves as absolute truth. It is in this realm of contestation of whose 
narrative of the truths becomes the battle ground—which defines the human condition.  
 Like Niebuhr, Tillich made a distinction between realism and idealism, in which 
the former deals with real life issues that confront us physically. He thus asserts that: 
Self-transcending realism is a universal attitude toward reality. It is neither 
a merely theoretical view of the world nor a practical discipline for life; it 
lies between theory and practice. It is a basic attitude in every realm of 
life, expressing itself in the shaping of every realm.
137
  
 
 In this view Tillich sees history as real and independent in its interpretation of 
reality. So we live in a temporal world that is a battleground between the forces of good 
and evil, powers that are expressed in mythology or rationality. Nevertheless, from an 
ontological perspective the world is good.
138
 Therefore, the ultimate goal of humanity is 
to reach self-realization within and above the temporal existence. This construct of 
Tillich is significant as we make the case for nation-building. For example, as we are 
witnessing in history the current North Africa and Middle East democratic cry for 
freedom and choice, we can posit that as human the ordinary peoples’ desire for self-
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realization is an ultimate and realistic human impulse. This is the kairos moment of 
history, in which one is inwardly conscious of fate and destiny of time.
139
 
 As Tillich points out, kairos is “found in the passionate longing of the masses; it 
can be clarified and take form in small circles of conscious intellectual and spiritual 
concerns; it can gain power in the prophetic word; but it cannot be demonstrated and 
forced. It is deed and freedom as it is also fate and grace.”140   
 Justice also is one of those ambiguous terms where Tillich asserts that the legal 
meaning is contradicted by the ethical and the ethical is also in conflict the religious 
meaning. He writes, “Legal justice, moral righteousness and religious justification seem 
to struggle with each other.”141 This struggle is real and cause of many of the conflicts we 
faced. When every interest group seems to have its definition of justice, they fail to do 
due diligence to what Tillich calls the ontological meaning of the word. It is in this 
interpretation that we have a common understanding of the basic meaning of the word 
that all can relate to. For example, as observed, how does one spread democratic ideals as 
part of the global common good, when love and power are often contrasted in such a way 
that love is identified with resignation of power and power with a denial of love?
142
 Are 
they not compatible? Tillich writes, “Powerless love and loveless power are contrasted. 
This is unavoidable if love is understood from its emotional side and power from its 
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compulsory side.”143 Finding a realistic and balanced approach on these two ideals is 
crucial in Tillich’s view. For example, I certainly believe that Obama’s speech to the 
Muslim world in Cairo did inspire lots of young Muslims who for so long have been 
suppressed by the Mullahs and conservative religious leaders and tyrannical and brutal 
dictators who propagandized the rhetoric of America’s imperialism and Israel’s Zionism 
to perpetuate and perpetrate their brute force on their own people. These young people 
could now feel a sense of worthiness and dignity—knowing that if President Barrack 
Hussein Obama, who looks like them and also bears similar Arabic name like most of 
them did, could become the leader of the free world, they too had reasons to be hopeful in 
experiencing the necessary changes in the political and social lives of their countries and 
regions.   
 Now, in such critical time, we ask, can America and all the freedom loving people 
and nations—especially Christians in these nations be in support of the use of smart 
power as a form of love by intervening in failed or collapsing states in Libya, Yemen, 
Syria, the Ivory Coast and many other nations who are now in need of just intervention? I 
assert, like Tillich and Niebuhr, we ought to be champions and intervening forces for 
realistic peace—which requires the use of smart power through force. 
 This position of reinterpretation of love and power in a realistic manner in my 
view, finds resonance with Reinhold Niebuhr and Tillich. As Tillich posited in his 
critique of Nietzsche and the idea of Christian radical love, both misconstrued the 
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ontological understanding of love and power in their analysis and function in the real 
world, in which God is majestic, mysterious and ethical. Tillich concludes that “One 
could say that constructive social ethics are impossible as long as power is looked at with 
distrust and love is reduced to its emotional or ethical quality [because] such division 
leads to a rejection of or indifference to the political realm on the side of religion.” 144 In 
Tillich’s perspective, our ethical task is to be aware of the element of love in its affinity 
with “power and of the element of power without which love becomes chaotic 
surrender.”145  
 It is the smart and realistic combination of these two–love and power that we as 
Christians ought to accept as the socio-ethical and theo-political task in being responsive 
and attentive to global issues as seen through the French, British, and Americans 
intervention in Libya. Their actions avoided the onslaught on Benghazi, the last 
stronghold of the protesters, who for weeks have demanded the end of a madman’s forty-
one years of brutality and the suppression of freedom. So love and power were the means 
of implementing the humanitarian mission rather than to watch Assad or Ghaddafi kill 
their people while the world waits. Similarly, such comparison can be said of the relation 
between love and justice—in which the latter contributes to the cause of justice. As 
illustrated by Tillich, Justice which seeks equal distribution among heirs finds a 
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compromise with love which transcends justice by one’s “willingness to surrender 
fortune for the sake of others”, as exemplified by King Lear.146  
 As such, the powerful and influential nations through the backing of the United 
Nations realized that the world could not sit idly but must do something for the sake of 
the disenfranchised freedom loving citizens in Libya—and if for the sake of consistency, 
such moral and political will ought to be extended anywhere else on this planet. Hence, 
what we are witnessing is in essence a confirmation of a new era of global or collective 
sovereignty which transcends national sovereignty. In this new world order, the 
application of smart power as love and justice is the sine qua non for world socio-
political reality for the sake of the common good. This means that we can no longer 
embrace friendly or unfriendly dictators with a sense of impunity. Tillich writes: 
We can’t free a criminal on the basis of love—that is injustice…through 
leniency, which is wrongly identified with love, a person may [choose a] 
criminal career…which is neither justice nor love but injustice, covered by 
sentimentality. 
 
 This view of justice in Tillich’s construction, can be realized only if both the 
demand of the universal law and particular situation are accepted and made effective for 
the concrete situation as in the case of the humanitarian intervention in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo and now Libya, where a multinational forces acted with a show 
of force against the tyrannical rulers. This active and practical participation of the 
international community to justifiably use force against the enemy of peace and 
democracy is in essence the love of neighbor and the others, which transcends an abstract 
conception of justice. In a simple term, to understand justice or love one must know what 
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is injustice or apathy. In concurrence, Tillich adds, “But it is love which creates 
participation in the concrete situation…so justice is just because of love which is implicit 
in it.” Moreover, Tillich raises another pertinent issue in understanding the correlation of 
power and justice for appropriating the common good. I believe that this argument raised 
here by Tillich is very crucial in dissecting nation-building especially where the 
applications of justice, love, hope and the common good are interwoven. Within his 
framework of our new narrative, how does one articulate law and order in the application 
of justice?  
 On this basis of the correlation between love, justice, and power, Tillich makes an 
inquiry: 
Who gives the law in which justice is supposed to be expressed? To give a 
law is the basic manifestation of power. But if the group which has power 
gives laws, how are they related to justice? Are they simply the expression 
of the will to power of the group?
147
 
 
 This moral view of justice as articulated by Tillich has relevance to international 
politics, relations, and laws. It exposes the hypocrisy of nations which Niebuhr strongly 
critiqued. Can the United States, the West, China and Russia abide by the same rule of 
laws in spite of their immense powers and global influences? It is on this very nature of 
world politics that we find so much inconsistencies and undermining of the United 
Nations by the very nations who at various times seek their own narrow minded self-
interests within this world body. Sadly, these acts of reluctance, undermining and 
bureaucracy, have served as catalysts for many atrocities in our world even at times when 
the UN intervention forces have been involved. Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
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The Democratic Republic of Congo, and Haiti are recent cases that attest to the 
application of law and order in the application of justice.  Nevertheless, the full 
engagement of all nations through this world body is the best organization for the 
promotion of justice peace, love, democracy, and the common good—through 
international collaboration. On this basis of socio-political engagement, collective 
responsibility, mutual cooperation and collaboration, an ethical world of realistic 
possibilities can be realized. For this international effort to succeed, Tillich cautions us to 
be aware of appropriate political action that takes into account cultural possibilities. 
Therefore, “to act without recognizing cultural limits is utopian. Politics then…is not just 
adjusting to culture; it may mean opposition to the dominant cultures…the drive to 
oppose culture arises from ethics and the ability to discern possibilities for changes.
148
 
 The articulation of our socio-ethical and theo-political responsibilities become the 
driving force for us to understand “practical activity toward the realization of the 
unconditioned”149 as it affects the action of the people and their communities. 
 In summary of Tillich’s formulation of the ideal ethical community, there is three-
fold structure in our quest for appropriating the common good—namely, ethics as agape 
which is known as the law of human nature, the second human wisdom is represented by 
the laws, moral principles and guidelines; and third it is within the concrete situation in 
which the actor takes upon his or herself the risk of making a moral decision. In essence, 
Christian realism resonates with Roman Catholic and Protestant’s views of the world in 
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need of love, hope, justice, and the common good. We seek to (re)build communities, 
nations, and people that have been exposed to structural violence, evil, and corruption—
all due to our sinful nature. Yet, we recognize that we can strive for the good life 
(personally and collectively) despite our own limitations. 
 223 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
BUILDING A WHOLISTIC NATION-BUILDING TOOLKIT 
 
An Application of a Realistic Nation-Building Toolkit 
I paraphrase that “Neither was Alexandria built in one week nor Rome in a day.” 
Even in the two creation narratives of Genesis, the omniscient, omnipotent, and 
omnipresent God took time to create the universe and humanity out of chaos.
1
 This 
maxim certainly serves as a reminder and a reality of the challenges of nation-building. 
Ravaged nations transitioning from chaos to order, need more time than it takes for peace 
conferences, signing ceremonies and photo ops. Initiating a country’s recovery requires 
many years and many resources, including large sums of resources from the international 
community. The basic structure of a country is the same: political, economic, and judicial 
systems; cultural, educational, and medical institutions.  
In spite of the massive financial stimulus package of the United States in attempt 
to rescue the nation from depression almost four years ago, unemployment and economic 
fragility hovers over the USA. In Liberia, despite the goodwill of the international 
community for nearly eight years, and with the world largest direct foreign investments 
of nearly $16 billion to date, the nation of 3.5 million people is relatively stable and 
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peaceful but remains fragile.
2
 Based on these realities and complexities, this work makes 
the case that a comprehensive model that goes beyond any theoretical framework, is the 
necessary common good that can bring about the creation of a workable, reliable, and 
sustainable nation (re)building programs. The ultimate goal of a successful nation-
building is to create a recognizable and legitimate political authority that unites the 
diversity of its society by creating social cohesion which stimulates the (re)building of 
the broken state—drawing upon religious, secular, ordinary, and/or the amalgamation of 
various interest groups into this nation-building workforce. 
Therefore, this agenda requires a realistic nation-building schema that I referred to 
as SIDE: Security, Institutional building, Democracy, and Economic reconstruction. 
Because these tasks are so interconnected, fitting them together into a unified, organic 
whole is a complex undertaking. The mixed results from prior nation-building ventures 
have played a role in the U.S. and the international community’s retreat from their global 
neighbors and responsibilities to rethinking their roles in the process. In the last two 
decades, Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Rwanda became the focus of nation-building 
efforts. Later, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and other 
nations are also gradually experiencing the process of democratic change as fragile as it 
might be. 
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Endeavors in Somalia failed, and the United States withdrew. Haiti and Nigeria 
held contentious but modestly peaceful elections in 2011 respectively. Bosnia is a shaky 
work in progress. East Timor seems near the end of its own infancy since 2002 when it 
joined the community of nations after a hard fought struggle for independence from 
Indonesia in 2000, and elections were held on May 2007; so too is Southern Sudan, the 
newest nation admitted to the community of nations in July 2011. However, a threatening 
border war over oil resources is looming between Southern Sudan and Sudan. Liberia 
also held its elections producing Africa’s first female and second term president in 2003 
and 2011 respectively; Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Angola are now forging new paths 
toward nation-building, the situation in The Democratic Republic of Congo remains 
volatile as ethnic militias stir up troubles; and Haiti is in a slow state of recovery after the 
devastating earthquake and prior political chaos and a disputed runoff elections in 2011.  
The biggest of all conflicts—Afghanistan and Iraq, where the United States had 
spent more than a trillion dollars, with significant loss of human lives on all sides of the 
conflict, in the last ten years, remains one of the most controversial wartime debates. The 
Ivory Coast held elections but disputes led to a bloody stalemate until ex-president 
Laurent Gbagbo was captured and arrested by French and UN soldier on April 11, 2011. 
We await the outcome of the Arab and Muslim wave for freedom and democracy, 
sweeping that region of the world, where Libya and Syria are gravely in a state of chaos 
and collapse. The attack on U.S. soil—on the morning of 9/11 forced the United States 
government under the leadership of George Bush out of isolationism. When the United 
States began bombing Afghanistan, many in the U.S. informally began an engagement in 
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just war theory—what justifies jus ad bellum, America’s right to go to war; the second 
establishing jus in bello, how would America conduct itself within and after the war.
3
 
 This was the challenge the Bush administration faced and now confronted by the 
Obama’s administration. As Bush said in 2000, during his presidential debate with Al 
Gore “we’re not into nation-building,” However, his entire years in office were spent on 
war which he claimed was the pursuit of justice and democracy. Bush understood that the 
threat to the United States would remain if a defeated Afghanistan seeks help from its 
neighbors—countries that support and harbor the same terrorist groups responsible for 
9/11. 
Is the international community or in particular, the United States, adequately 
equipped or ill-equipped in its governmental structures to take on the nation-(re)building 
mission, even when and where that is appropriate, since it does not have an operational 
arm proficient in nation-building in the way that it has a Department of Defense 
proficient in projecting military power? What we can assert is whether or not it is ready, 
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the U.S., like the UN must begin to adequately strategize their role for nation-building so 
as to avoid hasty, costly, wasteful, and endless endeavors.  
As stated earlier, the Bush administration paradoxically began its first term on the 
notion of pursuing a policy of isolationism when it declared an opposition to nation- 
building during the first election campaign in 2000. It can be argued that this isolationism 
was the direct cause of the United States losing significant global legitimacy and 
influences. How? It created a backlash at American own allies who saw its governmental 
policy as anti-internationalism and uncooperative towards pressing global concerns such 
as climate change, international justice, and commerce.  
Furthermore, before the terrorist attacks, economist Jeffrey Sachs, director of The 
Earth Institute and Quetelet Professor of Sustainable Development, and Professor of 
Health Policy and Management at Columbia University, stated that the Bush 
administration’s position on isolationism was unwise. “[P]oor economic performance 
abroad has the potential to translate into state failure that, in turn, jeopardizes significant 
U.S. interests.” As Sachs wrote in an article titled, “The Strategic Significance of Global 
Inequality, “If the United States wants to spend less time responding to failed states, as 
the Bush administration has stated, it will have to spend more time helping them [failed 
states] achieve economic success to avert state failure.”4  
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This critique of isolationism means that no nation is immune from global 
problems as the world is too interconnected in a multifaceted capacity that these 
problems would sooner or later be at its doorsteps. In another article, “GOP Nation-
Building”, Justin Logan and Christopher Preble of the Cato Institute, succinctly critiqued 
the United States’ policy on nation-building, especially efforts led the Republican Party.  
For the authors, there is a great sense of hypocrisy and deceit on the part of these 
politicians. They write:  
Throughout the 1990s, Republicans castigated the Clinton administration 
for conducting foreign policy like social work: vague, ill-defined missions 
in remote locales from Haiti to Bosnia to Kosovo. Republicans asked 
forceful questions about how these missions served the U.S. national 
interest. In November 1995 a clear majority of Republicans in Congress 
voted to stop Clinton from sending American forces to Bosnia as part of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement (a prohibition that Clinton flatly ignored). 
When a second Balkan crisis erupted in Kosovo, John Bolton had to point 
out to Bill O’Reilly that the United States had become “involved in a 
conflict where it has no tangible national interest, where it has no clear 
objectives in mind, and where the ultimate outcome could be very risky 
for what our real interests are…5  
 
The authors also believe that Mr. John Bolton, like most pre 9/11 conservatives of 
the Republican Party, viewed nation-building as a dangerous and dubious misuse of 
American power, whether in Kosovo, Haiti, Liberia or Somalia.  Consequently, there was 
an overwhelming support for then candidate George W. Bush. This was well attested by 
Dr. Condoleezza Rice in 2000 when she asserted that “we don’t need to have the 82nd 
Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.”6,7 Bush himself unequivocally declared during 
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one of the presidential debates with Al Gore, that “I don’t think our troops ought to be 
used for what’s called nation building…I mean, we’re going to have some kind of nation-
building corps from America? Absolutely not.”8  
 Nevertheless, there is an overwhelming recognition, that there is a need for the 
UN, NATO, or other continental organizations like the AU and EU to assertively take on 
the task of nation-building or forming an institute or unit for reconstruction and 
stabilization of potential hotspots or failed states. This effort, when seriously considered, 
can help alleviate or minimize the extremely poor track record of nation-building efforts. 
This unit will be able to build institutional knowledge about nation-building, allowing 
them to reverse the abysmal history of past nation-building failures. This unit must be 
supported by the United States and its allies, including the United Nations, and will help 
stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can 
reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a sustainable market economy.  
The Importance of Social Cohesion 
    The ultimate goal of this schema-SIDE in this nation-building toolkit is the 
creation and sustainability of social cohesion. A successful nation-building process 
involves the cohesion or unification of a society from the loosely associated groups that 
existed previously (social integration).
9
 What this means is establishing an ongoing 
dialogue between the different groups rather than within them. All groups must be 
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involved in all aspects of society, because the  exclusion of any one group will only lead 
to further problems. As Hippler points out, this also serves a practical purpose. Nation-
building needs a national infrastructure, with  things such as transport and 
communication structures, the development of a national economy from regional or local 
economic areas, and a nationwide mass media for  establishing a national political and 
cultural discourse as the fragile state seeks to build an enviable civil society.
10
 These 
assets must be accessible to all groups of the population and be used by them for 
transactions and communication.
11
  
 In addition to this, an “active and open participation of civil society in the 
formulation of the country’s government and its policies is crucial.”12 Furthermore, the 
leadership must do all it takes to inculcate in the general public, the importance of 
democratic values, of the civic culture and civil society that develop and sustain them. 
The overall goal then, is to promote and increase social, political, and economic equality, 
and of human development, rather than just economic development or state-building, 
which is pertinent in any successful strategy for long-term democratic nation-building.
13
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 However, difficulties of achieving the aforementioned goals are compounded by 
the interference of disenfranchised groups (as we have been witness to with the ongoing 
insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Pakistan). If civil society does not exist, then 
people who are faced with the collapse of the autocratic government will deal with their 
justifiable fear of what happens next by looking to form new associations to protect 
themselves.
14
   
 A major catalyst of nation-building (as characterized by Hippler) is the 
development of a functional state apparatus that can actually control its national territory 
(state-building).
15
 A state is more properly the governmental apparatus by which a nation 
rules itself.
16
 This can only really happen if the two factors have been achieved 
(legitimate political authority and social integration). We can argue that citizens are much 
more likely to become a part of the state security apparatus (through the armed forces, 
police, etc.) if they feel that they are part of the ‘nation’ and civil society. This civil 
participation avoids factional forces within the nation as seen through local or ethnic 
militias, exemplified in Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, and other fragile states.  
 This new and inclusive participation of all the people in its simplest formulation 
of the fragile nation has become the trend for state-building, especially as understood by 
the international community since the 1990s, where national and/or international actors 
                                                 
14
 Noah Feldman. What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building. Princeton:  
Princeton University Press, 2004, 73. 
 
15
 Jochen Hippler. Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation. New 
York:  Pluto Press, 2005, 9. 
 
16
 Stephenson. Nation Building. Beyond Intractability. 
  
232 
work together to establish, reform and strengthen state institutions that were seriously 
eroded or are missing.
17
  
Through the nation-building process, national security, the establishment of the 
rule of law, effective delivery of basic goods and services through functional formal state 
institutions, and generation of political legitimacy for the (new) set of state institutions 
are paramount. The state must prioritize security for the citizens of said nation. After all, 
before a state “can become a democratic state, it must become a state, which establishes a 
monopoly over the means of violence.”18  
Violence also undermines the political transition by making people too frightened 
to participate in the political process.
19
 Security is absolutely vital to the nation-building 
process. All other aspects of nation-building flow from it, and if it falters or fails, the 
nation-building project will certainly be a failure.
20
 After this, other aspects of nation-
building can begin, such as the establishment of a stable economy, legal system, and 
administrative apparatus. Let us now analyze the schema—SIDE.  
Security 
Security is a prerequisite for an effective nation-building campaign and as the 
pillar of all future development. If the most basic human needs such as security, food and 
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safe place for living are not met any democratization effort is waste of time and money. 
Freedom from fear is a basic human right that guarantees the life without violence for the 
people.
21
 A government in a failed state does not possess the capabilities to secure the 
framework of safe development.  
However, in certain cases the government is the source of violence. A failed state 
generates a security vacuum. Without minimal stability nobody will invest in 
development. The intervening power has to fill this gap. Creating stability means not only 
to stop the armed conflict but also to prevent humanitarian crisis. Securing the 
humanitarian aids is a basic goal.
22
 Somalia proved in 1992 that the aid supply also can 
be the aim of fighting.
23
 That is why it is becoming obvious that in a failed state the only 
possibility for development is the presence of a foreign power.  
The first task of the intervening actor after stopping the armed violence is 
disarming and demobilizing the combatants and help them to reintegrate into the society. 
Minimal requisite is to collect at least the heavy arms and break up the armed units by 
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offering alternative livelihoods for former combatants. This stage of intervention requires 
the deployment of troops, in the case of Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Haiti, Guatemala, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan. But nation-building requires generally the long-term commitment 
of ground forces to either depose or maintain the regime. The second is the use of 
American or the international mandated forces or military and civilian personnel in the 
political administration. In some cases, the U.S. and UN exercise decisive influence in 
the selection of leaders to head the new regimes.
24
  
Even though the most striking aspect of the American record on the more than 
200 nation building attempts, since the 1900, is a mixed legacy in establishing democratic 
regimes, Japan and Germany are considered as the most successful outcomes. Nation-
building is generally less challenging in small societies. Accordingly, the U.S. record is at 
worst dismal.
25
 Further, due to the lack of an accountable and transparent system of 
governance and the failure on the International community to adequately make the case 
for these crucial elements, progress has been impeded in many of these countries.  
Nevertheless, when international resources are adequately harnessed for the 
stabilization and eventual rebuilding process it is important the local people are in 
partnership with the international community. This requires the total involvement of the 
people in deciding their priorities in light of the pressing realities that the nation and the 
international community are confronted with. The nation and its people must not forge a 
path to eternal dependency but embracing the path to sustainability and interdependency. 
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This requires reality check and constant transparency and openness to the media on 
progress and changes taking place.  
During this transitional stage, the combatants need job opportunities more than 
other groups of the society. It seems to be a contradiction but in case we consider that ex-
combatants are socialized to violence it becomes obvious that they will find means to 
survive. They will increase crime rate if nothing is done to remedy their problems. 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea or the Ivory Coast have shown very clearly that illegal 
(pejoratively called “black market”) economy, drug trafficking, terrorist groups or 
criminal gangs can provide “alternatives” for sustaining their life styles. Despite the fact 
that there is broad cooperation in the international community, the task of building up 
security in a war torn state and securing stability is never an easy undertaking.  
For instance, the security in Afghanistan was mainly concentrated in Kabul in 
2003 and its immediate surroundings. Building up the basic infrastructure, 
demilitarization, rebuilding the roads, bridges, hospitals, or the basic public services are 
also the part of the first step that aim to secure the basic human needs. Since the local 
government is incapable to guarantee these services the intervening power has the duty to 
substitute the state.
26
 To maintain the basic duties of the state there is a need of 
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establishing of an interim authority. The UN seems to share this view by approving 
several Security Council resolutions. For example, the 1244 Security Council resolution 
in 1999 authorized the UN Mission in Kosovo to organize the rebuilding and to set up the 
interim authority. Considering the fact that NATO intervention in 1999 was labeled 
illegitimate, the resolution showed clearly the changed attitude towards post-conflict 
settlements. The interim authority has to set up police to secure public security in the long 
term. International military forces are able to stop armed struggles but incapable to gain 
the confidence of the society. Local police forces are best suited for this task.  
The RAND has been publishing very considerable studies on nation-building, 
making the case that nation-building really matters and it is context dependent. As the 
RAND report cites, a post-conflict society requires at least two local police officers for 
every 1000 inhabitants.
27
 Creating self-sustaining institutions is a crucial point of the 
rebuilding process since the institutions create the framework for the economic 
development and for the societal recovery.
28
 The institutional needs of the rebuilding 
process are in essence part of peace-building and very crucial in determining the future of 
that nation.  
In any stabilization, development and reconstruction efforts, there would have to 
be a military component. By definition, the target state will be emerging from conflict or 
collapse, and the UN, EU or American administrators will need to operate within a 
relatively secure environment as they initiate and implement stabilization and 
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reconstruction programs. But based on the historical record, Preble and Logan are 
suggesting an absolute minimum of five foreign troops per 1,000 indigenous populations 
would be needed to be successful. Yet, there is an awareness of the difficulties of 
garnering such numbers of troops to dealing with the problems of ailed states:  
But if we wanted to have a serious chance of success, the above figures 
suggest what would be required. Sending in a few bureaucrats and soldiers 
was the strategy in the 1990s. We know what kind of results that strategy 
yielded in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.
29
  
 
 Normatively, nation-building concerns the construction or reconstruction of a 
nation using the power of the state, typically in the wake of a devastating conflict. Nation 
building entails “both the formation and establishment of the new state itself as a political 
entity and the processes of creating viable degrees of unity, adaptation, achievement, and 
sense of national identity among the people.”30 The goal is a stable state that can 
ultimately become a nation. This is usually a slow process that requires an extended 
transitional period of rule or the extensive support of the international community.
31
  
Institutional Building 
Another important factor in nation-building efforts is a broad amount of 
international support needed for institutional development—the heart and soul of a 
                                                 
29
 Ibid., 3. 
 
30
 Etzioni, 13. Originally presented as a paper at the annual meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, September 02, 2004 (Not 
Available), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60138_index.html (accessed 05.26.09).  Also see Wendell 
Bell and Walter E. Freeman, ‘Introduction’, in Wendell Bell and Walter E. Freeman, eds, Ethnicity and 
Nation-Building: Comparative International, and Historical Perspectives. Beverly Hill: Sage Publisher, 
1974, 11.  
 
31
 Larry Diamond. “Building Democracy after Conflict: Lesson from Iraq.” Journal of Democracy 
16, No. 1 (January 2005). Also see Larry Diamond, World Religions and Democracy: A Journal of 
Democracy Book. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2005, 2-3.   
  
238 
functioning state. The intervening power can influence institution-building externally and 
internally by helping in the creation of the interim authority for reshaping the body polity. 
It is very important that the sustainable development program gain loyalty towards the 
institutions of the society as seen in Germany and Japan after the World War II. 
However, sometimes the “good institutions” are not able to develop towards 
sustainability or they might lead to growing undemocratic phenomenon inside of the 
society. In a failed state it is easy to find groups that are interested in maintaining the 
“bad institutions.” The warlords’ or the corrupt civil servants’ main goal is to sustain the 
chaotic state.
32
  
Therefore, the three aforementioned aspects of nation-building characterized by 
Hippler and others are much more likely to sustain the institutions when they are 
supported by the international community in conjunction with the local actors. In 
particular, external actors are especially valuable in mediating a dialogue between the 
different groups in the social integration phase. Hippler’s third component (state-
building) is also much easier to bring about when coupled with the economic, military, 
and political support of the international community. Multilateral nation-building is more 
complex and time-consuming but considerably less expensive.
33
  
If the cost of burden is eased by the external actors pushing the nation-building 
effort forward, they are more likely to see it through. This is important because nation-
building efforts take at least 5 years, but usually end up being much longer. All actors 
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involved also need to share a unity of purpose for the nation-building effort, because  
”incoherence  and  competition  among  outside  actors  can  destroy  a  local government 
and society.”34  Indeed, “burden-sharing and unity of command are the twin pillars of 
successful nation-building.”35 The five international communities that require 
coordination are nongovernmental organizations, donors/governments, multilateral 
organizations, militaries, and, significantly, the private sector.
36
 Their ultimate goals 
should be “humanitarian relief, transitional security, rule of law, infrastructure 
reconstruction, economic development, and the political transition.”37 The NGOs can 
usually provide humanitarian support; governments provide the resources and human 
power, multilateral organizations such as the United Nations can serve to organize the 
international  community, militaries ensure security (without which nation-building is 
impossible),and  the private  sector  can offer  employment which  keeps  the economy 
from becoming stagnant. Privatization of former state-owned industries also stimulates 
jobs and develops a tax base, but must take considerations of key assets such as the usage 
of water, which is a national security resource, where poverty and drought are persistent. 
This leads us to the role of economic reconstruction in nation-building.
38
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Democracy 
Over the years nation-building has signified an effort to construct a government 
that may or may not be democratic, but preferably is stable.
39
 At the very least, “the 
objective of nation-building ought to be the creation of reasonably legitimate, reasonably 
liberal democracies.”40 But the democratization element of nation-building does not 
usually appear until later in the process. This is because “in order to have a democratic 
state, a country must first have a state.”41 Given this, nation-building should first make a 
goal of “providing and enhancing not only social and economic well-being and 
governance and the rule of law but also other elements of justice and reconciliation and, 
very essentially, security.”42 So basically, “nation-building opens up democratic 
potential, but not necessarily the door to actual democracy.”43 
However, seeking to build a democratic society is essential to fostering an 
authentic nation-building process. In fact the reason so many nations fail or collapse is 
due to the undemocratic nature of their leaders who are corrupt, despotic, unaccountable, 
and lacking transparency. These attitudes create a deeply rooted syndrome of failed state 
that Ghani and Lockhart pointedly argue for a democratic statecraft—one that recognizes 
state building as the central goal and accountability to citizens as the critical 
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mechanism—required  to understand and break these patterns.44 For these scholars, the 
contrast between functioning and dysfunctional states is best captured by the notion of 
sovereignty gap.
45
 
The strategic vision in reversing the trends of failed states requires that states 
must perform a multiplicity of “interrelated functions that range from provision of 
citizenship rights to promotion of an enabling environment for the private sector. This 
multidimensional role stands in marked contrast to the 19
th
 century when states were one-
dimensional providers of security.”46 The legitimate state, as portrayed, performs a series 
of important functions for its citizens, thereby becoming an instrument for collective 
mobilization, cooperation, and trust. It can then tackle both the immediate-term societal 
needs and the longer terms generational and environmental requirements. 
In dysfunctional states, office holders focus primarily on personal aggrandizement 
while the state failed to provide or perform essential services. Such failures take a toll on 
citizens, as well as the wellbeing of its neighbors—economically, environmentally, and 
politically. Zimbabwe, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and Haiti are cases in point.
47
 
However, in democratic theory, it is said that the people are the principals and their 
government their agent. The dysfunctional axiom as Ghani asserts, turns this principle 
outside down—where the people become agents of unaccountable rulers. The absence of 
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an unaccountable government does not mean the lack of public opinion. Indeed, as Ghani 
writes, “it’s in the cafes; classroom, market places, and farms that complaints circulate.”48  
Henceforth, how do we make democracy pertinent in the nation-building process?  
Ghani and Lockhart provide ten realistic working frameworks. Firstly, the most crucial 
function of the state is law making. Law defines both the powers and limits of the state 
and the people within that state.
49
 The rule of law is the glue that binds all aspects of the 
state, the economy, and society. Thus each function is defined by specific set of rules that 
create governance arrangements—right decisions, processes, accountabilities, freedoms, 
and duties—for that function. 
The complexity of the tasks a state must perform requires internal mechanisms to 
monitor each branch of government—a check and balance approach. All societies have 
tensions; the key is whether these disputes are resolved through the process of law or are 
dealt with externally. By “finding existing rules exclusionary, both Mahatma Gandhi and 
Martin Luther King called for fundamental change in those rules, which took place within 
the framework of the rule of law.”50 When rule of law takes hold, it creates a reinforcing 
loop of stability, predictability, trust, and empowerment. First, rule of law stabilizes 
government and holds it accountable. Second, it sets a predictable environment which 
other players can make plans over the long term. Third, it creates confidence in the 
public, which trusts that, when change is necessary, it will take place within the 
framework of continuity. Lastly, it empowers those in civil society and the economy to 
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take initiatives, form associations, create companies, etc. It changes the nature of politics 
from divisive to a collective endeavor; people can disagree, but their disagreements are 
resolved through peaceful process. For example, the recent American Healthcare 
legislation and the debt ceiling debates are cases in point, where we saw the use of the 
existing laws and the ability to compromise led to the passage of such bills. In an 
undemocratic regime, such tension would most likely lead to bloodshed or to other forms 
of violence and intimidations. 
A great example is Singapore, once a corrupt nation in the fifties is an example in 
which Transparency International Corruption Perceptibility Index, ranked among the 
most transparent nations. “Its patriarch, Lee Kuan Yew saw the rule of laws as the source 
of good governance in creating both wealth and social benefits. The result has been that 
Singaporeans identify with their legal system, transforming a small Island without any 
natural mineral resources in to a global powerhouse.”51  
In contrast, distrust in the enforcement of formal rules increasingly leads to a 
universe of parallel rules that constitute the actual norms of society.
52
 Criminalization of 
the economy, informal judicial processes for property and other disputes, patron-client 
relationships as vehicles of entry to government service, and illegal natural resources 
concession and tax avoidance becomes the norm, public land and property are 
expropriated by officials, the state becomes predatory, rulers perceive themselves the law, 
and violence becomes the key mechanism for change. The poor feel hopeless and distrust 
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the system as they focus on survival.
53
 But when political leaders claim and cede power 
through orderly processes, seeking mandates from citizens at regular intervals, they build 
trust in the legitimacy of state’s power. However, throughout history, succession to high 
office has been the source of conflict. 
Another changed reality is the globalization of economy, which requires a process 
of co-production of rules involving the states, firms, and citizens to produce rules that 
transcends boundaries. So global cooperate chains affect the entire globe and no longer 
an issue of a single nation. For example, environmental issues must be taken seriously. 
Beef from Argentina could contaminate the global food chain.
54
 Sound management of 
public finances is the vehicle through which states can realize public goods. Efficient 
collection and allocation of resources among contending priorities turn ideas and 
aspirations into concrete outcomes.  
Therefore, the record of state activities lies most clearly in its budget, which is 
both medium and message. As Ghani argues, the budget brings the rights and duties of 
citizenship into balance. Each entitlement must have a line of expenditure being matched 
with a source of revenue. The discipline of preparation, implementation, and alteration of 
budgets allows the translation of public goals into measureable programs and project. 
Hence, “public expenditure takes place through rules for the procurement of goods and 
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services, accounting and auditing. Adherence to these rules is critical indicator of the 
state’s effectiveness and accountability.”55 
To achieve this outcome it will be an immense challenge that requires serious 
attention from nations recovering from wars particular circumstances and lessons from 
the experiences, including the mistakes of other nations. The guiding principle of the 
change that these nations need to undergo, in my view, is that stable political systems rest 
on the consent of the people and that this consent is generated through performance of 
core state functions on behalf of citizens. The challenges of building states that can 
perform these core functions in post-war regimes will be immense. But a dedicated 
leadership that can inspire its people and hold itself accountable can make a significant 
impact in the process of nation-building. In particular, a state that works in these nations 
requires the creation of a national leadership and an efficient aid system.  
Nonetheless, we must be cognizant of the fact that the departure of a dictator 
however and whenever that occurs, does not remove the negative stigma of the decades 
of bad governance. To overcome this legacy, new successors will need to combine 
dedication to the common good with imaginative leadership and management skills, 
underpinned by an ethic of collective team service. This would entail a refreshing 
departure from the stifling effects of the cult of personality, and from entrapment by ties 
of kinship, friendship, patronage and the perks of office.  
These can be alluring on first sight, and perhaps regarded as part of the spoils of 
victory in the aftermath of a change of regime. But to give in to such temptations would 
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also perpetuate the old evil regime’s divisive legacy. A break from the past ought to 
move the country to a new path which combines technical and human expertise with 
moral commitment in forming a recognizable polity and economy. It’s my hope that 
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in the wake of the Arab awakening can forge such optimism 
but with a realistic sense of the struggle and growing pain of their newly found freedom 
that ought to be balanced with responsibility.   
We must also be cognizant of the fact that nation-building is typically not only 
concerned with transforming a country so that it can become stable or economically 
viable (a concept the Bush-Cheney regime originally pursued in Iraq) and competitive on 
the world market. Truly, nation-building is principally about political reconstruction and 
transformation that pursue a democratic agenda.
56
 This falls in line with the concept of 
nation-building as defined by Hippler.  
According to Hippler, “nation-building is on the one hand a process of 
sociopolitical development, and on the other hand it can be a political objective as well as 
a strategy for reaching specific political objectives.”57 As he points out, these two 
definitions of nation-building can be viewed as being descriptive or analytical versus the 
normative strategic process. Both of these definitions will be vital to understanding the 
entire process, because you cannot have one without the other. “A nation is widely 
understood to be a community invested in a state, and the concepts mentioned below 
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reflect as much.”58 Given this, there are certain key elements in every nation-building 
endeavor that are vital to making the process work. These are the recognition of political 
authority, social cohesion, and the (re)building of all apparatuses of the state.  
 The first of these elements is the concept of an ideological and realistic integrative 
policy. What this fundamentally entails is enabling the citizens of said nation to come to 
regard themselves as some kind of collective identity affecting the political common 
good—by drawing upon their shared but diverse historical narratives. 
This is a sociocultural structuring and integration process leading to shared 
characteristics of identity, values, and goals. It  is  not  the  homogeneity  
of  these  characteristics  that  is  relevant,  rather  the  recognition  of  
heterogeneity  and  facilitating  inclusion.
59
   
 
 In the case of Rwanda, the nation through its political authority is fostering an 
agenda that regards its people beyond Tutsi and Hutus, and finding a new shared identity 
for fostering healing, reconciliation and progress. Yet, the task may remain arduous. In 
fact, ethnicity might remain socially relevant within in the private sphere. The same can 
be said of Iraq, where the task of the government is to recognize that the nation is 
composed or Sunni Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, and Kurds. But until they all come to regard 
themselves under a primary national identity as Iraqi, while at the same time holding their 
respective ethnic, religious, or cultural identities as Sunni, Shi’a, or Kurdish as 
secondary, a  successful and stable state  is  unlikely to be achieved. 
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  As long as the primary identity and loyalty lies with the tribe, clan or an ethnic or 
ethno religious group and the national identity level remains subordinate or missing, a 
nation-state will  continue to be precarious.
60
 This is why “the United States has failed to 
install viable democracies in Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan, and Iraq because all four 
countries are divided ethnically, socio-economically or tribally.”61   
Economic Development and Reconstruction 
 Economic reconstruction is essential to nation-building and comes after security 
has been established. In relation to Hippler, economic reconstruction is intertwined with 
the state-building phase, and by providing employment contributes to the building of a 
national infrastructure and civil society, both of which are vital to the social integration 
phase. Judging by past examples, “the level of a country’s economic development had 
proved to be one of the best predictors of a durable democracy.”62 However, there is a 
difference between economic development and economic reconstruction in the context of 
nation-building. Economic reconstruction assumes that there was a well-functioning 
economy, but that some catastrophic event undermined it and the economy must be put 
back on its feet.
63
 This is opposed to economic development, which refers to “building a 
modern economy where none previously existed.”64 
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 Obviously, economic reconstruction is the much easier option for the nation-
builder, but which task is undertaken, reconstruction or development, depends entirely on 
the country in question. But if the case is economic reconstruction, it is much more likely 
that the nation-building effort will be successful because most of the factors of a stable 
economy were already in place. Money also needs to find its way into the local economy, 
so “contracts to rebuild utilities, roads, and bridges should give preference to local firms 
and contractors that meet local hiring quotas.”65 Given this, in nation-building efforts it is 
vital to get the economy back on track with the local populations in partnership with the 
international community. 
Apart from the establishment of the basic administrative and institutional building 
processes, there ought to be rigorous shaping of the legal frame of the body polity, rule of 
law, the market, or the civil society.
66
 Surprisingly, the international community—thanks 
to the spread of neoliberal philosophy in the international economy—envisioned the state 
as the biggest enemy of global free trade and obstacle in strengthening the weak states–
through deregulation, decentralization, and liberalization. But the last two decades have 
experienced a growing gap between the rich and poor which are clearly being manifested 
even in the United States. Such a trend has the propensity for rolling back any gains for 
nation-building especially amongst fragile states. 
Now it is obvious that a failed state with a none-existing economy is more 
dangerous for free and fair economic activities than a functioning but less liberalized and 
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less open one. After satisfying the basic human needs it can be differentiated by at least 
three phases of institution building. Firstly, beyond the basic administration the 
mechanism of political consultation has to be built up. It means that there is a need of 
party formation and political participation of the society on the local and national levels.  
In essence, democracy has to be a grass roots initiative taking place in the village 
and town councils, community blocks, the schools, and other civic organizations. In the 
second phase it has to create – via local political consultations – the frame of polity, i.e. 
government, parliament, jurisdiction and constitution. Finally, the local society has to 
create the institutions to make them self-sustaining.
67
 The International NGOs are very 
active in this area. The promotion of “good governance,” anti-corruption programs, 
training of civil servants, security sector reform, election observation are the most 
relevant tasks that these NGOs and international organizations such as the EU, the World 
Bank or the IMF can initiate or provide good practices.
68
  
The Importance of Transitional Justice 
A significant factor in nation-building is the task of transitional justice. This is 
essential to realizing all three aspects characterized by Hippler, because it is difficult for a 
divided nation to come together until it has dealt with past injustices between the 
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different groups. Oftentimes the nations being rebuilt were under the rule of an 
oppressive or corrupt regime, and it is important to bring the greatest perpetrators of 
criminal acts to justice.
69
 This is needed for a variety of reasons. The goal is to hold 
accountable the perpetrators of human rights violations so that victims believe that justice 
prevails. It is difficult for a nation to move towards the future when it has yet to deal with 
its past. The intended effect is to address and deal with the underlying causes of conflict 
within a society, and with that break the circle of violence that often characterizes such 
conflicts.  
Not only do these procedures prevent the recurrence of conflict, they also provide 
a valuable forum for individuals and communities to feel a sense of closure (which may 
never happen) and to begin healing old wounds.
70
 So until indigenous capabilities can be 
reconstituted, an interim criminal-justice system is just a stopgap measure and must not 
replace efforts by local actors to work towards a long-term permanent judicial system 
steeped in the tradition of universal human rights.
71
 Therefore, the ultimate goal of any 
nation-building effort should be “an impartial and accountable legal system for the future, 
in particular, creating an effective law enforcement apparatus, an open judicial system, 
fair laws, and a humane corrections system.”72  
                                                 
69
 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu. Global Justice. The Politics of War Crimes Trials.  Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008, 104-112. Also see Joan T. Phillips. Just War Theory. Muir S. Fairchild 
Research Information Center Maxwell AFB, AL, April 2009. 
 
70
 Michèle Flournoy and Michael Pan. “Dealing with Demons: Justice and Reconciliation.” The 
Washington Quarterly (Autumn 2002). 
 
71
 Moghalu, 3-8ff. 
 
72
 John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan. “Toward Post Conflict Reconstruction.” The 
Washington Quarterly (2002): 93. Also see “Toward Postconflict Resolution,” 169-183 in A. Lennon, ed. 
  
252 
Furthermore, a just nation-building ethic that embraces transitional justice must 
be aware of wide range of approaches that states or nations may use to address past 
human rights abuses. They include series of actions and policies, resulting in the creation 
of institutions through policies in times of political transitions from violence and 
repression associated with armed conflicts, military regimes and authoritarian rule to 
peace, societal stability and democracy.
73
  
These policies and the institutions may include both judicial and non-judicial 
approaches. Transitional justice is informed by a society’s desire to rebuild social trust, 
seek ‘reconciliation’, repair or create a broken justice system so as to prevent future 
human rights violations, and build a democratic system of governance.  
As well noted by many practitioners and experts on just peace building, especially 
after a protracted conflict, transitional justice ought to be approached generally in at least 
six primary lenses that  are all context driven to meet each particular society’s needs. 
They are:  
Trials: policy of retributive justice through national or international 
courts/tribunal for criminal prosecutions of individual perpetrators. Truth-
Seeking/Fact Finding Mechanisms: a non-retributive justice approach to 
promote truth seeking of past abuse and clarify history. Often pursued 
through truth commissions and other investigative institutions. 
Reparations: a restorative policy approach through the provision of 
material and sometimes non-material compensation to victims of human 
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rights violations. Reform of Abusive Institutions: a policy directed towards 
the reform of democratic and governance institutions. These reforms may 
include vetting and lustration. Memorialization: policies and institutions of 
remembering the past to establish ‘collective memory.’ Memorialization 
meets victims’ demands to ‘never forget’ and assist in generating dialogue 
and discussion about the past and establishing accurate historical record. 
Community-based and/or Traditional/Religious Initiatives: the use of 
traditional and/or religious reconciliation practices to promote justice, 
accountability, reintegration of former combatants and foster national, 
individual or community reconciliation.
74
 
 
Therefore, justice and reconciliation appear to be the running themes in 
transitional justice approaches. They seem to be fundamental goals for transitional justice 
processes. In post-conflict societies, for instance, there appears an increasing 
international currency in shared experiences in promoting peace through justice and 
reconciliation.
75
 It is widely held that societies making a transition away from a period of 
violent conflict, civil war and/or severe political repression and authoritarianism toward a 
better present and future government, that is accountable and has respect for human 
rights, justice, human security, and national unity must embark on a journey of 
reconciliation.
76
 This is because reconciliation can be an important factor in preventing 
recurrence of violence and ensuring continued democratization. In this sense, 
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reconciliation seems to be the ultimate goal of transitional justice. Such an understanding 
has often diluted transitional justice processes and outcomes. Both the concepts of justice 
and reconciliation have often been joined together as constituting transitional justice 
outcomes, whereas the two are distinct.  
Transitional justice is premised on a belief that the demand for justice is important 
but not an absolute one: instead criminal justice must be balanced with the need for 
peace, reconciliation, democracy, equitable development and the rule of law. Transitional 
justice therefore represents an attempt to pursue justice with a keen eye on sustainable 
national reconciliation. Thus, there is a linkage between transitional justice processes and 
reconciliation. The truth, however, is that due to the contested nature of the concept of 
reconciliation, the reconciliation goal of transitional justice processes has often been 
subsumed with that of justice, resulting in, sometimes, false reconciliation.
77
 However, 
reconciliation must be seen as the only possibility for people in conflict to account for the 
past (back-ward looking) and seek a new path for the future (forward looking). Ideally 
reconciliation seeks: 
To prevents, once and for all, the use of the past as the seed of renewed 
conflict. It consolidates peace, breaks the cycle of violence and 
strengthens newly established or reintroduced democratic institutions. As 
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a backward-looking operation, reconciliation brings about the personal 
healing of survivors, the reparation of past injustices, the building or 
rebuilding of non-violent relationships between individuals and 
communities, and the acceptance by the former parties to a conflict of a 
common vision and understanding of the past. In its forward-looking 
dimension, reconciliation means enabling victims and perpetrators to get 
on with life and, at the level of society, the establishment of a civilized 
political dialogue and an adequate sharing of power.
78
   
  
If the international community and Christians who desire to see in this temporal 
world—the full restoration of human dignity and flourishing of all people and the 
environment as a whole—irrespective of race, religion, gender or creed, we must then 
promote and work assiduously for the promotion of transitional justice as it relates to 
nation-building. 
Balancing Reconstruction with Development 
Nation-building encompasses two different types of activities, reconstruction and 
development. Although the distinction between the two is often blurred, it has always 
been present to nation-builders of earlier generations dealing with post-conflict situations. 
The official title of the World Bank is the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Most of its early work focused on reconstruction or the restoration of war-
torn or damaged societies to their pre-conflict situation. Development, however, refers to 
the creation of new institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth, thereby 
transforming the society into something that it has not been previously. 
Clearly, there is a huge conceptual difference between reconstruction and 
development. Reconstruction is what historically intervening nations have shown they are 
capable of doing. Post-war Western Europe benefited significantly from US 
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reconstruction programs. This effort was in complete contrast to the Balkan’s 
intervention, where we witnessed uncoordinated, political and economic 
mismanagement. “Reconstruction is possible when the underlying political and social 
infrastructure has survived conflict or crisis; the problem is then the relatively simple 
matter of injecting sufficient resources to jumpstart the process, in the form of supplying 
food, roads, buildings, infrastructure, and the like.”79 
Development is however, much more problematic, both conceptually and as a 
matter of pragmatic policy. This was what America came to realize after its own success 
of the New Deal projects and the Tennessee Valley Authority, where it domestically 
transformed lives. On the international front, “the early American self-confidence in its 
ability to promote development came crashing down under the pressure of a variety of 
factors in the 1970s and 1980s. State-building, done without regard for the democratic 
legitimacy of the governments involved, implicated foreign donors in human rights 
abuses of recipients and failed to prevent coups, revolutions, and wars that led to political 
breakdown.”80 
In recent years, attention has now moved from the Harrod-Domar neoclassical 
growth model,
81
 which argues that the path to development meant sufficient capital 
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investment, followed by emphasis  on education, population growth, debt relief, and [the 
infamous structural] adjustment as panacea for development.”82 Now, attention has 
ethically been placed on institutions and governance as critical factors in development. 
But Fukuyama believes that this is open to its own evolution. He writes, 
But any honest appraisal of where the “state of the art” lies in 
development today would be important, we know relatively little about 
how to create them; they are, in any case, only one part of a much more 
complicated set of necessary strategies.
83
 
 
In light of this, Fukuyama sees the temptation to let nation-builders stick to 
reconstruction and avoid development. “The problem is that this bifurcation is usually not 
possible in developing countries with weak or absent state sectors.”84 As we are aware, 
many of these conflicts have destroyed basic institutions, obliterating the distinction 
between reconstruction and development. The examples of Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Somalia, speak to this issue. Therefore, to get them back to some form of normalcy, it 
requires both development and reconstruction.
85
  
The development function is a critical nation-building task—it is the ability to 
create and maintain self-sustaining indigenous institutions that permit outside powers to 
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formulate an exit strategy. A lack of conceptual clarity on how to promote institutional 
development makes it extremely difficult to transition out of reconstruction phase of 
nation-building. For example in Bosnia, the European High Representatives functioned as 
a vicar of Europe since the Dayton Accord. They overturned local elections, and takes on 
the governance task of the land, in their effort to fight corruption and promoting good 
governance and human rights. But these approaches undercut the Bosnian capacity to self 
governance. What such acts generate is resentment against the intervening power and or 
dependency syndrome by the local populations. A departure anytime soon would plunge 
these people back into the same internal conflict. A similar attitude prevails in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, where private US contractors are creating tensions and resentments 
amongst the local populations—doing jobs that the local populations could be doing. 
In certain respects, Fukuyama asserts that reconstruction can even become an 
impediment to development in the long run. Reconstruction requires rapid and massive 
outside intervention to stabilize conflicts, rebuild infrastructure, and deal with 
humanitarian issues. The local government is, by definition, unable to provide these basic 
functions itself. And is often bypassed for the intervening forces of NGOs, peacekeepers, 
and other aid agencies—often time being highly paid than the local officials in 
government.  
The development phase on the contrary, requires the eventual weaning of local 
actors and institutions from dependence on outside aid. This is conceptually 
straightforward, but extremely difficult to implement in practice. First, it is seldom the 
case that local institutions are actually strong enough to do all the things that they are 
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intended to do. This could be detrimental in weakening some basic functions of the state. 
Secondly, the outside nation-builders get in the habit of ruling and making decisions, and 
they are reluctant to allow their local protégé to make their own mistakes. The United 
States is an example in the early phase of the war in Iraq. Thirdly, nation-builders often 
lack clarity about their own impact on local populations. They chant the mantra of 
institution or capacity-building and they fail to understand how their continuous presence 
in the country tends to precisely weaken those institutions they are seeking to 
strengthen.
86
 
Iraq and Afghanistan present two different models of intervention. Afghanistan 
had a larger support from the international community with indigenous players involved. 
In Iraq, it was different. Tragically, the Bush administration failed to capitalize on the 
support structures that could have increased the possibilities of flushing or stamping out 
the insurgency and moving the country to a genuine nation-building—with institutions 
and self-governance as key to a democratic transition.  Instead, the new leadership under 
Hamid Karzai was so corrupt that the basic service for its people could hardly be 
delivered.  
The Taliban saw the weakness of the Karzais’s government and enforced its own 
autonomy in the countryside with drugs (heroine) as its cash crop. With the Bush 
administration more focused on Iraq, the Taliban and its sympathizers gradually 
regrouped and now posed a threat to the country’s future and for that matter, to the US 
administration under President Barack Obama and the so-called war on terror. Sadly, the 
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local populations and young American and NATO soldiers seem to be caught in a 
continuous quagmire. Such unfortunate incident on December 18, 2009 claimed one of 
my best friends and soccer buddy in Afghanistan when he, Sgt. Albert Ware and six other 
soldiers were fatally ambushed. The young man who ironically escaped the Liberian civil 
war as a refugee in America, moved by the devastation he saw on 9/11, joined the Illinois 
National Guard and subsequently the United States’ Army.87  
Even as President Obama accepted the controversial Nobel peace prize for 2009, 
in the midst of US led coalition’s troop surge, the US has still not defined its mission as 
being either nation-building or a war on terror. What we see is actually the combination 
of both.  In Iraq, due to the long held suspicion Iraqis felt about the Americans, based on 
the first Gulf war when Saddam was subdued, and an American supported insurgency 
brutally was quashed by his regime, there was a lurking fear of another brutal insurgency 
from the defeated Sunni-led Barth party supporters. The majority Shiites were reluctant 
to exert any form of legitimate claim to power. Owing to the deep ethnic division like 
that of Balkans, Iraq was left in the hands of the American led coalition.  
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Finally, a coalition government based on ethnic politics came into existence and 
later an election with its own complexities. The question now is when will the US end its 
nation-building efforts in the Middle East? How much influences will the Palestinian-
Israelis conflict affect the US mission? How about the wave of protest and demands of 
the ordinary people in North Africa and the Middle East? Further, how has America 
portrayed itself in this aspect of nation-building where the issue of war and peace 
significantly affect the outcome of nation-building? I will not answer these questions in 
this work because they could form a whole new corpus that is distinct from my focus. 
However, this aspect of American engagement is described in the following ways:  
First, the practical effect is not the declared goal, of U.S. intervention must 
be a regime change or the survival of a regime that would otherwise 
collapse. Regime change or survivability is the core objective of nation-
building, because an outside power, such as the United States, must 
overthrow a hostile regime or maintain a friendly indigenous regime to be 
able to implement its plans.
88
 
 
 It is worth noting that the primary goal of early American nation-building efforts 
was, in most cases, strategic—but narrow self interests based on power politics. In the 
first efforts, Washington decided to replace or support a regime in a foreign land to 
defend its core security and economic interests, not to build a democracy. The idea of 
transplanting democracy as sustained political ideals is most recent to the goals of nation-
building—as seen in Liberia, Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Egypt, and other Muslim nations still 
in the process of demanding their rights as seen in Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Iran. 
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Reexamining the International Aids System 
Another significant factor in nation-building is the prospect and perils of foreign 
aids. Firstly, what task is the aid system currently performing, and what capabilities does 
it have to performing them? Examining the aid complex from a design perspective 
reveals the way its people, processes, resources flows, and mental models results in 
different outcomes and level of wastes. Such an analysis is prerequisite for answering two 
questions: is the aid system in fundamental need for reform? And to what extent is it 
relevant to addressing the issues of poverty and stability in the rebuilding of failed state? 
The tasks usually is handling money, preparing projects, engendering change, providing 
advice as well as producing (as well as substituting) for state functions.
89
 This task 
usually involves number of organizations (WB, IMF, NGOs, UN, etc.). Then there are 
countries with their development agencies such as USAID, ECD, etc) that carry on these 
tasks on global level. 
However, the old system is realistically outdated and must be reformed. The first 
premise of the aid system is that states lack financial capital and secondly, that there is a 
need to build infrastructure. The aid then generated is in the hands of the agencies who 
assume the role of the weakened state to perform such tasks. As a result, they address 
symptom but not the root causes of the dysfunctionality. What the aid should instead do 
as its central function is generating prosperity by bringing a global knowledge of stocks 
                                                 
89
 Ibid., 84. 
  
263 
and flows to countries without it. Instead, what these countries get is an extractive and 
exploitative side of capitalism, leaving the countries with less entrepreneurial activities.
90
 
Historically, development aids went to Cold War camps, which was a tragedy for 
full nation-building since 1945. Europe benefited but not the rest of the world. There was 
emphasis on primary education for girls, but the skills required for full national 
development for management and leadership requires first rate higher education. College 
education provides the wherewithal for management, operation, and maintenance. 
However, the World Bank was reluctant to fund education and health, doubting the 
economic return from these institutions. They even failed to articulate Adam Smith’s 
concept of human capital, which he defined as the “acquired and useful abilities of all 
inhabitants or members of society.”91 However, the focus under Robert McNamara of the 
World Bank shifted to education and health especially for rural populations.
92
 He realized 
that first rate education also develops skilled citizens who support development for the 
economy and polity. As Ghani asserts: 
Such an approach links investments in human capital to the goal of 
forming a large middle class, which has historically been the vehicle for 
consolidating democracy. Moreover, it generates a demand for the rule of 
law and provides a solvent for ethnic, gender, and class tensions.
93
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For example, “Africa spends annually $4b on one hundred thousand expatriates 
according the Commission for Africa.”94 USAID gives millions to a few firms, with 
minimal consultation with the host country. These are works that Africans themselves 
could be doing to rebuild their continent. Sadly, this is one of the reasons of the deep 
resentment between the local population and the international partners, where a 
contrasting lifestyle permeates, with a new bourgeois class being the UN and NGOS.   
As observed, when these nations are in transition, there exists the aid rush, as both 
a process and outcome. Unfortunately, it carries the same kind of dangers as any form of 
political and social activism. It can become an anti-catalyst for the creation of 
institutional capacity, as well as instrument of division, resentment and corruption.  
Even though the United Nations and its agencies may try to ensure equality, the 
apparent randomness of allocations often feeds a sense of unfairness among citizens and 
tensions between the country’s regions and groups. The cascade of distributive schemes 
spreads a sense of entitlement without legal foundation, as it is not rooted in legal and 
policy frameworks.  Consequently, the unintended consequences can include severe 
inefficiencies, arising for example from staffing hundreds of project-units where 
redundant or duplicate layers of management are paid exorbitantly to oversee costly 
and/or misdirected projects. The result is that both government and citizens are bypassed, 
and the government loses the capability to respond to its citizens’ complaints. The aid 
agencies managing the projects are based in capitals far away, beyond the reach of 
domestic citizens and with no direct legal responsibilities to recipients. There is a double 
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loss of accountability, as citizens in the newly liberated countries have no official 
recourse and those in the aid agencies’ own countries are too remote from the facts on the 
ground to hold those agencies accountable.  
What happened in many of these recovering nations like Afghanistan and Haiti, 
have parallels with other many other post-conflict zones. Their lessons are multiple and 
relate alike to donors and recipients, external agencies and internal authorities, global 
citizens and local actors –realizing that in failed state situations, these categories are often 
interwoven. For the international community, Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, and Somalia teach 
that parallel organizations do not result in creation of functioning states; that technical 
assistance is often wasteful; and that coordination among donors remains elusive.  
In short, aid can become as much part of the problem as of the solution. It can 
work, as many examples show—the United States’ Marshall Plan in Europe—Post World 
War II the assistance provided by the European Union to Ireland and Spain, the World 
Bank-administered trust fund’s support for Japan, Korea, China and Singapore. There are 
a range of positive lessons from international responses to recovery, ranging from rapid 
settlement of debts (in the most recent case of Liberia), to the establishment of multi-
donor trust funds with strict rules for disbursement, and establishment of licensing and 
tendering control mechanisms to ensure careful stewardship of the country’s assets. But 
to overcome its current dysfunctionality, the international aid system must have the 
vision and the courage to create a new approach animated by a spirit of partnership and 
working through larger, more integrated programs.  
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Narrative and Nation-Building 
I hold that narrative is a powerful human communicative element that helps us 
make sense of the world of the past as reinterpreted by the present. As such, many 
contemporary thinkers have argued that structurally human thought is deeply embedded 
with narrative.
95
 Psychologist Jerome Bruner argues that “it is through narrative that we 
create and recreate selfhood, that self is a product of our telling and not some essence to 
be delved for in the recesses of subjectivity.”96 Narratives are not just a matter of 
individuals creating their inner and social “self”; narratives are also what bind societies 
and cultures together. Narratives are how we integrate events and actions through time 
into meaningful patterns. Narratives specify cause-and-effect relationships and organize 
these into coherent wholes. 
 Narratives tell us which events and actions are significant and which can be 
ignored. The inter-relationship of events in our lives is explained by these narratives. Our 
sense of meaning and purpose, our values and motivations are based on these 
narratives. Humans are deeply storied creatures. We bring our mini-narratives that are 
joined together into larger stories within stories. But for all these narratives to make sense 
to all, we must recognize what Ricoeur’s refers to as the meta-narratives.97 These are the 
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most valuable stories that are told, retold, and reframed and seen as objective or absolute 
truth. So how do we mitigate between these competing narratives and avoid arrogance, 
pride and superiority complexes of nations, tribes, races, and regions? It is incumbent 
upon us to accept our limitations within our various narratives and seek a dynamic and 
reasonable hermeneutic
98
 of interpretation that forces us to suspend our judgment and 
willingness to shift our standpoint so to avoid a dogmatic reading or interpretation of 
history. This hermeneutical process definitely can lead into a hermeneutical spiral.
99
  
There are various reasons why the concept of narrative is especially appropriate for 
considering the relation of Christian response to world affairs and for that matter to the 
process of nation-building. Humans are storytellers and story makers. We live self-
consciously in a present that has come from somewhere and leads somewhere. Stories are 
bound up with this human awareness of time, with living in the present, remembering the 
past and anticipating the future. In relating what has happened in the past and what will 
or may happen in the future, stories help humans make sense of present acts and events. 
Narratives allow humans to see the fragments of our finite lives within larger, meaningful 
wholes. Stories, with their own arches, tell of particular people in particular times and 
places, captures our moral imagination in ways that theoretical or abstract concept rarely 
do. They captivate people in their pre-reflective consciousness, and they give rise to new 
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reflection, thoughts and insights. Narratives speak to us as whole persons, evoking our 
emotions, intellect and will. 
Therefore, we as human persons live within many narratives—through and  
within family story, a refugee story, an ethnic story, a war story, a gender story, a 
transitional story, a national story, an education story, a work story, a friend story, a place 
story, a time story and a religious or a secular story. Our stories tell us who we are and 
offer structures and meanings to our lives by linking us with others. We learn our roles in 
life that enable us to carry out our tasks, account for institutional structures, identify 
prescription and proscription—informing us of the sacred and profane the good and the 
evil.  
Our own personal story is a unique and complex composition of the shared stories 
of the groups or communities to which we belong. To know a person or a community is 
to know that person or community’s story. To know the Christian community is to know 
its narrative. In essence our particular narrative is what Gene Outka calls “the 
Particularist Turn in Philosophical and Theological Ethics.”100 Outka identifies a 
movement that “turns away from formalist and universalist ethical theories and toward 
some particular historical-ethical community.”101 Universalist ethical theories claim that 
basic moral beliefs are known through reason alone, are available across cultures and 
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historical periods, are entirely justifiable without recourse to particular beliefs and 
practices that distinguish communities, and apply to all humans.  
The particularist ethical theories challenge these claims and insist that moral 
beliefs are historically and contextually situated. Human thinking and living are usually 
driven by traditions and culturally conditioned. We should therefore view our traditions 
borne by communities “not as mere milieus but as repositories, not accidental but 
essential to the moral knowledge on whose basis we ought to live our lives.”102 Such an 
understanding means that “the most fitting way to view our individual human lives is to 
narrate our histories.”103 
 Alasdair MacIntyre is a leading proponent of the particularist tradition. In his 
ground-breaking work After Virtue, MacIntyre writes,  
I can only answer the question, what am I to do? if I can answer the prior 
question, Of what story or stories do I find myself a part? The moral agent 
exists in a narrative context, the bearer of a particular social identity. . . . I 
inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety 
of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These 
constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point.
104
 
 
In this understanding of the moral agent—the individual in this view “regard[s] 
the self as being detached from the entanglements of society, history, and even its own 
past…as serene and autonomous, float[ing] freely in the rarefied atmosphere of 
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Reason.”105 In essence, Macintyre polemically takes aim at individualism or any form of 
narrow self-interest. Individualism in this direction is understood to mean self-
centeredness. I am what I am because I choose to be without regard to the others. It is 
based on total rejection of others in the name of false freedom without responsibility. 
Instead, MacIntyre argues that the moral agent is dependent on traditions that are born by 
communities through reasons, experiences, and Scripture—the quadrilateral within 
Methodism.  
MacIntyre’s focus on narrative relates with his argument of the importance of 
tradition, community, character, virtues, and vision for living the good (moral) life. To 
this view, MacIntyre writes, “A living tradition then is a historically extended, socially 
embodied argument and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute 
that tradition.”106 In this regard, our Christian narrative, which ties my personal narrative 
with this global narrative, belongs to such a living tradition of our world in its diversity 
and relatedness.  
The coherence of Christian narrative is further shaped by the work of Stanley 
Hauerwas, in his essay, “A Story Shaped Community.” He writes, “The social 
significance of the Gospel requires recognition of the narrative structure of Christian 
convictions for the life of the church.”107 The reality of Hauerwas’ argument is that if we 
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are striving to live the Christian life in solidarity with others, hermeneutics ought to be of 
significance in attempting to interpret Scripture in the context of the many genres of 
stories, in light of history, politics, social relationships, and future possibilities.  
This understanding of narrative opens us up to be active participants and attentive 
to realities and our own limitations as we work towards creating a better world. Whilst, 
Hauerwas posits that “every social ethic involves a narrative, whether it is concerned with 
the formulation of basic principles of social organization and/or concrete policy 
alternatives.”108 We then ought to leave the Sunday’s pews and the academic world of 
theories and debates towards a broken world of shattered dreams and communities to 
construct or shape communities by approximating justice, yet aware of our own 
limitations. However, our attentiveness and participation must in no way be seen as an 
attempt to control the world and meta-narrative. Rather, we are there to offer an 
alternative.  
Thus Hauerwas is right to critique our modus operandi—“In [which] our attempt  
to control our society Christians in America have too readily accepted liberalism as a 
social strategy appropriate to the Christian story.”109 He therefore conjectures that the 
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church does not exist to provide an ethos for democracy or any other form of social 
organization, but stands as a political alternative to every nation, witnessing to the kind of 
social life possible for those that have been formed by the story of Christ.”110 
Nevertheless, what system does offer us better political and economic system? I believe 
that democracy does offer us a better approach to collective consensus and as such, the 
church must be an advocate for such system that gives consent to the people. It is this 
very concept that Niebuhr makes the case for democracy as a realistic system for global 
cooperation. But this system usually gets compromised on global affairs as seen through 
the UN when opposing voices make their cases for or against various issues. This was the 
recent situation in Libya in time of crisis or urgency. To this Niebuhr cautioned:  
[That the] preservation of a democratic civilization requires the wisdom of 
the serpent and the harmlessness of the dove. The children of light must be 
armed with the wisdom of the children of darkness but remain free from 
their malice. They must know the power of self-interest in human society 
without giving it moral justification. They must have this wisdom in order 
that they may beguile, deflect, harness and restrain self-interest, individual 
and collective, for the sake of the community.
111
 
 
It is based on this very conviction that I bring my personal mini narrative 
interwoven with others and the globalized meta-narratives on the issue of failed states in 
need of nation-building, premised on the notion that democracy is indeed at the core of 
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rebuilding broken nations. It is a historical experience and analysis of human history that 
even challenges our Christian meta-narrative demanding our attention and action on this 
very least discussed subject of the problem of failed state in need of a genuine nation-
building within a Christian context. Since the civil war finally ended in my little West 
African nation of Liberia in 2003, and general and presidential elections ushered in 
Africa’s first and only female president, Madam Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in 2005 and 2011 
respectively, I have vivid memory of the evils of wars, the narrative of others and how 
the majority of the world population and powerful nations stood back while the carnage 
consumed us. But we were not the only victims—Rwanda, Angola, Sierra Leone, and 
The Balkans were in chaos and anarchy.  
My personal account is tied to Liberia, founded by freed American slaves. It has 
had a unique and controversial beginning since 1822 when freed American slaves 
returned to Africa to form a colony. My own ascendants Prince Abdul Rahman and 
Isabella who were enslaved in Natchez, Mississippi for nearly forty years were 
trailblazers to the new colony of Liberia, encouraged directly to forming a Christian 
nation, naming its first capital Christopolis and later renaming it Monrovia, in honor of 
James Monroe, the fifth president of the USA. This adventure was done through a grant 
given by the United States Government in collaboration the American Colonization 
Society and the US Navy to halt the slave trade in Africa. Their story is told as a PBS 
documentary called Prince Among Slaves.
112
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The settlers of Liberia, like their European-American counterparts in North 
America, sought to an extent, in building a nation by paradoxically committing the same 
inhumane treatments they suffered in Europe and the Americas, to the native inhabitants 
they met in Africa. It must also be noted that some of the natives themselves were still 
caught in the act of war and the slave trade, which rightfully infuriated the emancipated 
Americans in Liberia. A class and racial hierarchical division manifested itself in the 
order of the Mulattos, the dark skin Southerner, the repatriated Africans known as the 
Congoes and the Natives—with a shift of power to the darker skin, the so-called 
Americo-Liberians in alliance with the Congoes for an unbroken 130 years since Liberia 
independence on July 26, 1847. 
It was April 12, 1980 that ushered in the first native Liberian leadership in a 
bloody military coup led by uneducated and semi literate Non-Commissioned Officers 
trained by US military personnel. Prior to the coup d’état, the late president William 
Tolbert, whose father fought in the American civil war and resided in Charleston, South 
Carolina, had argued for Liberia’s self determination—in choosing its friends of nations 
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rather than being solely aligned to USA and its Cold-War allies. Tolbert, who was also a 
Baptist prelate, went so far, as being the first Sub-Saharan African president to openly 
criticize Israel in 1979 at the UN General Assembly, as a Zionist state denying the 
Palestinians their rights to self determination. Many Liberian historians and observers 
consistently argue that President Tolbert and other assassinated African and world leaders 
such as Patrice Lumumba of the D. R. Congo, and the bloody overthrow of the Allende’s 
government on Sept. 11, 1973 in Chile, were inner workings of the invincible hands of 
the US government through the CIA and other domestic actors.  It was a perilous time in 
world history—the bi-polar world under the canopy of the Cold-War eon. 
For example, my father, Borbor Gaye, a former soccer star and captain of the 
Liberian national team, returned home in 1981 from Europe where he studied in Romania 
for six years. The military junta immediately interrogated and branded him a communist. 
That experience forever changed him. My dad never revealed this incident to me until 
2008 in Chicago, Illinois. Prior to this intimate conversation, my own experiences and 
narrow escape in the 1990s from two wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, forever made an 
imprint on my mind—where I witnessed the destruction and dehumanization of minds, 
body, and spirits, the interplay of internal and external actors for exploitive natural 
resources, the staggering poverty, rapes, trauma, collapse of state institutions, and the 
lack of basic social services. Poignantly, I lived through a failed state! I knew then and 
now that the only remedy was an authentic nation-building agenda through collective 
efforts, hard work, and perseverance by a great majority.  
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My hopes in the early 1990s in the midst of tragedy was imbued by an 
indefatigable American Catholic nun, Dr. Shirley Kolmer, my high school principal and 
patroness of my drama group at St. Patrick’s Catholic High School in Monrovia, who 
constantly reminded me and my colleagues “that education, with a strong sense of 
morality was the key for us rebuilding our lives and that of our nation.” On October 15, 
1992, the overcrowded city of Monrovia was invaded by Charles Taylor and his 
marauding rebel forces of child-soldiers and adults. My home and others were being 
bombed and looted while we fled the outskirts and surrounding suburbs.  
At a major junction at the Freeport and Gardnerville road, in Liberia, Dr. Kolmer 
heading in the opposite direction to their convent, stopped and recognized me in the 
midst of the large crowd, while driving her white hatched back Subaru with four other 
American nuns. With more than five thousands civilians trekking, she and her fellow 
sisters lovingly greeted and counseled us, offering bottles and cups of water to civilians.  
In her eyes I saw a deep spiritual and human connection—the umbuunti, letting 
me and my people know that she and her colleagues were walking and feeling every bit 
of our sorrows, fears, frustrations, and tears of our failed state. In silence, she held my 
hands warmly and tightly—as if to say “take courage— this nation [Liberia] shall rise 
again!” Sadly, Sister Kolmer and four other nuns, namely, Sisters Barbara Ann Mutra, 
Mary Joel Kolmer, Kathleen McGuire and Agnes Mueller, all in their 50s and 60s, nurses 
and teachers, who spent years in Liberia, helping its development and sharing the lot of 
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its people,
113
 were brutally murdered on that same day by Taylor’s rebels, under the 
command of “General Mosquito”, Mr. Christopher Vambo.114 It was around that same 
period that peacekeepers from Senegal interrogated, humiliated, and falsely accused me 
of being a child soldier.   
The lesson learned from my own personal narrative in relation to the larger 
historical narrative is that failed state generates tremendous angst and regression—
trampling the human spirit for cooperation, justice, love, compassion and genuine 
development. However, to reverse such painful trend, there is a need for a balanced and 
strategic approach to nation-building with appropriate method for enabling the global 
common good which restores social order and instituting the democratic processes.  
The doctrine of the common good teaches that the individual person is a member 
of a larger body. Just as the goal, or end, of each individual member of a community is 
the common good of that larger community, so also the goal, or end, of each organ and 
muscle in our body is the common good of the overall person. This effort requires close 
attention to the moral concern for justice in global affairs, with recognition of global 
responsibilities of nations today, especially powerful nations in preventing genocide and 
the obligation to protect rights and lives. It is a task that calls us beyond our comfort 
zones, to new to uncomfortable and uncharted territories—of sustainable nation-building. 
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General Conclusions 
This Christian socio-ethical and theo-political task for appropriating the common 
good ought to be realistic and wholistic, informing our ideas and participation in the 
global public sphere—as exemplified through the personal narratives and writings of St. 
Augustine, Aquinas, John Wesley, the Niebuhr’s brothers, Novak, Hollenbach, and the 
hosts of other scholars and writers. They each taught us that faith in the public square is 
very different from imposing strict religious values; rather, it is putting to practice those 
principles espoused by Jesus and the Saints of Christianity. This means tuning our senses 
into a frequency that sees the world as a landscape that God can transform—as articulated 
by Loyola’s favorite phrase, Ad maiorem Dei gloriam. Translated: For the greater glory 
of God. 
This transformation is one that is prescribed in the Bible: turning society away 
from dominance, hypocrisy, pride, “greed, malice, deceit, envy, slander, arrogance and 
folly” (Mark 7: 22-23) and towards Christian principles that espoused justice, peace, 
love, compassion and goodness. In the process of nation-building, we then set out to do 
precisely that—to build nations based on very concrete values already articulated by our 
Christian faith. This is an eschatological hope for God’s “Kingdom to come on Earth.” 
 Our actions become intrinsically linked to the values we uphold and the vision we 
desire for all of God’s creation. Our task as Christians is not to hold back and be 
indifferent to others, but to be genuinely prophetic witnesses and builders of nations and 
broken lives, in our quest to fight and speak against all forms systemic evils, with love 
and justice without prejudice of the other. It is therefore important that Christians make a 
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strong case for being actively involved in nation-building. However, one should be open 
for disagreements as to how these values should be translated into practical terms.  
This act of participation requires openness to dialogue in resolving these 
differences. As well articulated by Pacem in Terris, we draw further strengths by 
knowing that our task obligates us to establish universal peace in truth, justice, charity, 
and liberty. This document clearly sets the basis upon which justice is grounded, laying 
the premise that God created all men and women equal, and as such we have rights and 
duties that are universal, inviolable and inalienable. Therefore, human has economic, 
political, cultural, and moral rights and duties. In detail, “every human being  has the 
right to live, to bodily integrity, to the means necessary for development of life, to be 
respected, to worship God according to one’s conscience, to choose freely one’s state in 
life, (and) to freely meet and associate.”115  
  In our call to be universal or global citizens, we ought to draw from our own 
Christian root of being united through the Eucharist or the African spirit of umbuunti—
our collective humanity. We share a history with all peoples knowing that we are 
intricately linked. If one nation goes down we all go down and if one rises, we also rise. 
In Niebuhr’s assertion,  
Genuine community, whether between men [and women] or nations, is not 
established merely through the realization that we need one another… 
Genuine community is established only when the knowledge that we need 
one another is supplemented by the recognition that “the other,” that other 
form of life, or that other unique community is the limit beyond which our 
ambitions must not run and the boundary beyond which our life must not 
expand…It also includes a religious sense of the mystery and greatness of 
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the other life, which we violate if we seek to comprehend it too simply 
from our standpoint.
116
  
 
  In simple terms, we do not do the good to or for others to be rewarded here or in 
the afterlife. We do it because it’s our moral obligation to reach into our umbuunti by 
recognizing the humanity in others and our responsibility to the greater environment or 
society. In terms of political, economic, social, and cultural transformations, the voice of 
the Christian person ought to be driven not by any desire to demonstrate the credibility or 
value of any socio-political or economic ideology, but by a commitment to the dignity of 
all people, particularly the poor, vulnerable, and disenfranchised. This places the onus on 
the gatekeepers of the church—the Pope, bishops, pastors, theologians, and laypersons to 
rearticulate and reinterpret matters of socio-economic and political affairs in light of 
reality as they portend to the creation of stable nations and breaking the curse of failing/ 
failed states. 
 In the tradition of Methodism, we are called to effectively tie together these 
aspects of scripture, tradition, and experience through the gift of reason as we endeavor to 
participate in the arduous task of nation-building. As children of God, we have not been 
created to blindly love God, but to choose to love God, and with certainty, the only way 
for us to come to this choice is to use reason to put together scripture with tradition and 
reason in a way that makes sense for us individually and collectively through our 
personal and collective experiences. Using this gift of reason, we can assess whether our 
experiences fall in line with what we read in scripture; we can discern whether the 
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traditional practices of our faith make sense in our current context and our own 
experience; we can examine our reading of scriptures in light of our tradition and 
experiences. In this way, the Wesleyan Quadrilateral helps us to more fully experience 
God’s divine purpose in our lives and as it affect the social-political conditions of 
ourselves and the others. Wesley’s practical approach is in essence, an appeal to bringing 
the world together in working for the common good, in a universalistic and 
communitarian worldview, as articulated by Martha Nussbaum, in her case against 
patriotism as well as other vices such as ethnocentrism, in favor of a universalistic 
allegiance “to the worldwide community of human beings.”117  
Moreover, the way to apply the Quadrilateral to the current issue of failed state 
and nation-building is a proactive reaction to injustices and crimes against humanity 
committed by governments who failed to protect their people and the international 
neglects those people have endured through the lack of will by the international 
communities.  
When Jesus was asked about the most important commandment– written in the 
canonical Gospels–he cites Leviticus 19:18, saying that we should not only love God but 
that we should love our neighbors in the same way that we love ourselves. In Luke, Jesus 
follows with the parable of the Good Samaritan–who reason and tradition tell us would 
have been considered in that context to have been stranger and an outcast–who acts out of 
love and compassion. In the Gospel of John, Jesus gives the disciples a new 
commandment: to love each other just as Jesus has loved them.   
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As I reason through these scriptures, I assert that one of the core values of the 
Christian faith is love. Is it possible to love our brothers and sisters in Christ if we are 
more concerned about selective issues like abortion, homosexuality, and the ordination of 
women than the full restoration of love, hope, justice, and the common good of the down 
trodden, the  brokenhearted and those living in failed states? I don’t think so. Further, the 
same chapter of Leviticus also adds, “When an alien resides with you in your land, you 
shall not oppress the alien. The alien who resides with you shall be to you as the citizen 
among you; you shall love the alien as yourself, for you were aliens in the land of 
Egypt.”118  
This passage reminds us of the Israelites in Egypt and Babylon. The people of 
God have been aliens in strange lands, and tradition reminds us of inhumane treatment, 
murder, and the unyielding injustice of those who have been under such oppression. I am 
also reminded of my family and people’s own history in the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade 
in which John Wesley poignantly wrote, 
If, therefore, you have any regard to justice, (to say nothing of mercy, nor 
the revealed law of God,) render unto all their due. Give liberty to whom 
liberty is due, that is, to every child of man, to every partaker of human 
nature… Be gentle toward all men; and see that you invariably do unto 
every one as you would he should do unto you.
119
 
 
Moreover, experience teaches me that we have been called to Koinonia, a place of 
active participation in the world. In my experience, this participation is not only a place 
for my immediate family and next door neighbors, but a place for security, stability, and 
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peace for all of people. It is a place of diversity made whole by our common human 
dignity and stewardship of God’s creation. This socio-political action is rooted on the 
experience, tradition, drawn from Scripture, and tested through our sense of reasoning—
acknowledging that we live in tensions and must find a balance approach to dealing with 
social, political, economic or religious issues that confront or challenge us all. 
 Therefore, putting Niebuhr’s argument into my own words, I maintain that every 
global citizen has a duty to try to form an intelligent opinion on every social, political, 
economic, and cultural issues of our world—knowing that the world we live in ought to 
be approached from realism, in which reason, experience, tradition and Scripture are 
interplayed. It’s a world informed by two forms of laws that correlate with our God given 
purpose—namely the natural law (natural justice) and the theological virtues of faith, 
hope, and love (original justice).
120
 This is the way we ought to be and do—that is, 
challenged to approximate justice; to do good to and for our neighbors and the strangers; 
and to work for the common good of all people, even in the midst of our own self-
interest. 
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